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ABSTRACT 
Kamden Alison Hayashi:  Time Preference and HIV Risk Behavior in Kenya and Malawi 
(Under the direction of Suzanne Maman) 
 
Background:  Time preference describes the extent to which individuals discount future 
outcomes when comparing them with more immediate outcomes.  Studies suggest that discounting of 
future health is associated with health risk behavior.  No studies have examined the association 
between time preference and HIV risk behavior in sub-Saharan Africa.   
Dissertation aims assessed the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior, 
examined whether marital status, sex, and present-bias (i.e., poor self-control) modified this association, 
and investigated whether individuals’ time preferences influenced their own and their spouse’s odds of 
having extramarital sex.  Three theoretical perspectives informed the study aims: traditional economics, 
behavioral economics, and interdependence theory.   
Methods:  I conducted two cross-sectional studies using survey data from parent studies in 
Kenya and Malawi.  First, I used logistic regression to analyze data from men in Kenya (n=1891) and men 
and women in Malawi (n=3054).  Second, I used dyadic analysis to analyze data from married and 
cohabitating couples in Malawi (n=869).   
Results:  In Kenya, men with high discount rates had significantly higher odds of being 
uncircumcised at baseline (marginally significant), having multiple sexual partners, drinking alcohol 
during a normal week and not using condoms at last sex, compared with men with low discount rates.  
Present bias significantly moderated the association between time preference and not using condoms at 
last sex.  In Malawi, high discount rates were significantly associated with higher odds of refusing post-
survey HIV testing.  Wives whose husbands had high discount rates, compared with low discount rates, 
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had significantly higher odds of perceiving their husbands had extramarital sex.  In couples with 
heterogeneous discount rates, wives had significantly higher odds of perceiving their husbands had 
extramarital sex.   Multiple non-significant associations between high discounting and HIV risk behavior 
were found in both countries. 
Conclusion:  Findings suggest that greater discounting of future outcomes is associated with 
higher odds of some HIV risk behaviors at the individual-level and couples-level.   Discount rates could 
be used to identify individuals who may need additional behavior change support.  Providing small, 
immediate incentives for adopting healthier behaviors or encouraging greater future-orientation may be 
helpful. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Dissertation Overview 
HIV incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa declined over the past decade, but the region still accounts 
for 70% of all new HIV infections worldwide, with 1.5 million people newly infected in 2013  (UNAIDS, 
2014a).  To reduce these numbers, interventions that address HIV risk behavior will continue to play a 
central role in nations’ HIV prevention strategies. 
Much of our current understanding of the individual-level determinants of HIV risk behavior is 
based on research from health behavior and psychology.  Somewhat overlooked are potentially relevant 
concepts from economics, which could provide additional insight into the persistence of these 
behaviors.   This study addresses this gap by exploring the relationship between time preference and 
HIV-risk behavior at the individual-level and couples-level.  Time preference refers to the preference for 
immediate rewards over delayed rewards when making decisions in which the two tradeoff  (Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  The decision to engage in HIV risk 
behavior represents this type of choice, since the “benefits” of risk behavior are immediate (ex: 
convenience of not using condoms, enjoyment of having multiple sexual partners), while the potential 
health consequences of contracting HIV may be delayed by years.  The extent to which individuals prefer 
immediate rewards is traditionally expressed as a discount rate, which is the percent by which 
individuals undervalue rewards that they must wait to enjoy.  Higher discount rates imply a stronger 
preference for immediate rewards and a weaker regard for future outcomes.    
The central hypothesis of this study is that individuals with high discount rates will have higher 
odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior, compared with individuals with low discount rates.  A secondary 
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hypothesis is that, within married couples, individuals with high discount rates, or whose spouse has 
high discount rates, will have higher odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior.   These hypotheses were 
addressed in the study aims:   
Aim 1:  Examine the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  
Aim 2:  Assess the extent to which marital status, sex, and inconsistent discounting (i.e., present-
bias) moderate the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior. 
Aim 3:  Examine the extent to which husband and wives’ time preferences influence their own 
and their spouse’s odds of extramarital sex and odds of perceiving that their partner is engaging 
in extramarital sex.   
The study aims were addressed by analyzing secondary data from separate studies in Kenya and 
in Malawi.  Analyses were cross-sectional.  The Kenya data is from the baseline survey of a voluntary 
medical male circumcision (VMMC) trial in the Nyanza Province of Kenya in 2013 (Thirumurthy et al., 
2014).  The Malawi data is from the 2006 wave of the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health 
(MLSFH), a longitudinal cohort study initiated in 1998 (Kohler et al., 2015a).   The specific HIV risk 
behaviors examined were:  having multiple sexual partners in the past 12 months and alcohol use during 
an average week (Kenya and Malawi); being uncircumcised, condom not used at last sex, and not 
previously tested for HIV (Kenya only); and concurrent sexual partners, infrequent condom use, and 
refusal of post-survey HIV testing (Malawi only).   
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation.  Chapter 2 
further discusses the concept of time preference, presents the theoretical perspectives informing the 
study aims, and reviews past empirical research on time preference and health behavior.  Chapter 3 
presents the study methods.  Chapter 4 presents the first dissertation paper, which explores the 
association between time preference and HIV risk behavior among individuals in Kenya and Malawi 
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(aims 1 and 2).  Chapter 5 presents the second dissertation paper, which explores how individuals’ time 
preferences influence the odds of engaging in extramarital sex and perceiving that their spouse is 
engaged in extramarital sex (aim 3).  Chapter 6 summarizes study results, reviews the study strengths 
and limitations, and discusses implications for future research. 
4 
CHAPTER 2:  BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter first provides a more detailed introduction to the concept of time preference.   It 
then reviews the theoretical perspectives guiding the study aims.  Finally, it reviews past research on 
time preference and health, highlighting gaps in the literature that this dissertation seeks to address. 
2.1 Time Preference 
Empirical studies show that people are impatient.  When given the choice between a smaller, 
immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward, all else being equal, most people would prefer the 
immediate reward  (Frederick et al., 2002; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  For example, if given the choice 
between $100 now and $120 in one month, many of us would prefer $100 now.  We “discount” the 
value of the larger $120 reward because we must wait to enjoy it.   Many health decisions involve these 
types of “intertemporal” tradeoffs.  We must eat healthily, go to the gym, and get regular health 
screenings in the present, to enjoy robust health in the future.   
Time preference is an individual characteristic that is theorized to govern the relative weight 
individuals assign to immediate versus delayed rewards.  Rewards can be tangible (ex: money) or 
intangible (ex: time, convenience).  More formally, time preference refers to the preference for delayed 
utility over immediate utility, utility being a measure of happiness or well-being  (Frederick et al., 2002; 
O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  As noted earlier, time preference is often described using the concept of 
“discount rates,” which is the percent by which individuals undervalue delayed rewards when 
comparing them to immediate rewards.  Individuals with higher discount rates have a stronger 
preference for immediate rewards compared to individuals with lower discount rates.  While it is 
possible to estimate an individual’s exact discount rate, more often studies use the concept of 
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discounting to describe how strong someone’s preference for immediate rewards is relative to others 
(ex: “she discounts the future to a greater extent than he does”).   
 Time preference and similar concepts have been widely studied in different academic fields 
including economics (“time preference”), psychology (“delay discounting,”  “delay of gratification” – a 
concept made famous by Mischel and colleagues’ marshmallow test), sociology (“time perspective,” 
“deferred gratification pattern”), and health communications (“concern for future consequences”).    
Few studies have examined the extent to which these similar constructs overlap, and research within 
each field remains fairly isolated (A. Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2011).   For clarity, this 
study draws primarily from the economic literature on time preference.  Other public health researchers 
have adopted this approach, and there is now a growing body of research on time preference and health 
behavior.   This approach is also consistent with study measures that are economic-based. 
 Time preference is traditionally theorized to be a fixed characteristic (Dietrich & List, 2013). 
There is evidence that time preferences predict lifetime outcomes, indicating their long-term stability 
(Golsteyn, Grönqvist, & Lindahl, 2014).  One study which took repeated measures of individuals’ time 
preferences found little change over a two year period (Meier & Sprenger, 2015).  Animal models show 
that other species also discount future outcomes, suggesting that it is a fundamental aspect of decision-
making (Amy L. Odum, 2011; Amy L Odum, 2011).   However, other scholars contend that time 
preferences can be modified through education and other measures  (G. S. Becker & Mulligan, 1997).  
There is evidence that shocks, such as natural disasters, can result in people having greater concern for 
their immediate well-being years after such events  (Cassar, Healy, & von Kessler, 2017).  Other research 
suggests that time preferences may change depending on context or domain.  For example, individuals 
might discount their future health substantially more than they do future monetary rewards.  
Collectively, the empirical evidence suggests that time preferences are a relatively stable characteristic 
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that can be used to predict behavior, although this association can be attenuated by a range of other 
factors that also influence decision-making. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Theory of Health Capital 
Grossman’s theory of health capital (Grossman, 1972, 1999) provides the theoretical rationale 
for examining time preference as a potential determinant of HIV risk behavior.  The theory is based on 
the theory of human capital by economist Gary Becker (Gary S Becker, 1962, 1993).  Health is 
characterized as an asset that has inherent value, since being healthy feels good, as well as instrumental 
value, since good health allows us to do other things, such as earn income  (Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 
2016; Gilleskie, 2008).  Individuals can choose to invest in their health by spending money on healthcare 
and by adopting health promoting behaviors and avoiding health risk behaviors.  Viewed from this 
perspective, the decision to engage in HIV risk behavior represents an investment decision.  Individuals 
must decide whether the costs of the investment (ex: inconvenience of using condoms, only having one 
sexual partner) are worth the long term benefit of reducing their risk of contracting HIV and developing 
AIDS.  The theory of health capital suggests that individuals’ time preferences will shape health 
investments, just as they do financial investments.   It might therefore be expected that individuals who 
discount their future health to a greater extent will be more likely to engage in HIV risk behavior, 
compared with individuals who discount their future health to a lesser extent. 
In order to explore the specific way time preference potentially influences the decision to 
engage in HIV risk behavior, it is useful to draw on additional concepts from traditional economics, 
behavioral economics, and interdependence theory.  Each of these theoretical perspectives provides 
somewhat different accounts of how time preference affects choice.  The three perspectives are 
explored in the study aims.   
7 
Aim 1:  Traditional Economic Perspective 
Aim 1 examines the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  This aim 
represents the traditional economic perspective.  This perspective is based on the discounted utility 
model, which assumes that individuals’ intertemporal choices – or choices that involve tradeoffs 
between more immediate and delayed rewards – are governed by a single, constant discount rate 
(Frederick et al., 2002; George Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Samuelson, 1937).   
The assumption of constant discounting means that for any particular choice between an 
immediate and a delayed reward, the extent to which individuals undervalue the delayed reward will 
not change.  Because the relative weight assigned to each reward remains the same, their preference 
for one reward over the other will not change.   Once an individual decides, for example, that the 
immediate costs of using condoms or of getting an HIV test are worth the future health benefit, they will 
not deviate from this decision. 
The assumption of constant discounting is convenient because it means that discount rates can 
be used to make reliable predictions about individuals’ behavior.   Underlying this perspective is the 
assumption that individuals are rational decision-makers.  Rationality in this context means that 
“individuals make optimal decisions based on their information, resources and preferences” (Krugman, 
2007; Levin & Milgrom, 2004; McFadden, 1999; Simon, 1955).   
The assumption that individuals have constant discount rates distinguishes the discounted utility 
model from the perspective explored in aim 2.   Constant discounting is also referred to in the literature 
as having “time-consistent preferences” or engaging in “exponential discounting,” since “for each unit of 
time that constitutes the delay to delivery, the value of a reward decreases or is discounted by a fixed 
proportion” (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Kirby, 1997).   
The discounted utility model was designed to make the study of decision-making more tractable 
by only including its most essential elements.  Although critics argue that the model is over simplified 
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and lacks descriptive validity, it continues to be the standard framework used by economists and others 
to study decisions that involve costs and benefits that occur at different points in time (Frederick et al., 
2002; Soman et al., 2005).  It is therefore worth investigating how well the model predicts the decision 
to engage in HIV risk behavior.  Rational choice models also continue to be highly influential across the 
social sciences.     
Aim 2:  Behavioral Economic Perspective  
Aim 2 examines the extent to which marital status, sex, and inconsistent discounting, also 
known as “present bias,” moderates the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  
Aim 2 represents the behavioral economic perspective, which draws on theory from economics and 
psychology to better understand behavior.   Rather than individuals having constant discount rates, as is 
assumed in traditional economics, behavioral economics contends that individuals have discount rates 
that change.  Changing discount rates imply that the relative weight individuals’ assign to immediate and 
delayed rewards is variable, and can result in their altering their preference for one reward over the 
other.   As a result, individuals will sometimes change their minds and not always follow through with 
previously made plans.  Proponents of this model of decision-making argue that it more accurately 
describes how people behave in the real world.   We often make plans to adopt future-oriented 
behaviors (implying low discount rates), but later fail to follow through (implying higher discount rates).   
We say we want to start going to the gym, but later find every excuse not to go.  We pledge to stop 
eating unhealthy foods, but have trouble saying no to dessert.    
Underlying this perspective is the assumption that individuals are not perfectly rational, but 
instead can be influenced by cognitive biases which lead to systematic errors of judgment (Ariely, 2008; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).   “Present bias” is the particular 
cognitive bias responsible for the “preference reversals” just described.  Individuals who display present 
bias tend to be more future-oriented, and thus have lower discount rates, when making plans about 
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their future behavior, but become much more present-oriented, and thus have higher discount rates, 
when the time to act on these plans arrives in the present.   These changes are considered to be errors 
of judgement because they prevent individuals from adopting behaviors they know to be in their best 
interest.  Present bias has previously been equated with poor self-control.  With regard to HIV risk 
behavior, individuals with present bias engage in these behaviors not because they undervalue their 
future health, but rather because they lack the willpower to abstain from these behaviors.   Viewed from 
this perspective, HIV risk behavior is not due to excessive discounting, as the traditional economic 
perspective suggests, but rather to inconsistent discounting brought on by a lack of self-control. 
Analytically, the behavioral economics perspective suggests that, due to poor self-control, there 
is a subset of future-oriented individuals who will not behave as predicted.  In order to identify these 
individuals, and more accurately predict their behavior, researchers must measure individuals’ discount 
rates at least twice, once in the near term and once in the far term.  Individuals are deemed to display 
present bias if they have low discount rates in the far term (which suggests an underlying tendency to be 
future-oriented), but have high discount rates in the near term(which suggests self-control problems in 
the present).  Inconsistent discounting is referred to in the literature as displaying “present bias, having 
“time-inconsistent preferences” or engaging in “hyperbolic discounting,” since “for each unit of time 
that constitutes the delay to delivery, the reward’s present value decreases by an increasingly smaller 
proportion,” following a hyperbolic function (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Kirby, 1997).   
Determining whether HIV risk behavior is due to excessive discounting (traditional economics) 
or inconsistent discounting (behavioral economics) is important for understanding the cognitive process 
behind these behaviors, as well as for targeting interventions.  If risk behavior is due to excessive 
discounting, interventions which encourage individuals to adopt a more future-oriented outlook may be 
appropriate.  If inconsistent discounting is the cause, interventions to improve self-control, such as 
precommittment devices, may be helpful.  These devices help individuals lock their future selves into 
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desired courses of action.   For example, someone wishing to end a concurrent relationship may plan 
ahead of time to bring a friend with them when they talk with their partner, to ensure they act 
according to plan.   They might also give a friend something valuable, and tell the friend to keep the item 
if they fail to end their concurrent relationship within a certain timeframe.   These types of strategies 
have been effective at bringing about behavior change in U.S. studies (Ariely, 2008; Downs, 
Loewenstein, & Wisdom, 2009; G. Loewenstein, Brennan, & Volpp, 2007).  Because individuals with 
present bias are highly sensitive to costs and rewards that are right in front of them, interventions which 
offer small financial incentives in exchange for adopting healthier behaviors may also be effective, as 
well as interventions which introduce small costs for engaging in risky behaviors, for example, by 
imposing limits on where and when alcohol can be sold (Downs et al., 2009; G. Loewenstein et al., 
2007).  
Aim 3:  Interdependence Theory  
Aim 3 examines how spouses’ time preferences mutually influence one another’s risk behavior.  
This aim represents the perspective exemplified by interdependence theory which emphasizes the 
importance of social interactions and relationship contexts in determining behavior (Kelley, 2003; Kelley 
& Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) .   Although interdependence theory is from social psychology, 
it draws on concepts from economics and game theory, so complements the other two perspectives in 
this paper. 
Traditionally, psychologists and health behavior researchers have focused on selected individual 
characteristics, such as personality traits and perceptions, to explain health behavior.   Interdependence 
theory contends that individuals do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather are influenced by those 
around them.  Marriage is the most significant interpersonal relationship for most adults.   It is therefore 
likely that the marital context shapes the health behaviors of spouses, similar to how the peer context 
influences adolescent health behavior  (Ennett et al., 2006).   
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Interdependence theory is a social exchange theory, which assumes that individuals enter into close 
relationships for mutual benefit.  Within marriage, individuals try to maximize benefits and minimize 
costs, and will consider alternatives to remaining in the marriage.  The theory suggests that through 
ongoing social interactions, spouses become mutually dependent on one another.  As a result, each 
spouse’s behavior is the joint product of their own characteristics and their spouse’s characteristics, as 
well as characteristics of the marriage itself, such as length of marriage or whether individuals have 
heterogeneous or homogenous characteristics. 
The theory suggests that in order to understand why individuals engage in HIV risk behavior, it is 
necessary to consider the joint influence of all three of these factors.  Interdependence theory does not 
make specific predictions about the outcome of spousal interactions, but instead provides a taxonomy 
of “situation structures” or contexts in which decision are made.  The theory suggests that in situations 
that are “temporally extended,” in which spouses make choices that have future consequences, “delay 
of gratification,” a construct similar to time preference, will play a central role in members’ decision-
making (Kelley, 2003; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Van Lange, 2012).   
In practical terms, many new HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa occur within serodiscordant 
married and cohabitating couples.  Understanding the extent to which spouses influence one another’s 
risk behaviors within these relationships is therefore an important priority.   Evidence of spousal 
influence suggests that researchers would benefit from collecting information from both members of a 
married couple, even if their goal is to understand and predict the behavior of only one spouse.  It also 
suggests that couples-based interventions may be more effective than interventions aimed at 
individuals, since both spouses could be enlisted to encourage and maintain healthy behaviors.   With 
regard to extramarital sex, intervening at the couples level, even when only one spouse is having sex 
outside of marriage, could prove to be an effective approach to limiting this behavior.  
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2.3 Review of the Empirical Literature on Time Preference and Health 
Empirical research supports the hypothesis that health risk behavior is driven by both excessive 
discounting and inconsistent discounting  (Story, Vlaev, Seymour, Darzi, & Dolan, 2014).  Time 
preference has been associated with addictive risk behaviors including alcohol use (Bickel, Odum, & 
Madden, 1999; Field, Christiansen, Cole, & Goudie, 2007; Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; 
Petry, 2001; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), smoking (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009; Bickel et al., 1999; 
Brown & Adams, 2013; Goto, Takahashi, Nishimura, & Ida, 2009; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007), and drug 
use (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Kirby & Petry, 2004; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Kollins, 
2003), although a few dissenting studies found no correlation (Khwaja, Silverman, & Sloan, 2007).   
The relationship between time preference and preventive health behaviors is more mixed.  Time 
preference has been negatively associated with breast cancer screening (Levy, Micco, Putt, & 
Armstrong, 2006), physical activity (Chiteji, 2010), hypertension management (Axon, Bradford, & Egan, 
2009), and influenza vaccination (G. B. Chapman & Coups, 1999), although some of these correlations 
were small.  Time preference has also been associated with greater body mass index (BMI) (Dodd, 2014; 
Ikeda, Kang, & Ohtake, 2010; Komlos, Smith, & Bogin, 2004), though some studies found the 
relationship only held for certain populations, such as women (Weller, Cook III, Avsar, & Cox, 2008) or 
African American men (P. K. Smith, Bogin, & Bishai, 2005).  Several studies examined multiple health 
behaviors at once to assess the consistency of the association between time preference and health.   A 
seminal study of time preference and health related outcomes found a small correlation with smoking, 
but no correlation with seat belt use, dental exams, or being overweight (Fuchs, 1980).  Another study 
found that, as predicted, time preference was negatively associated with mammography, prostate 
examinations, dental visits, cholesterol testing, flu shots, physical activity, and smoking, but was not 
correlated with clinical breast exams (Bradford, 2010).  
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Few studies have explored the link between time preference and risky sexual behavior. One 
study of urban youth in the United States (n=1042) found that greater discounting of future outcomes, 
which suggests a more present-oriented outlook, was associated with  ever having had sex, having ever 
had gonorrhea or chlamydia, having sex before age 16 years, having more than one partner in the last 
six months, and having been or currently being pregnant or having impregnated someone. (Chesson et 
al., 2006).  There was no association between greater discounting and having unprotected sex in the 
past six months, although this this measure did not control for the status of the sex partner, so does not 
necessarily indicate risky sex.  Acceptance of an HSV-2 test (Herpes Simplex Virus Type 2) and presence 
of the HSV-2 antibody were also uncorrelated with discounting the future  (Chesson et al., 2006).  
Another study of U.S. college students (n=188) found that individuals who were more future-
oriented were less likely to have ever had sex and reported fewer sexual partners  (Rothspan & Read, 
1996).  More future-oriented respondents were also more likely to try and gain information about their 
partners’ sexual histories, to attempt to stay with one sexual partner, and to refrain from having sex 
with new partners.  The relationship between time preference and condom use, however, was only 
significant for one of the measures used to assess time preference and was non-significant when 
respondents were asked about using condoms specifically as a means of preventing HIV.  This study 
measured respondents’ “time perspective,” a construct similar to time preference, using questions from 
the Stanford Time Perspective Inventory scale.    
Collectively, past research suggests that time preference is a potentially important determinant 
of health behavior, but there are still many gaps in the literature.  Most studies have been conducted in 
high-resource settings, and it is unclear whether results are generalizable to low-resource settings 
where the relationship between time preference and health behavior may differ.  For example, even 
highly future oriented individuals may not avoid risk behavior in the present if contracting HIV is seen as 
being somewhat inevitable or if life expectancy is low.  Subgroup analysis is often overlooked due to 
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small sample sizes, so less is known about whether the association between time preference and health 
behavior varies by sex, race, or other demographic characteristic.  There do not appear to be any studies 
which examine how spouses’ time preferences mutually influence one another’s health behaviors.  Few 
studies have examined the extent to which inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) predicts health 
behavior, in part because this theory is more recent than the traditional perspective.   Finally, only a 
small number of studies have investigated the extent to which time preference is associated with sexual 
risk behavior in the general population.  Additional research that is theoretically informed and uses well-
designed time preference measures may over time contribute to more contextually accurate models of 
the relationship between time preference and health behavior, as well as to a better understanding of 
how this association varies in different resource settings. 
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CHAPTER 3:  STUDY SETTING, AIMS AND METHODS 
 This chapter provides information about background on the study settings and the parent 
studies from which data for these analyses were drawn, the study aims, conceptual models, and 
hypotheses.  It also presents the study samples, measures and analysis plan.    
3.1 Study Setting 
Table 1 provides an overview of the study setting in Kenya and Malawi.  Columns 1 and 2 
contain information about Kenya and the Nyanza region where the data analyzed in this study was 
collected.  Column 3 provides information about Malawi.   







Population 48 million 5.4 million 18 million 
HIV Prevalence 
Adults, aged 15 to 49  
Women, aged 15 to 49  











HIV Incidence  
Adults, aged 15 to 49 
 
Adults aged 15 and over 
 
2.5 per 1000 people 
 




4.15 per 1000 people 
 
32,000 newly infected 
 







(National AIDS and STI Control Programme of Kenya, 2012; UNAIDS, 2016a, 2016b; UNPD, 2017) 
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Kenya Parent Study 
Kenya Setting 
Kenya is located in eastern Africa with a total population of 48 million (UNPD, 2017).  Adult HIV 
prevalence is 5.4%, representing 1.5 million adults living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 2016a).  Adult 
incidence is 2.5 per 1000 people, which represents 56,000 new infections per year  (UNAIDS, 2016a).  
4.8% of married couples in Kenya are serodiscordant  (National AIDS and STI Control Programme of 
Kenya, 2012).  The Nyanza region has the highest adult prevalence in the country, 15.1%  (National AIDS 
and STI Control Programme of Kenya, 2012).     
Rates of voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) remain low in Nyanza province, 
particularly among men in the 25 to 49 year old age group (Galbraith et al., 2014).  Increasing uptake of 
VMMC is an important priority for the Kenyan government, since the procedure has been shown to 
reduce men’s risk of acquiring HIV by 50% to 60% (Auvert et al., 2005; Bailey et al., 2007; Gray et al., 
2007).  Condom use in Kenya is low, with only 19.9% of men and 8.6% of women reporting consistent 
condom use  (National AIDS and STI Control Programme of Kenya, 2012).  Barriers to condom use 
include the perception that condoms are difficult to use, men’s concern that condoms reduce sexual 
pleasure, the belief that God will protect them from HIV, women’s difficulty in negotiating condom use, 
and the desire for children  (Ngure et al., 2012; Volk & Koopman, 2001).   Men (14.2%) were more likely 
than women (2.2%) to report having two or more sexual partners in the past 12 months (National AIDS 
and STI Control Programme of Kenya, 2012).  Having multiple sexual partners is due in part to male 
norms which encourage having more than one partner, as well as to cultural practices such as wife 
inheritance or widow cleansing (Luginaah, Elkins, Maticka-Tyndale, Landry, & Mathui, 2005; Okeyo, 
1998; Perry et al., 2014).  UNAIDS reports that testing rates in Kenya are low, especially among men 
(UNAIDS, 2016a, 2017). 
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 Studies have found high prevalence of alcohol abuse in Kenya, which is partly attributable to the 
high availability and low cost of informal alcohol, which is alcohol brewed in the home (Hall et al., 1993; 
Othieno, Kathuku, & Ndetei, 2000; Papas et al., 2010).  Alcohol use has been associated with a range of 
HIV risk behaviors, including inconsistent condom use, multiple sexual partners, forced sex, and intimate 
partner violence  (Balkus et al., 2016; Fisher, Bang, & Kapiga, 2007; Fisher, Cook, Sam, & Kapiga, 2008; 
Kalichman, Simbayi, Kaufman, Cain, & Jooste, 2007; Maman, Campbell, Sweat, & Gielen, 2000; Morojele 
et al., 2006; Mthembu, Khan, Mabaso, & Simbayi, 2016; Schneider, Chersich, Neuman, & Parry, 2012; 
Sikkema et al., 2011; Zablotska et al., 2006).   
Study Design and Participants 
 
 Uncircumcised men, ages 25 to 49, were randomized to receive small economic incentives to 
obtain no-fee VMMC at designated local clinics.  The purpose of the study was to examine whether 
these incentives could increase uptake of VMMC by reducing possible economic barriers associated with 
VMMC, such as transportation costs and time away from work.  (Thirumurthy et al., 2014)  I analyzed 
data from the baseline survey of this study which was completed by all study participants (n=1891).  
Researchers administered these surveys in-person at participants’ homes between June and December, 
2013.   
The trial was conducted by researchers at the University of North Carolina, in collaboration with 
Impact Research and Development Organization (IRDO), the largest VMMC service organization in 
Kenya.  The project received approval from the Office of Human Research Ethics at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the ethics and research committee at Kenyatta National Hospital, 
University of Nairobi. 
The trial took place in the Nyanza region in western Kenya.  Participants were randomly selected 
using cluster sampling.  Seven out of 76 sublocations (groups of villages) in Nyanza were randomly 
selected with probability proportional to population size.   3,333 men were then randomly selected from 
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a list of all men living in households within each sublocation.   1504 men met the study eligibility criteria 
and were successfully recruited.   The criteria were: self-reported age between 25 and 49 years, self-
reported to be uncircumcised, and no intention to leave the study area in the next 3 months.  Enrolled 
men were administered a baseline questionnaire in their homes.  They were then randomized into one 
of three intervention groups or a control group.  (Thirumurthy et al., 2014) 
Malawi Parent Study 
Malawi Setting 
Malawi is located in southern Africa with a total population of 18 million (UNPD, 2017).  Adult 
HIV prevalence in Malawi is 10.3%, representing 1 million people living with HIV/AIDS  (UNAIDS, 2016b). 
Prevalence among women was 11.2%, compared with 7.1% among men  (UNAIDS, 2016b).  Adult 
incidence is 4.15 per 1000 people, which represents 32,000 new infections per year, primarily due to 
heterosexual transmission  (UNAIDS, 2016b).  The Malawi data that this dissertation analyzed was drawn 
from each of the country’s three regions.  HIV prevalence in these regions varies from 6.6% in the 
Northern region to 7.6% in the Central region and to 14.5% in the Southern region  (Malawi National 
Statistical Office and ICF Macro, 2010).   
23.5% of men and 0.7% of women with two or more sexual partners in the past 12 months 
reported using a condom at last sex (Malawi National Statistical Office and ICF Macro, 2010).  Husbands 
and wives preferred promoting fidelity within marriage over condom use, despite being aware of the 
potential HIV risk posed by their partner.  Outside of marriage, condom use can signal to a partner that 
there is a fear of contracting disease and that the relationship is transactional  (Chimbiri, 2007).  9.2% of 
men and 0.8% of women reported having had two or more sexual partners in the past 12 months  
(Malawi National Statistical Office and ICF Macro, 2010).  7.3% of men and 0.3% of women report 
concurrent sexual partnerships in the past 12 months.   Concurrent sexual partnerships are associated 
with higher HIV prevalence among both men (11.8%) and women (31.8%) who have ever had sex and 
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who were tested for HIV.  Qualitative research shows that dissatisfaction with primary partnerships is an 
important driver of multiple and concurrent sexual partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
dissatisfaction can be related to lack of communication, domestic discord, lack of romance, and a desire 
for other partners (Shelton, 2009; Soul City Institute Regional Programme, 2008; Watkins, 2004).  In 
Malawi, specifically, concurrent sexual partnerships may be facilitated by the perception that having 
concurrent partners is common and that polygamy is consistent with tradition (Rupali J. Limaye, 
Babalola, Kennedy, & Kerrigan, 2013).  70% of people who are living with HIV know their status (UNAIDS, 
2016b).  28.3% and 10.6% of male and female Malawians, respectively, ages 15 and older, reported 
using alcohol in the past 12 months in 2010  (World Health Organization (WHO), 2014).  Malawi’s 
National Alcohol Taskforce Committee (NATC) reported that, as in Kenya, the consumption of informal 
alcohol is pervasive in rural areas because of its low price (R. J. Limaye, Rutkow, Rimal, & Jernigan, 
2014).    
Study Design and Participants 
The Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health (MLSFH) is a longitudinal cohort study of 
men and women, ages 15 to 49, residing in three rural districts in Malawi (Kohler et al., 2015a).  The 
purpose of the study is to better understand rural Malawians’ health, family dynamics, social networks 
and HIV-risks  (Kohler et al., 2015a).  The MLSFH was established in 1998 and is ongoing.  Six waves of 
data are publicly available:  1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010.  Approximately 4,000 individuals 
were interviewed in each wave.    I analyzed data from the 2004 and 2006 waves only, since these were 
the only years in which time preference was measured.   
The original 1998 MLSFH sample was comprised of 1,532 randomly selected ever-married 
women, ages 15 to 49, and 1,065 of their male spouses.  Women were selected using a cluster random 
sampling strategy (Kohler et al., 2015a). Three districts, one from each of Malawi’s three regions, were 
selected as study sites:  Rumphi in the north, Mchinji in the center, and Balaka in the south.   145 villages 
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were randomly selected from each district.  Women were randomly selected from a list of all women 
living in households within the study villages.  Women living in smaller villages were oversampled using 
sampling fractions that were inversely proportional to village populations.  The MLSFH samples in 2001, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 included: individuals on the MLSFH roster who had not previously been 
interviewed, returning MLSFH respondents, and new spouses.  In 2004, 984 adolescents, ages 15 to 24, 
were added to the sample to compensate for the aging of the initial cohort and the underrepresentation 
of younger, unmarried individuals.     
Although the MLSFH was not designed to be a representative of Malawi’s rural population, 1998 
MLSFH sample characteristics were similar to the rural population of the 1996 Malawi Demographic and 
Health Survey (MDHS) (Kohler et al., 2015a).  Attrition was due primarily to migration.  Respondents 
who migrated out of the study area, but later returned, were included in subsequent rounds of data 
collection.  Although there was evidence of differential attrition, researchers found that attrition did not 
substantially alter the results of multivariate analysis of HIV-related outcome variables, including 
number of lifetime sexual partners, one of the variables included in this study  (Anglewicz, Adams, 
Obare, Kohler, & Watkins, 2009; Kohler et al., 2015a).  The MLSFH, previously known as the Malawi 
Diffusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP), is administered by the University of Pennsylvania in 
collaboration with the University of Malawi.  The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Pennsylvania and by the College of Medicine Research Ethics Committee 
(COMREC) or the National Health Sciences Research Committee (NHSRC) in Malawi.   
3.2 Study Aims, Conceptual Models and Hypotheses 
Aim 1   
Aim 1 examines the extent to which time preference is associated with HIV risk behavior.  The 
risk behaviors examined are:  having multiple sexual partners in the past 12 months and alcohol use 
during an average week (Kenya and Malawi); being uncircumcised, condom not used at last sex, and not 
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previously tested for HIV (Kenya only); and concurrent sexual partners, infrequent condom use and 
refusal of post-survey HIV testing (Malawi only).   
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model for aim 1 is shown in Figure 1.  Aim 1 represents the traditional economic 
perspective which suggests that individuals have constant discount rates that directly influence 
decisions that involve tradeoffs between immediate and delayed outcomes.  
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Model for Study Aim 1 
Research Question and Hypotheses  
Research Question 1.1:  To what extent is time preference associated with HIV risk behavior? 
Hypothesis 1.1.1:  individuals with high discount rates, who undervalue their future health to a 
greater extent, will be more likely to engage in HIV risk behavior than individuals with low 
discount rates. 
Aim 2  
Aim 2 examines the extent to which marital status, sex (Malawi only) and inconsistent 
discounting (i.e., present bias) (Malawi only) moderates the association between time preference and 
HIV risk behavior.    
Kenya and Malawi 
Multiple sexual partners 
Alcohol use in an average week 
  
Kenya Only 
Uncircumcised at baseline 
Condom not used at last sex 
Not previously tested for HIV 
  
Malawi Only 
Concurrent sexual partners 
Infrequent condom use 








The conceptual model for aim 2 is shown in Figure 2.  This aim is informed by the behavioral 
economic perspective which holds that discount rates are not constant, but rather can change such that 
individuals who generally are future-oriented will temporarily switch to being highly present-oriented, 
resulting in their seizing immediate rewards they had previously chosen to forgo. 
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Model for Study Aim 2 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 2.1:  Do marital status, sex (Malawi only) and inconsistent discounting 
(Malawi only) moderate the relationship between time preference and HIV risk behavior? 
Hypothesis 2.1.1:  Marital status will moderate the positive association between high 
discounting and HIV risk behavior, such that the association will be less positive for individuals 
who are married than for individuals who are unmarried. 
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Hypothesis 2.1.2:  Sex will moderate the positive association between high discounting and HIV 
risk behavior, such that the association will be less positive for women than for men.   
Hypothesis 2.1.3:  Inconsistent discounting will moderate the positive association between high 
discounting and HIV risk behavior, such that the association will be more positive for individuals 
who display inconsistent discounting than those who do not.   In more common terms, 
individuals who demonstrate inconsistent discounting will be more likely to engage in HIV risk 
behavior than individuals with consistently low discount rates.   
Married men and women may constrain each other’s risk behavior, reducing the influence of 
their own time preference on their odds of risk behavior.  Women have less control over their choices, 
particularly those related to HIV risk behaviors (such as condom use), so that their own time preference 
may not be as strongly associated with risk behavior compared to men.   
Aim 3  
Aim 3 examines the extent to which husband and wives’ time preferences influence their own, 
as well as their spouse’s, odds of engaging in extramarital sex and odds of perceiving that the other is 
engaging in extramarital sex.  I will analyze data from a sample of married and cohabitating couple in 
Malawi who participated in the 2006 study wave of the MLSFH. 
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model for aim 3 is shown in Figure 3.  The model has two predictor variables --
wives’ time preference and husbands’ time preference --and two outcome variables -- wives and 
husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex.  A similar model will be used to examine husband and 
wives’ odds of perceiving that their spouse is engaging in extramarital sex.  “Actor effects” are 
represented by the solid arrows pointing from each spouses’ time preference to their own alcohol use.  
“Partner effects” are represented by the dashed arrows pointing from each spouse’s time preference to 
the other spouse’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex.  These effects are estimated simultaneously.   
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This model is based on Kenny’s Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), which captures the 
mutual influence between dyad members.   
 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Model for Study Aim 3 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research question 3.1.  Do individuals’ time preferences influence their own and their spouse’s 
odds of engaging in extramarital sex? 
3.1.1. Individuals with high discount rates will have higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex 
compared with individuals with low discount rates (actor effect).   
3.1.2. Individuals whose spouses have high discount rates will have higher odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex compared with individuals whose spouses have low discount rates (partner 
effect).   
3.1.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex will 
be greater than the effect of wives’ discount rates on husbands’ odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex.   
3.1.4. Husbands and wives will each have higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex if both 
spouses have high discount rates, compared with if only one spouse or neither spouse has high 






Odds of Extramarital sex 
Husbands’ 
Odds of Extramarital sex 
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Research question 3.1.  Do individuals’ time preferences influence the odds of perceiving that their 
spouse is engaging in extramarital sex? 
3.2.1. Individuals with high discount rates will have higher odds of perceiving that their spouse is 
engaging in extramarital sex (actor effect).    
3.2.2. Individuals whose spouses have high discount rates will have higher odds of perceiving 
their spouse is engaging in extramarital sex (partner effect).   
3.2.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on wives’ odds of perceiving husbands are 
engaging in extramarital sex will be greater than the effect of wives’ discount rates on husbands’ 
odds of perceiving their wives are engaging in extramarital sex.   
3.2.4. Husbands and wives will have higher odds of perceiving the other as engaging in 
extramarital sex if both spouses have high discount rates, compared with if only one spouse or 
neither spouse has high discount rates (dyad-level effect).   
3.3 Study Overview 
Table 2 contains an overview of the analytic samples, predictor and outcome variables, and 
methods for the two dissertation papers.  Paper 1 addresses aims 1 and 2.  Paper 2 addresses aim 3.    
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Table 2.  Analytic Samples, Predictor and Outcome Variables, and Methods 













Men and women 





Kenya and Malawi 
Multiple sexual partners 
Alcohol use in an average week 
  
Kenya Only 
Uncircumcised at baseline 
Condom use at last sex 
Not previously tested for HIV 
  
Malawi Only 
Concurrent sexual partners 
Condom use frequency 

















Malawi Only  
Self-reported extramarital sex 
Perception that one’s spouse is 







3.4 Analytic Samples 
Paper 1 
Kenya sample.  1891 men completed the baseline survey of the Kenya study in 2013.  One 
respondent was excluded due to missing covariate data, resulting in a final sample size of 1890 men.  All 
respondents were between 25 and 49 years old. 
Malawi sample.  The analytic sample in Malawi consisted of 3054 respondents, 1688 (55%) women and 
1366 (45%) men.  3255 individuals, ages 15 and older, completed the 2006 MLSFH survey.  I limited the 
sample to respondents between 15 and 64 years of age.  68 respondents were excluded for being 
outside of this age range.   133 respondents were excluded due to missing covariate data.  The 15 to 64 
year old age range has been used in previous studies reporting health statistics in Malawi, including the 
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Malawi DHS and the Malawi Population-based HIV Impact Assessment (PHIA) conducted by Columbia 
University  (ICAP, December 2016).      
Paper 2 
The analytic sample for paper 2 was comprised of 869 currently married or cohabitating couples 
in Malawi.  (For convenience, I refer to all dyads as married couples, and individuals within these dyads 
as spouses.)  Spouses were interviewed separately.    925 currently married or cohabitating couples 
were identified in the 2006 MLSFH sample, in which spouses reported being married to one another, 
were not missing covariate or time preference data, and were between 15 and 64 years old.  50 men 
reported having more than one current or previous wife who was in the sample (44 men had two wives, 
6 men had three wives).   One husband-wife pair from each of these groups was selected at random for 
inclusion in the study, the remaining pairs were dropped, resulting in a final sample of 869 couples.   
3.5 Measures 
Table 3 lists the Kenya and Malawi outcome, covariate and time preference measures in 
adjacent columns.  Some outcomes were measured in both countries, allowing for a more direct 
comparison of study results, while other outcomes were country-specific.  All outcomes were defined as 
dichotomous variables.  To assist in interpreting results, risk behaviors were coded so that “1” indicates 
risk behavior.       
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Based on men’s self-report during 









NA Were you having sex with other partners 
during the time you were having sex with 
[your most recent sexual partner]? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Had more than 
one sexual 
partner in the 
past 12 months 
In total, with how many different people 
have you had sexual intercourse in the 
past 12 months? 
How many sexual partners did you have 








Have you ever taken alcohol? 
[If yes], how many drinks of alcohol 
(bottles, glasses, etc.) do you normally 
have in a week? 
 
0=do not drink in a normal week 
1=one or more drinks in a normal week 
During an average week, would you say 
that: 
 
0=you do not drink in an average week 
1= you drink 1-2 days in an average week 
you drink 3-4 days in an average week 
you drink 5-7 days in an average week 
Infrequent 
condom use in 
the past 12 
months 
NA Have you ever used a condom with [your 
most recent sexual partner]?  [If yes], 
how often did you use a condom with 
[your most recent sexual partner]? 
0=every time, almost every time 
1= never, at the beginning, sometimes 
Condom not 
used at last 
sexual 
intercourse 
The last time you had sexual intercourse, 






survey HIV test  
 
NA Refusal recorded by VCT counselors who 




NA=respondent not located  
Not previously 
tested for HIV  
I do not want to know the results of the 
test, but have you ever been tested to see 
if you have HIV? 
[Being previously tested for HIV was not 
included as an outcome in Malawi due to 
an intervention carried out on the MLSFH 
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 cohort in 2004 which may have 
influenced respondents’ decisions to be 
tested]  (Thornton, 2008).    





NA During your time together, did you have 
a boyfriend/girlfriend, or did you have 
sex with someone other than [your most 
recent spouse]?   
 
Did you have other sexual partners 
during the time you were in a sexual 
relationship with [your most recent 
spouse]? 
 
1=”yes” to one or both questions 
0=”no” to both questions 
Perception that 





NA Women’s measure:  During your time 
married together, did [your spouse] have 
a girlfriend, or did he have sex with 





Men’s measure:  During your time 
married together, did [your spouse] have 
a boyfriend, or did she have sex with 







What is your age? How old are you? 
Sex NA Determined by study administrators 
during recruitment.  Men and women 
were given surveys tailored to each sex. 
Marital Status What is your current marital status? 
0=married 
1=never married, separated, divorced, 
widowed 
 
What is your current marital status? 
0=married 
1=never married, separated, divorced, 
widowed 
 
Education Have you attended any school?  
What is the highest level of school you 
have attended?   
 
Dummy coded: 
What is the last grade that you 
successfully passed? 




0= no schooling or some primary 
education   
1= primary education completed 
2= some secondary or completed 
secondary education and above 
0=no schooling or some primary 
education 
1= primary education completed 
2= some secondary or completed 
secondary education and above  
Wealth 
(continuous) 
Additive index of 11 household items, 
rescaled to 0 to 1 continuous variable: 
 








Motorcycle or scooter 
Car or truck 
Boat 
Additive index of 16 household items, 
rescaled to 0 to 1 continuous variable: 
 
Bed with mattress 
Sofa set 
Table and chair(s) 











ESCOM electricity or generator 
Metal roof 




1=Rumphi (north)  
2=Mchinji (central) 







Time Preference in the Near Term: 
Suppose that you have just won a prize 
that will give you a series of payments 
over time.  You can select the prize from 
two options.  Please indicate your 
preferred prize.  Imagine that the person 
giving you the money is someone you 




Do you prefer:   
100 Shillings today or 200 Shillings in one 
month? 
100 Shillings today or 300 Shillings in one 
month? 
 
Set 1:    
Now I want to ask you some questions 
about a hypothetical situation. Suppose 
you have earned 500 Kwacha for work 
that you have done for a trustworthy 
neighbor during the last week. The 
neighbor gives you an option for how 
he pays you for this work. One option is 
that you get paid today. The alternative 
option will be to get a slightly higher 
payment in a month from now. 
 
Would you prefer: 
310 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 1 
week? 
330 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 2 
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100 Shillings today or 400 Shillings in one 
month? 
100 Shillings today or 175 Shillings in one 
month? 
100 Shillings today or 150 Shillings in one 
month? 
100 Shillings today or 125 Shillings in one 
month? 





Set 2:    
Please indicate your preferred prize.  
Imagine that the person giving you the 






Do you prefer:  
100 shillings in one month or 200 shillings 
in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 300 Shillings 
in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 400 Shillings 
in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 175 Shillings 
in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 150 Shillings 
in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 125 Shillings 
in two months? 




410 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 3 
weeks? 
540 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 1 
month? 
550 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 2 
months? 
670 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 4 
months? 
690 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 3 
months? 
780 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 5 
months? 




Set 2:      
Next, I am going to ask you the same 
questions again, with one important 
difference. I will no longer ask you about 
receiving money now compared with 
receiving money later. Instead, I will ask 
you about receiving money 2 months 
from now compared with receiving 
money at a time more than 2 months 
from now.   
 
Would you prefer: 
 310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 2 months plus 1 week? 
780 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha 
in 7 months? 
540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha 
in 3 months? 
670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 6 months? 
550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 4 months? 
690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 5 months? 
410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 2 months plus 3 weeks? 
800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 7 months? 
330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha 




Outcomes measured in Kenya and Malawi.   Having more than one sexual partner was assessed 
with the questions, “In total, with how many different people have you had sexual intercourse in the 
past 12 months?” in Kenya, and “How many sexual partners did you have in the past 12 months?” in 
Malawi.    Having only one partner was the reference.   Used alcohol in a normal or average week was 
measured in Kenya with the questions, “Have you ever taken alcohol?” and “How many drinks of alcohol 
(bottles, glasses, etc.) do you normally have in a week?”   In Malawi, respondents were asked: “During 
an average week, would you say that:” (0=“you do not drink in an average week” or “you have never 
drank alcohol,” 1=“you drink 1-2 days in an average week,” 2=“you drink 3-4 days in an average week,” 
3=“you drink 5-7 days in an average week”).  The reference was “does not consume alcohol in a normal 
or average week.” 
Kenya-specific outcomes. Being uncircumcised at baseline was based on men’s self-report to 
study administrators when they were assessed for eligibility to join the Kenya parent study.  
Circumcision status was based on men’s self-reports.  The reference is men who were circumcised at 
baseline, and who had undergone the procedure when they were 15 years and older, which increased 
the chance that they themselves made the decision to be circumcised, rather than their parents.  Men 
circumcised at baseline who had the procedure when younger than 15 years, or who could not 
remember the age at which they were circumcised, were excluded.  Condom not used at last sexual 
intercourse was measured with the question, “The last time you had sexual intercourse, was a condom 
used?”  The reference was “did use a condom.”   Not previously tested for HIV was assessed by asking, “I 
do not want to know the results of the test, but have you ever been tested to see if you have HIV?”  
Being previously tested for HIV was the reference. 
Malawi-specific outcomes.  Having concurrent sexual partners was measured by asking 
respondents who reported having at least one sexual partner in the past 12 months, “Were you having 
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sex with other partners during the time you were having sex with [your most recent sexual partner]?”  
The reference was not having sex with other partners.  Infrequent condom use was assessed with the 
questions, “Have you ever used a condom with [your most recent sexual partner]?  [If yes], how often 
did you use a condom with [your most recent sexual partner]?”  (1=”never,” 2=”at the beginning,” 
3=”sometimes,” 4=”almost every time,” 5=”every time.”)  The reference was using condoms “almost 
every time” or “every time.”  Refusal of post-survey HIV testing was recorded by MLSFH voluntary 
counseling and testing (VCT) counsellors.  Acceptance of testing was the reference.  Respondents who 
could not be located and offered testing were excluded.  Following completion of the 2006 survey, VCT 
counselors attempted to contact all 2006 survey respondents.  2,662 (87%) respondents were located 
and offered home-based rapid HIV testing  (Obare et al., 2009).  208 (8%) refused and 2445 (92%) 
accepted.  98% of those who accepted testing learned their test results that day (Kohler et al., 2015a).  
Married respondents living with their spouses were offered couples HIV testing and counselling (HTC).  
Individual HTC was offered to unmarried individuals and to married individuals if their spouse was 
absent or their spouse declined couples HTC (Obare et al., 2009).   In paper 2, respondents were coded 
as engaging in extramarital sex if they answered “yes” to either of the following questions:  “During your 
time together, did you have a boyfriend/girlfriend, or did you have sex with someone other than [your 
most recent spouse]?,” and “Did you have other sexual partners during the time you were in a sexual 
relationship with [your most recent spouse]?“  Not engaging in extramarital sex was the reference.    For 
married women, the perception that their husband was engaging in extramarital sex was indicated if 
respondents answered “yes” to the following question: “During your time married together, did [your 
spouse] have a girlfriend, or did he have sex with someone else apart from you and his other 
wife/wives?”  Married men were asked: “During your time married together, did [your spouse] have a 
boyfriend, or did she have sex with someone else apart from you?”  “Not” perceiving spousal 
extramarital sex was the reference.   
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Covariate Measures   
Demographic covariates were age, marital status, education, and wealth.  Sex and region were 
additional covariates in Malawi.  Age was coded as a continuous variable in units of five years.  Marital 
status was defined as a dichotomous variable.  Married was the reference.   A majority of respondents in 
the Kenya and Malawi samples were married, and I wanted the constant in logistic regression models to 
refer to the odds of HIV risk behavior for married individuals (who also belonged to the other reference 
categories).   Unmarried included never married, divorced, and widowed.  Education was defined as a 
categorical variable with three levels: no education or some primary, completed primary education, and 
some secondary education and above.  The reference was no education or some primary.   Sex was a 
dichotomous variable, with male as the reference.  Region was a categorical variable; southern region 
was the reference.  Wealth was coded as a continuous variable and was measured in both Kenya and 
Malawi using asset indices.  Respondents were given a list of 11 household items in Kenya, and 16 items 
in Malawi, and asked to indicate which items they owned.  Their wealth index score was the number of 
items they owned, rescaled to a 0 to 1 continuous variable.     
Time Preference Measures and Variable Construction 
Measures  
The Kenya and Malawi studies each measured time preference following a procedure frequently 
found in the literature.  Respondents were asked to choose between a series of smaller, sooner prizes 
and larger, delayed prizes.   All prizes were hypothetical, monetary sums.  Respondents were asked to 
choose between the same series of prizes twice, once in a time frame close to the present (“near term”) 
and once in a time frame further in the future (“far term”).   The full set of questions used to assess time 
preferences in Kenya and Malawi are shown in Table 3.  Prizes converted to U.S. dollars are shown in 
Appendix A.  Example questions from Kenya were: 
1. Would you prefer 100 shillings today, or 200 shillings in one month?  (Near term) 
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2. Would you prefer 100 shillings in one month, or 200 shillings in two months?  (Far term) 
Subsequent questions varied the size of the delayed reward until respondents switched from 
preferring the smaller, sooner prize to the larger, later prize, or vice versa.   The purpose of this exercise 
was to identify respondents’ “indifference point,” which is the amount of money they would need to be 
offered after a one month delay, in order for them to be indifferent between that reward and 100 
shillings today.  These indifference points were then used to estimate the range in which individuals’ 
discount rates were likely to fall.  Individuals had higher discount rates (i.e., undervalued their future 
reward to a greater extent) if they required a larger delayed reward in order be indifferent between that 
reward and the 100 shillings today. (For the far term questions, the indifference point would be the 
amount of money they would need in two months, in order to be indifferent between that reward and 
100 shillings in one month.)    
Consistent with some past studies, the far term discount rate measure was interpreted as 
representing respondents’ “true” time preferences, and was used as the primary predictor variable in 
the study analysis  (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006).  The near term measure was used to assess whether 
individuals displayed inconsistent discounting (i.e., present-bias.)  If respondents’ discount rates were 
“low” in the far term, but “high” in the near term, they were categorized as demonstrating inconsistent 
discounting.  Inconsistent discounting was defined as a dichotomous variable.  The reference was having 
consistently “low” discount rates in both the near and far term.  
The Malawi survey followed a similar format as Kenya.  Respondents were asked to choose 
between a series of hypothetical monetary prizes in the near term (ex: do you prefer 800 Kwacha now 
or 850 Kwacha in 5 months?), and then again in the far term (ex: do you prefer 800 Kwacha in two 
months or 850 Kwacha in 7 months?)   As was the case in Kenya, the far term measure represented 
respondents’ “true” time preference, the main predictor in the study analysis.  The near term measure 
was used to assess whether respondents displayed inconsistent discounting. 
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Variable Construction 
The Kenya and Malawi time preference variables were dichotomized for study analysis.   I chose 
to dichotomize these variables so that the study results would be clearer and easier to interpret, to 
ensure that there were a sufficient number of cases in each level of these variables, and to facilitate 
comparison of the Kenya and Malawi results.   Because the two countries used different questions to 
assess time preference, the response categories did not correspond.  Dichotomizing the variable made it 
possible to divide respondents in each country into high and low discount rate groups that were roughly 
comparable.   Respondents were categorized as having “high” discount rates if their estimated discount 
rate was greater than 1663% per year in Kenya, and greater than 2303% per year in Malawi.  “Low” 
discount rates were the reference.    
These percentages were only use to dichotomize the time preference variables and were not 
used in the study analysis.  As reference, these percentages indicate the amount by which a smaller 
prize today would need to be multiplied by in order for respondents to be indifferent between that 
smaller prize and the multiplied reward in one year.  For example, in Kenya, having a discount rate of 
1663% implies that an individual is indifferent between $1 today and $1663 in one year.  So another way 
of describing how individuals were divided into “high” and “low” discounting groups is that individuals 
who were indifferent between $1 today and some amount less than $1663 in one year were considered 
to have “low” discount rates, while those who were indifferent between $1 and some amount greater 
than $1663 in one year were deemed to have “high” discount rates.   
Cut-points for categorizing respondents as having “high” discount rates in the two countries 
(greater than 1663% per year in Kenya, and greater than 2303% per year in Malawi) were selected after 
observing the distribution of responses to the Kenya and Malawi time preference questions.  These 
criteria resulted in 55% of respondents in Kenya having “high” discount rates, but only 15% of 
respondents in Malawi being designated as having “high” discount rates.  The small size of this group 
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limited statistical power, and ruled out some moderation analyses due to insufficient numbers of 
respondents who had “high” discount rates.   I chose to retain the criteria that produced these groups 
because I wanted the Kenya and Malawi time preference variables to be similar, to allow for comparison 
of country results, and the cut-points chosen were two of the closest available.  In addition, 72% of 
Malawi respondents had estimated discount rates that were tightly clustered near the middle of the 
sample distribution.  Rather than splitting this cluster, which may have produced “high” and “low” 
discounting groups with low contrast in terms of discounting and HIV risk behavior, I instead chose to 
designate the 15% of respondents who had discount rates greater than those in the cluster as having 
“high” discount rates, while the remaining respondents had “low” discount rates.  Details on the full 
distribution of responses to the Kenya and Malawi time preference questions, and how responses to 
these questions were converted to discount rates, are shown in Appendix A. 
In order to conduct the analysis for paper 2, I needed to select a different cut-point for 
dichotomizing the Malawi time preference that was less unbalanced.  I chose the point that most evenly 
divided respondents into “high” and “low” discounting groups.  Respondents in the four highest 
discount rate groups were coded as having “high” discount rates.  This dividing point represented having 
an annual discount rate of roughly 472% or higher.  This estimated rate is only reported for reference 
and was not used in the study analyses.  One drawback of dichotomizing the Malawi variable using 
different criteria in papers 1 and 2 is that the results from these papers are not directly comparable.   
3.6 Analysis Plan  
Paper 1 
I explored the main effects of time preference on HIV risk behavior, as well as the potentially 
moderating effects of marital status (Kenya and Malawi), sex (Malawi only) and inconsistent discounting 
(i.e., present bias) (Malawi only).  The Kenya and Malawi samples were analyzed separately due to 
differences in how time preference and other variables were measured.   Logistic regression was used to 
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analyze data from Kenya, with standard errors clustered by village.  Logistic regression with, and 
standard errors clustered by, family (marital, sibling or parent-child ties), were used to analyze data 
from Malawi.   
I fit unadjusted and adjusted models for each outcome.  Adjusted models controlled for age, 
marital status, wealth, and education in Kenya and Malawi, as well as sex and region in Malawi.  
Continuous variables were demeaned.  Moderation was tested by interacting each potential moderator 
with time preference.  I was not able to test each moderator with every outcome in Malawi due to 
insufficient numbers of cases for some interaction categories.  Statistical analysis was performed using 
Stata version 14.2 (StataCorp).  A subset of the Kenya sample (n=1504) was used in a four arm 
intervention trial which suggests that the analytic sample in this study (n=1896) was sufficient for the 
analysis (Thirumurthy et al., 2014). 
Paper 2 
I used dyadic analysis to estimate the effect of husbands and wives’ time preferences on each 
spouse’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex.  Dyadic analysis treats individuals as being nested within 
dyads, which accounts for possible non-independence between spouses in both time preferences and 
their likelihood of having extramarital sex  (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  Dyads or couples were the unit of 
analysis.  I used Kenny’s Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM) to model actor and partner 
effects for husbands and wives within the same dyad  (David A Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006; David A. 
Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).   This model is illustrated in Figure 4, with the corresponding parameters 
listed in Table 4.   Separate models were estimated for the two study outcomes of engaging in 
extramarital sex and perceiving that one’s spouse is engaging in extramarital sex. 
The APIM has two predictor variables (wives’ and husbands’ time preferences), and two 
outcome variables (wives and husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex).  Actor effects are 
illustrated as the solid arrows (aw and ah) and represent within individual effects, or the effect of an 
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individual’s own time preference on their odds of engaging in extramarital sex, holding spouse’s time 
preference constant.  Partner effects are illustrated as the diagonal lines (pwh and phw) and represent the 
effect of a spouse’s time preference on an individual’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex, holding the 
individual’s time preference constant.   
Figure 4 can also be expressed as two simultaneous linear equations.  In equation 1, wives’ odds 
of engaging in extramarital sex are a function of wives’ time preference and husbands’ time preference.  
In equation 2, husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex are a function of husbands’ time 
preference and wives’ time preference.  
extramaritalsexw=aw * discountratew + pwh * discountratew + Ew (1) 
extramaritalsexh=ah * discountrateh + phw * discountrateh + Eh (2) 
These effects are estimated simultaneously using structural equation modeling (SEM).   The 
model is saturated because all means, variances and covariances are freely estimated, and will therefore 
not have fit statistics.  Degrees of freedom and chi-square are both equal to zero (df=0, χ2=0)  (David A. 
Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).  The residual variance for husbands and wives’ odds of extramarital sex 
represent measurement error and variance not accounted for by the model.  These residual variances 
are correlated to control for other sources of non-independence, such as exposure to social norms 
condoning sex outside of marriage or assortive mating (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  Husbands and wives’ time 
preferences are also correlated (c1) in order to estimate actor effects, holding partner effects constant, 
and vice versa (Fitzpatrick, Gareau, Lafontaine, & Gaudreau; David A. Kenny & Cook; David A. Kenny & 
Ledermann, 2010).    
SEM allows for more than one equation to be estimated from the covariance matrix of the 
independent and dependent variables  (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  SEM is recommended for analyzing data 
from “distinguishable” dyads, or dyads in which the members can be differentiated, in this case by sex  
(David A Kenny et al., 2006; David A. Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).  Had the sample been comprised of 
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same-sex couples, dyads would be treated as “indistinguishable” and multi-level modeling would be 
recommended (Fitzpatrick et al.; Gonzalez & Griffin, 1999).  Both approaches produce the same results.  
Statistical analysis was performed using Stata version 14.2 (StataCorp) and MPLUS version 8.0. 
In addition to the standard APIM, I also estimate a model that contains the interaction of 
husbands and wives’ time preferences.  This interaction tests whether there is a dyad-level effect of 
being in a relationship in which both spouses have high discount rates (high-high), as opposed to both 
having low discount rates (low-low) or mixed discount rates (husband high-wife low, or vice versa).  
These pairings describe the characteristics of dyads, rather than individuals, so are treated as 
representing between-dyad effects (David A Kenny et al., 2006).  By contrast, actor and partner effects 
are estimated while holding the other constant, so describe within-dyad effects.    
The sample size for aim 3 (n=869 couples) compared favorably with other studies in the 
literature of married and dating couples, in which the APIM was used to estimate actor and partner 
effects.  Representative studies explored the extent to which: heavy episodic drinking predicts future 
heavy episodic dinking (n=208 couples) (Mushquash et al., 2013), sexual satisfaction predicts life 
satisfaction (n=126 couples) (Fitzpatrick et al.), HIV status predicts HIV related perceptions of HIV risk 
(n=127 couples) (L. A. Eaton, West, Kenny, & Kalichman, 2009), and negative and positive affect predicts 
global distress (n=79 couples) (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  
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Figure 4.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM) for Husbands and Wives’ Odds of Engaging in 
Extramarital Sex 
 
Table 4.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model Parameters 
aw Effect of wife’s time preference on wife’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex (actor 
effect) 
ah Effect of husband’s time preference on husband’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex 
(actor effect) 
pwh Effect of husband’s time preference on wife’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex 
(partner effect) 
phw Effect of wife’s time preference on husband’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex 
(partner effect) 
c1 Correlation between wives (x1) and husbands’ time preference (x2).   
c2 Correlation between the error terms of wives (e1) and husbands’ (e2) odds of engaging 
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3.7 Study Contribution 
The study contributes to research on HIV-related risk behavior by exploring the influence of 
individuals’ time preferences on condom use frequency, number of sexual partners, concurrent sexual 
partnerships, alcohol use, HIV testing, and extramarital sex.    Although a growing body of literature 
suggests that time preference is a potentially significant determinant of health behavior, no studies, to 
my knowledge, have examined the specific relationship between time preference and these risk 
behaviors in sub-Saharan Africa.  The study examined this relationship from three different perspectives:  
economics, behavioral economics, and health behavior.   An interdisciplinary approach was chosen 
because it allows for a more comprehensive investigation of the theoretical and empirical association 
between time preference and condom use frequency, number of sexual partners, concurrent sexual 
partnerships, and alcohol use.  Results of these analyses can be used by public health practitioners to 
enhance existing prevention programs and to inform the development of effective prevention 
interventions. 
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CHAPTER 4:  TIME PREFERENCE AND HIV RISK BEHAVIOR AMONG INDIVIDUALS IN KENYA 
AND MALAWI 
4.1 Introduction 
Time preference is an individual characteristic that describes the relative weight that individuals 
assign to more immediate rewards versus delayed rewards when choosing between the two.  Empirical 
studies show that time preference is an important determinant of economic behaviors that require 
these types of tradeoffs, such as saving and investing.  More recent studies demonstrate that time 
preference may also predict non-economic behaviors, including behaviors related to health.  Few 
studies have explored the relationship between time preference and HIV risk behavior, however, and 
none, to my knowledge, have examined this association in high HIV prevalence settings where a greater 
understanding of these behaviors is most needed.  This study addresses this gap by exploring the 
association between time preference and HIV risk behavior in two high prevalence countries, Kenya and 
Malawi.   
Preferences in economics are roughly analogous to personality traits in psychology.  Time 
preference refers to the preference for more immediate rewards over delayed rewards, because more 
immediate rewards can be enjoyed sooner, while delayed rewards require additional waiting  (Frederick 
et al., 2002).  Time preference is traditionally measured by estimating the extent to which individuals 
“discount” or undervalue delayed rewards relative to rewards that are available to them sooner.   Most 
people discount delayed rewards to some extent.  For example, if given the choice between $100 now 
and $120 in six months, most of us would prefer the $100 now.  We perceive the $120 in six months as 
being worth less than $100 now because we must wait six months to receive it.    
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Discounting of delayed rewards is a well-documented phenomenon in economics and psychology that 
has been observed in different contexts, cultures, and even different species (Ainslie, 1974; Vanderveldt, 
Oliveira, & Green, 2016).  While there are other reasons for discounting delayed rewards, such as 
uncertainty about the future, or risk aversion, time preference is motivated primarily by an aversion to 
waiting  (Frederick et al., 2002).  For this reason, time preference has often been compared with 
impatience.   
Theoretical Framework 
Grossman’s theory of health capital and Becker’s theory of human capital suggest that time 
preference will influence HIV risk behavior, because these behaviors have delayed consequences  (Gary 
S Becker, 1962; Grossman, 1972).  The “benefits” of risk behavior are immediate (ex: convenience of not 
using condoms, pleasure of having multiple sexual partners), while the potential future health 
consequences may not be felt for many months or years.  It might therefore be expected that individuals 
who discount their future health to a greater extent will be more likely to engage in HIV risk behavior, 
compared with individuals who discount their future health to a lesser extent.    
There are two different theoretic perspectives on the how discounting influences our choices.   
The discounted utility model, which represents the traditional economic view, assumes that individuals 
are rational and have a single, constant discount rate that they apply to all decisions that involve 
tradeoffs between more immediate and delayed rewards (Frederick et al., 2002; George Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 1992; Samuelson, 1937).  Because discount rates are constant, individuals’ behavior over time 
will be “time consistent” or unchanging over time.  If someone decides that condom use is in their best 
interest, for example, they will consistently use condoms.   Because of these simplifying assumptions, 
behaviors can be predicted by a single estimate of individuals’ discount rates.  The discounted utility 
model is the most widely used framework employed to study choices that have delayed consequences, 
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in part because the model’s assumptions make these choices more amenable to study  (Frederick et al., 
2002; Soman et al., 2005).    
Behavioral economics, which draws on insights from psychology, challenges the traditional view.   
In the real world, individuals frequently fail to adopt behaviors they know to be in their best interest.  
We pledge to skip dessert after dinner, but later indulge.  We resolve to quit smoking in the New Year, 
but on January 1 cannot resist cigarettes.  This pattern of behavior suggests that discount rates are not 
constant, but rather increase as the “smaller, sooner” reward gets closer to the present.  Thus, we are 
willing to forgo dessert after dinner, but not now.  Theory ascribes these reversals to “present bias,” 
which is the impulsive desire to seize more immediate rewards as they get closer to us in time, “in a way 
that our ‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate” (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  From the behavioral 
economic perspective, therefore, HIV risk behavior is not due to excessive discounting of one’s future 
health, as predicted by the traditional view, but rather to inconsistent discounting brought on by poor 
self-control.   We recognize it is in our best interest to avoid HIV risk behavior, but struggle to act 
according to this decision in the present.   This distinction is important because it suggests different 
cognitive processes driving HIV risk behavior, and it also has implications for interventions.  Individuals 
who fail to sufficiently value their future health might benefit from programs that encourage a more 
future oriented outlook, while individuals who engage in risk behavior due to inconsistent discounting 
might benefit from interventions that address their self-control problems.  Experimentally, inconsistent 
discounting (i.e., “present bias”) is predicted by measuring individuals’ discount rates in the far term (ex: 
do you prefer $100 in six months or $200 in seven months?) and in the near term (ex: do you prefer 
$100 now or $200 in one month?).  If individuals prefer the $200 in seven months, but the $100 now, it 
suggests inconsistent discounting, and would predict higher odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior. 
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Review of the Empirical Literature on Time Preference and Health 
Empirical research supports the hypothesis that health risk behavior is driven by both excessive 
discounting and inconsistent discounting  (Story et al., 2014).  Time preference has been associated with 
addictive risk behaviors including alcohol use (Bickel et al., 1999; Field et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2005; 
Petry, 2001; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), smoking (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009; Bickel et al., 1999; 
Brown & Adams, 2013; Goto et al., 2009; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007), and drug use (Coffey et al., 2003; 
Kirby & Petry, 2004; Kirby et al., 1999; Kollins, 2003), although a few dissenting studies found no 
correlation (Khwaja et al., 2007).  The relationship between time preference and preventive health 
behaviors is more mixed.  Time preference has been negatively associated with breast cancer screening 
(Levy et al., 2006), physical activity (Chiteji, 2010), hypertension management (Axon et al., 2009), and 
influenza vaccination (G. B. Chapman & Coups, 1999), although some of these correlations were small.  
Time preference has also been associated with greater body mass index (BMI) (Dodd, 2014; Ikeda et al., 
2010; Komlos et al., 2004), though some studies found the relationship only held for certain populations, 
such as women (Weller et al., 2008) or African American men (P. K. Smith et al., 2005).  Several studies 
examined multiple health behaviors at once to assess the consistency of the association between time 
preference and health.   A seminal study of time preference and health related outcomes found a small 
correlation with smoking, but no correlation with seat belt use, dental exams, or being overweight 
(Fuchs, 1980). Another study found that, as predicted, time preference was negatively associated with 
mammography, prostate examinations, dental visits, cholesterol testing, flu shots, physical activity, and 
smoking, but was not correlated with clinical breast exams (Bradford, 2010).  
Collectively, these early findings suggest that time preference is a potentially important 
determinant of health behavior, but many gaps remain.  A majority of existing studies were conducted 
in the U.S. and other high-resource settings, and have focused on behaviors most relevant to these 
populations.  There is relatively less research on the extent to which inconsistent discounting (i.e., 
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present bias) explains risk behavior, in part because this theory is more recent than the traditional 
perspective.  Subgroup analysis is often overlooked due to small sample sizes, so less is known about 
whether the association between time preference and health behavior varies by sex, race, or other 
demographic characteristic.  Finally, the literature contains mixed results.  One contributing factor may 
be that this line of research is relatively recent.  It is not yet well understood whether and how the 
association between time preference and health behavior varies by behavior, subgroup, or other 
contextual factors, which if left unmodeled could account for variation in study results.    Another factor 
is that studies use different procedures to elicit time preferences, which has empirically been shown to 
produce different estimates of individuals’ discount rates (Frederick et al., 2002).  The lack of a gold 
standard measure of time preference is a larger problem within the economics and psychology literature 
that can make it difficult to compare results across studies.  Additional research that is theoretically 
informed and uses well-designed time preference measures may over time contribute to more 
contextually accurate models of the relationship between time preference and health behavior, as well 
as to greater consensus about the best way to measure time preferences for the purpose of predicting 
health behavior. 
This paper addresses some of these gaps by examining the cross-sectional association between 
time preference and HIV-related risk behaviors among a sample of men in Kenya, and men and women 
in Malawi.  Risk behaviors measured in both countries were defined as having more than one sexual 
partner in the past 12 months and drinking alcohol during a normal or average week.  Kenya-specific 
outcomes were being uncircumcised at baseline (i.e., at the time of study enrollment), not using a 
condom at last sexual intercourse, and not being previously tested for HIV.  Malawi-specific outcomes 
were frequency of condom use in the past 12 months and having at least one concurrent sexual partner 
while with their most recent sexual partner.  
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Study Hypotheses 
The central hypothesis of this study is that individuals with high discount rates, who undervalue 
their future health to a greater extent, will be more likely to engage in HIV risk behavior than individuals 
with low discount rates, who undervalue their future health to a lesser extent.  This hypothesis is 
informed by the traditional economic perspective. 
A second hypothesis is that individuals who demonstrate inconsistent discounting (i.e., present 
bias) will be more likely to engage in HIV risk behavior than individuals with consistently low discount 
rates.  This hypothesis is informed by the behavioral economic perspective.   This hypothesis can be 
restated as a test of moderation.  Individuals with low discount rates who display present bias 
(characterized by a sudden switch to high discount rates), will be more likely to engage in HIV risk 
behavior than individuals with low discount rates who do not display present bias.   
Two additional hypotheses examine the potential moderating effects of marital status (Kenya 
and Malawi) and sex (Malawi only) on the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  
The positive association between discount rates and HIV risk behavior will be more positive for 
unmarried individuals than for married individuals.  This positive association will also be more positive 
for men than for women.   Married men and women may influence each other’s risk behavior, reducing 
the influence of their own level of time preference on their behavior.  Women have less control over 
their choices, particularly those related to HIV risk behaviors (such as condom use), so that their own 
time preference may not be as strongly associated with risk behavior than it will be for men.   
This study contributes to the literature on time preference and health behavior in several ways.  
First, the study examines how time preferences potentially affect HIV risk behaviors, such as 
inconsistent condom use and having multiple sexual partners, behaviors which are among the central 
drivers of global HIV incidence.  Second, the study examines the association between time preference 
and HIV risk behavior in sub-Saharan Africa, which could shed light on whether the relationship between 
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time preference and health behavior is generalizable to low-resource settings, where uncertainty about 
the future may result in uniformly high discounting of future outcomes (i.e., insufficient variation in the 
independent variable.)  If an association is found, it could contribute to our understanding of the drivers 
of HIV risk behavior in this region, as well as in low-resource areas within high-resource countries.   
Third, the study explores two rival, theoretically informed pathways by which time preference may 
influence HIV risk behavior, adding to existing knowledge about the cognitive processes driving these 
behaviors, and potentially assisting in identifying new avenues for intervention.  Fourth, this study 
examines the extent to which the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior varies by 
sex and marital status, information which could enhance our understanding of the different role that 
time preference plays in the risk behaviors of different subgroups, potentially allowing for more 
targeted interventions in the future.   Finally, this study examines risk behaviors, such as condom use 
and having multiple sexual partners, which require two people to interact.  To my knowledge, the way in 
which one participant’s time preference might influence another person’s behaviors, has not been 
explored.   It might be expected that the time preference of one participant will have less predictive 
power in two-person behaviors.   
4.2  Methods 
Study Setting and Design 
I conducted secondary analysis of cross-sectional survey data from two independent studies, 
one in Kenya conducted in 2013, and the other in Malawi conducted in 2006.  Each survey collected 
information on respondents’ time preference, demographics, and HIV risk behavior.   
Kenya:   I analyzed baseline survey data from a randomized controlled trial that provided small financial 
incentives to men to increase uptake of voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC).(Thirumurthy et 
al., 2014)   The study was carried out in the Nyando district in western Kenya.  HIV prevalence in the 
region was 15.1%, compared with a national prevalence of 5.9%.(UNAIDS, 2014b)    
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3,333 men were randomly selected from a roster of all men, ages 25 to 49 years, living in seven 
randomly selected sub locations in the study area.  The baseline survey was administered to 1,504 men 
who met the study’s eligibility criteria: self-reported age between 25 and 49 years, self-reported to be 
uncircumcised, and no intention to leave the study area in the next 3 months.  390 men who had 
previously been circumcised also completed the baseline survey.   
The Kenya trial was conducted by researchers at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
in partnership with Impact Research and Development Organization (IRDO), the primary VMMC provider 
in the study area.   This project was approved by the Office of Human Research Ethics at the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the ethics and research committee at Kenyatta National Hospital, 
University of Nairobi.   
Malawi:  I also analyzed data from the 2006 study wave of the Malawi Longitudinal Study of 
Families and Health (MLSFH).  This wave was selected because it contained detailed measures of 
respondents’ time preferences and HIV risk behavior.  The MLSFH is a longitudinal cohort study of rural 
Malawians.  The MLSFH survey was conducted in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, and every two years 
thereafter (Kohler et al., 2015a).  3,000 to 4,000 individuals were surveyed in each study wave.   
The original 1998 MLSFH sample was comprised of 1,532 randomly selected ever-married 
women, ages 15 to 49 years, and 1,065 of their male spouses.   These women were randomly selected 
from 145 villages located in three rural districts: Rumphi in the Northern region, Mchinji in the Central 
region, and Balaka in the Southern region.  Each district was characterized by different ethnic and 
religious groups.  HIV prevalence was 6.7% in Rumphi, in 10.3% Mchinji, and 13.8% in Balaka (Kohler et 
al., 2015a).   National prevalence was 9.1% (UNAIDS, 2014c).  Subsequent survey waves included all 
previous MLSFH respondents and new spouses.  Individuals on the initial MSLFH roster who were absent 
during the first three survey waves did not receive further follow-up visits (Kohler et al., 2015a).   In 
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2004, 984 adolescents, ages 15 to 24 years, were added to the sample to compensate for the aging of 
the initial cohort.    
Attrition between study waves was substantial, primarily due to migration (Anglewicz et al., 
2009).  However, researchers found that the demographic profiles of the 1998 and 2010 MLSFH samples 
were similar to the rural sample of the Malawi Demographic and Health Survey (MDHS), which is a 
nationally representative survey (Kohler et al., 2015a; Thornton, 2008).   Details of the MLSFH sampling 
strategy are available in the study documentation (Kohler et al., 2015a; Kohler et al., 2015b).   
The MLSFH is administered by the University of Pennsylvania in collaboration with the University of 
Malawi.  The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Pennsylvania and, in Malawi, by the College of Medicine Research Ethics Committee (COMREC) or the 
National Health Sciences Research Committee (NHSRC).   
Analytic Samples 
Kenya sample.  1891 men completed the baseline survey of the Kenya study in 2013.  One 
respondent was excluded due to missing covariate data, resulting in a final sample size of 1890 men.  All 
respondents were between 25 and 49 years old. 
Malawi sample.  The analytic sample in Malawi consisted of 3054 respondents, 1688 (55%) 
women and 1366 (45%) men.  3255 individuals, ages 15 and older, completed the 2006 MLSFH survey.  I 
limited the sample to respondents between 15 and 64 years of age.  68 respondents were excluded for 
being outside of this age range.   133 respondents were excluded due to missing covariate data.  The 15 
to 64 year old age range has been used in previous studies reporting health statistics in Malawi, 
including the Malawi DHS and the Malawi Population-based HIV Impact Assessment (PHIA) conducted 
by Columbia University  (ICAP, December 2016).      
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The Kenya and Malawi samples were not pooled because the two studies used different measures to 
assess time preference and HIV risk behavior.  Instead, the relationship between time preference and 
HIV risk behavior is explored in each country separately, and then compared qualitatively.   
Measures 
Table 5 lists the Kenya and Malawi outcome, time preference and covariate measures.  Some 
outcomes were measured in both countries, allowing for a more direct comparison of study results.  
Other outcomes were country-specific.  All outcomes were defined as dichotomous variables.  To assist 
in interpreting results, risk behaviors were coded so that a positive response indicates engaging in risk 
behavior.  Additional information about how the time preference variables were measured and 
constructed is shown below. 
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Based on men’s self-report during 








NA Were you having sex with other partners 
during the time you were having sex with 




Had more than 
one sexual 
partner in the 
past 12 months 
In total, with how many different 
people have you had sexual intercourse 
in the past 12 months? 
How many sexual partners did you have 







Have you ever taken alcohol? 
[If yes], how many drinks of alcohol 
(bottles, glasses, etc.) do you normally 
have in a week? 
 
0=do not drink in a normal week 
1=one or more drinks in a normal week 
During an average week, would you say 
that: 
 
0=you do not drink in an average week 
1= you drink 1-2 days in an average week 
you drink 3-4 days in an average week 
you drink 5-7 days in an average week 
 
Infrequent 
condom use in 
the past 12 
months 
NA Have you ever used a condom with [your 
most recent sexual partner]?  [If yes], 
how often did you use a condom with 
[your most recent sexual partner]? 
0=every time, almost every time 
1= never, at the beginning, sometimes 
 
Condom not used 
at last sexual 
intercourse 
The last time you had sexual 







survey HIV test  
 
NA Refusal recorded by VCT counselors who 
administered the tests to all respondents 









NA=respondent not located 
Not previously 
tested for HIV  
I do not want to know the results of the 
test, but have you ever been tested to 
see if you have HIV? 
 
[Being previously tested for HIV was not 
included as an outcome in Malawi due to 
an intervention carried out on the MLSFH 
cohort in 2004 which may have 
influenced respondents’ decisions to be 





What is your age? How old are you? 
Marital Status What is your current marital status? 
0=married 
1=never married, separated, divorced, 
widowed 
 
What is your current marital status? 
0=married 
1=never married, separated, divorced, 
widowed 
 
Sex NA Determined by study administrators 
during recruitment.   
Education Have you attended any school?  
What is the highest level of school you 
have attended?   
 
Dummy coded: 
0= no schooling or some primary 
education   
1= primary education completed 
2= some secondary or completed 
secondary education and above 
 
What is the last grade that you 
successfully passed? 
Number of years at level __. 
 
Dummy coded: 
0=no schooling or some primary 
education 
1= primary education completed 
2= some secondary or completed 
secondary education and above  
Wealth Additive index of 11 household items, 
rescaled to 0 to 1 continuous variable 
 
Additive index of 16 household items, 
rescaled to 0 to 1 continuous variable 
 




1=Rumphi (north)  
2=Mchinji (central) 
 
Time Preference Measures (See Appendix A for conversion to USD.) 
 
Time Preference  
 
 
Time Preference in the Near Term: 
Suppose that you have just won a prize 
 
Set 1:    





 that will give you a series of payments 
over time.  You can select the prize from 
two options.  Please indicate your 
preferred prize.  Imagine that the 
person giving you the money is 




Do you prefer:   
100 Shillings today or 200 Shillings in 
one month? 
100 Shillings today or 300 Shillings in 
one month? 
100 Shillings today or 400 Shillings in 
one month? 
100 Shillings today or 175 Shillings in 
one month? 
100 Shillings today or 150 Shillings in 
one month? 
100 Shillings today or 125 Shillings in 
one month? 






Set 2:    
Please indicate your preferred prize.  
Imagine that the person giving you the 






Do you prefer:  
100 shillings in one month or 200 
shillings in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 300 
Shillings in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 400 
Shillings in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 175 
Shillings in two months? 
about a hypothetical situation. Suppose 
you have earned 500 Kwacha for work 
that you have done for a trustworthy 
neighbor during the last week. The 
neighbor gives you an option for how 
he pays you for this work. One option is 
that you get paid today. The alternative 
option will be to get a slightly higher 
payment in a month from now. 
 
Would you prefer: 
310 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 1 
week? 
330 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 2 
weeks? 
410 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 3 
weeks? 
540 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 1 
month? 
550 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 2 
months? 
670 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 4 
months? 
690 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 3 
months? 
780 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 5 
months? 




Set 2:      
Next, I am going to ask you the same 
questions again, with one important 
difference. I will no longer ask you about 
receiving money now compared with 
receiving money later. Instead, I will ask 
you about receiving money 2 months 
from now compared with receiving 
money at a time more than 2 months 
from now.   
 
Would you prefer: 
 310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 2 months plus 1 week? 





100 Shillings in one month or 150 
Shillings in two months? 
100 Shillings in one month or 125 
Shillings in two months? 
[skip codes used] 
 
 
in 7 months? 
540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha 
in 3 months? 
670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 6 months? 
550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 4 months? 
690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 5 months? 
410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha 
in 2 months plus 3 weeks? 
800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha 
in 7 months? 
330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha 






The Kenya and Malawi studies each measured time preference following a procedure frequently 
found in the literature.  Respondents were asked to choose between a series of smaller, sooner prizes 
and larger, delayed prizes.   All prizes were hypothetical, monetary sums.  Respondents were asked to 
choose between the same series of prizes twice, once in a time frame close to the present (“near term”) 
and once in a time frame further in the future (“far term”).   The full set of questions used to assess time 
preferences in Kenya and Malawi are shown in Table 5. The prizes in these questions converted to U.S. 
dollars are shown in Appendix A.   Example questions from Kenya were: 
3. Would you prefer 100 shillings today, or 200 shillings in one month?  (Near term) 
4. Would you prefer 100 shillings in one month, or 200 shillings in two months?  (Far term) 
Subsequent questions varied the size of the delayed reward, until respondents switched from 
preferring the smaller, sooner prize to the larger, later prize, or vice versa.   The purpose of this exercise 
was to identify respondents’ “indifference point,” which is the amount of money they would need to be 
offered after a one month delay, in order for them to be indifferent between that reward and 100 
shillings today.  These indifference points were then used to estimate the range in which individuals’ 
discount rates were likely to fall.  Individuals had higher discount rates (undervalue their future to a 
greater extent) if they required a larger delayed reward in order be indifferent between that reward and 
the 100 shillings today. (For the far term questions, the indifference point would be the amount of 
money they would need in two months, in order to be indifferent between that reward and 100 shillings 
in one month.)    
Consistent with some past studies, the far term discount rate measure was interpreted as 
representing respondents’ “true” time preferences, and was used as the primary predictor variable in 
the study analysis  (Ashraf et al., 2006).  The near term measure was used to assess whether individuals 
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displayed inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias.)  If respondents’ discount rates were “low” in the 
far term, but “high” in the near term, they were categorized as demonstrating inconsistent discounting.  
Inconsistent discounting was defined as a dichotomous variable.  The reference was having consistently 
“low” discount rates in both the near and far term.  
The Malawi survey followed a similar format as Kenya.  Respondents were asked to choose 
between a series of hypothetical monetary prizes in the near term (ex: do you prefer 800 Kwacha now 
or 850 Kwacha in 5 months?), and then again in the far term (ex: do you prefer 800 Kwacha in two 
months or 850 Kwacha in 7 months?)   As was the case in Kenya, the far term measure represented 
respondents’ “true” time preference, the main predictor in the study analysis.  The near term measure 
was used to assess whether respondents displayed inconsistent discounting. 
Variable Construction 
The Kenya and Malawi time preference variables were dichotomized for study analysis.   I chose 
to dichotomize these variables so that the study results would be clearer and easier to interpret, to 
ensure that there were a sufficient number of cases in each level of these variables, and to facilitate 
comparison of the Kenya and Malawi results.   Because the two countries used different questions to 
assess time preference, the response categories did not correspond.  Dichotomizing the variable made it 
possible to divide respondents in each country into high and low discount rate groups that were roughly 
comparable.   Respondents were categorized as having “high” discount rates if their estimated discount 
rate was greater than 1663% per year in Kenya, and greater than 2303% per year in Malawi.  “Low” 
discount rates were the reference.    
These percentages were only use to dichotomize the time preference variables and were not 
themselves used in the study analysis.  As reference, these percentages indicate the amount by which a 
smaller prize today would need to be multiplied by in order for respondents to be indifferent between 
that smaller prize and the multiplied reward in one year.  For example, in Kenya, having a discount rate 
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of 1663% implies that an individual is indifferent between $1 today and $1663 in one year.  So another 
way of describing how individuals were divided into “high” and “low” discounting groups is that 
individuals who were indifferent between $1 today and some amount less than $1663 in one year were 
considered to have “low” discount rates, while those who were indifferent between $1 and some 
amount greater than $1663 in one year were deemed to have “high” discount rates.   
Cut-points for categorizing respondents as having “high” discount rates in Kenya (greater than 
1663% per year) and in Malawi (greater than 2303% per year) were selected were selected after 
observing the distribution of responses to the Kenya and Malawi time preference questions.  These 
criteria resulted in 55% of respondents in Kenya having “high” discount rates, but only 15% of 
respondents in Malawi designated as having “high” discount rates.  The small size of this group limited 
statistical power, and ruled out some moderation analyses due to insufficient numbers of respondents 
who had “high” discount rates.   I chose to retain the criteria that produced these groups because I 
wanted the Kenya and Malawi time preference variables to be similar, to allow for comparison of 
country results, and the cut-points chosen were two of the closest available.  In addition, 72% of Malawi 
respondents had estimated discount rates that were tightly clustered near the middle of the sample 
distribution.  Rather than splitting this cluster, which may have produced “high” and “low” discounting 
groups with low contrast in terms of discounting and HIV risk behavior, I instead chose to designate the 
15% of respondents who had discount rates greater than those in the cluster as having “high” discount 
rates, while the remaining respondents had “low” discount rates.  Details on the full distribution of 
responses to the Kenya and Malawi time preference questions, and how responses to these questions 
were converted to discount rates, are shown in Appendix A. 
Analytic Strategy 
I explored the main effects of time preference on HIV risk behavior, as well as the potentially 
moderating effects of present bias, sex and marital status.  The Kenya and Malawi samples were 
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analyzed separately due to differences in how time preference and other variables were measured.   
Logistic regression was used to analyze data from Kenya, with standard errors clustered by village.  
Logistic regression with and standard errors clustered by family (marital, sibling or parent-child ties), 
were used to analyze data from Malawi.   
I fit unadjusted and adjusted models for each outcome.  Adjusted models controlled for age, 
marital status, wealth, and education in Kenya and Malawi, as well as sex and region in Malawi.  
Continuous variables were demeaned.  Moderation was tested by interacting each potential moderator 
with time preference.  I was not able to test each moderator with every outcome in Malawi due to 
insufficient numbers of cases for some interaction categories.  Statistical analysis was performed using 
Stata version 14.2 (StataCorp). 
4.3 Results 
This analysis tests the hypothesis that individuals with high discount rates, who undervalue their 
future health to a greater extent, will have higher odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior in the present.   
Data from two independent samples were analyzed:  men in Kenya, ages 25 to 49 years, and men and 
women in Malawi, ages 15 to 64 years.  I first describe the demographic characteristics, HIV risk 
behaviors, and time preferences of respondents in each sample.   I next examine the individual-level 
determinants of time preference within each sample.   Finally, I present the Kenya and Malawi results.   
Sample Characteristics 
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the Kenya sample.  The sample was comprised of 1890 
men, ages 25 to 49 years.  Mean age was 34 years, 88% of men were married, and 75% completed 
primary education or higher.   55% of men in Kenya were categorized as having “high” discount rates.  
Discount rates did not vary significantly by marital status.  9% of respondents demonstrated inconsistent 
discounting, which behavioral economists suggest will be associated with higher odds of risk behavior.    
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6.7% of men reported being HIV-infected.   84% of men were uncircumcised at baseline.  
Participation in the remaining risk behaviors was relatively low.  17% of men reported having more than 
one sexual partner in the past 12 months, 27% drank alcohol in a normal week, and 9% had not 
previously tested for HIV.   80% of married men, and 43% of unmarried men reported not using a 
condom at last sex.   
Men in Malawi, ages 25 to 49 years.  For comparison purposes, Table 6 also describes a 
comparable sample of men in Malawi (n=719), ages 25 to 49 years, the same age range as men in Kenya.   
Compared with men in Kenya, men in Malawi within this age range were slightly younger, had similar 
levels of wealth, were more likely to be married, and had lower levels of education.  22% of men in 
Malawi had more than one sexual partner in the past 12 months and 25% drank alcohol in an average 
week, percentages that were similar to men in Kenya.   HIV prevalence among men in Malawi was 4.9%, 
based on actual test results offered to respondents in 2004 and 2006.  18% of men were categorized as 
having “high discount rates” using similar criteria as in Kenya, and 8% of men displayed “inconsistent 
discounting.” 
Men and women in Malawi, ages 15 to 64 years.  Summary statistics for the full Malawi sample, 
which was comprised of men and women, ages 15 to 64 years, are shown in Table 7.  Mean age was 33 
years for women and 36 years for men.   81% of both men and women were married.   29% of women 
reported having no education compared with 16% of men (p<.001).   Using criteria that were similar to 
those used in Kenya, 15% of respondents were designated as having “high” discount rates.  Women 
discounted hypothetical monetary rewards less than men.  12.5% of women had high discount rates, 
compared with 17.7% of men (p<.001).    Women (4%) were also less likely to demonstrate inconsistent 
discounting than men (7%.)   6.9% of women were HIV-infected, compared with only 3.8% of men 
(p=.002).     
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Women engaged in lower levels of risk behavior than men, despite being more likely to be HIV-
infected, a trend also found in the Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in Malawi in 2000-2005 
(UNAIDS, 2016c).    Less than 3% of women in the Malawi sample for this study reported having more 
than one sexual partner or engaging in a sexually concurrent relationship while with their most recent 
sexual partner.   By comparison, 22% of men reported having more than one sexual partner (p<.001), 
and 32% reported having concurrent sexual partners (p<.001).   Less than 5% of women reported having 
ever taken alcohol, compared with 41% of men (p<001).   92% of both men and women accepted home-
based rapid HIV testing and counseling offered to all respondents following completion of the 2006 
survey.   
Determinants of Time Preference 
To explore possible predictors of time preference, I conducted logistic regression with “high 
discount rate” as the outcome (“low discount rate” was the reference).  These results are shown in 
Table 8.  In Kenya (column 5), wealth was the only significant predictor of having high discount rates and 
the effect was fairly small (AOR 1.07, 95% CI 1.04-1.71, p=0.02).  Among a comparable group of men in 
Malawi, ages 25 to 49 years (column 4), being from the Northern region was associated with having 
lower discount rates, a marginally significant association. 
In the full Malawi sample, column 1, women (AOR 0.64, 95% CI: 0.51-0.79, p<.001) had 
significantly lower odds of having high discount rates compared with men.  Respondents from the North 
Region (AOR 0.55, 95% CI: 0.4-0.76, p<.001) had significantly lower odds of having high discount rates, 
while respondents from the Central Region (AOR 1.56, 95% CI 1.22-2.0, p<.001) had significantly higher 
odds of having high discount rates, compared with respondents in the South.  These region effects were 
above and beyond the effects of wealth and education, which suggests that culture may be a 
determinant of discounting.  Among women in Malawi (column 2), significant region effects remained.  
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Among the full sample of men (column 3), being unmarried was a marginally significant predictor of 
having high discount rates.    
Across both countries, and all subgroups in Malawi, completing primary education and 
completing secondary education was associated with lower odds of having high discount rates, although 
these associations were not significant.  This finding might have been an artifact of the dichotomous 
measures used for education and time preferences, which reduced statistical power.  Past research 
suggests that education may mediate the relationship between time preference and health (Farrell & 
Fuchs, 1982; Fuchs, 1980), or that time preference may mediate the relationship between education 
and health (G. S. Becker & Mulligan, 1997).  A study in the Philippines, however, also found that high 
discounting was not as strongly associated with education and household income as expected (Ashraf et 
al., 2006).  Collectively, these findings suggest that time preference is an independent construct, and not 
solely a proxy for other variables such as education or wealth. 
Kenya Results 
Significant Findings 
The five risk behaviors examined in Kenya were: being uncircumcised at baseline, having more 
than one sexual partner, using alcohol during a normal week, not having previously tested for HIV, and 
did not use a condom at last sex.   The primary predictor variable was men’s discount rates (“high” or 
“low”) in the far term, which was hypothesized to be a more stable measure of respondents’ “true” time 
preferences.   A secondary predictor variable was inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias,) indicated 
if respondents’ had low discount rates in the far term, but high discount rates in the near term.  This 
pattern of discounting suggested that respondents’ underlying tendency was to have low discount rates, 
but that they were prone to self-control problems in the near term, possibly resulting in higher odds of 
risk behavior.    55% of men in Kenya had high discount rates.  20% of men demonstrated inconsistent 
discounting.    
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Four results were statistically significant, and had practical significance as well.   First, men with 
high discount rates had 30% higher odds of being uncircumcised at baseline, compared with men with 
low discount rates, in both unadjusted (OR 1.3, 95% CI: 0.97-1.73, p=0.08) and adjusted models (AOR 1 
.29, 95% CI: 0.97-1.72, p=0.08.)  Each association was marginally significant.  These results are illustrated 
in Figure 5.  Full results are shown in Table 9, columns 1 and 2.   To put these results in context, the 
baseline odds of being uncircumcised was 6.5 (95% CI: 4.15-8.88) among men with low discount rates, 
who were married, of average age and wealth, and had some primary education or less (“reference 
group”).    Within this group of men, it is expected that 6.5 men will be uncircumcised for every man 
who is circumcised.   Men in this group with high discount rates had 1.29 times higher odds of being 
uncircumcised, which translates into odds of 8.4 (95% CI: 5.54-11.3).  A related result is that men with 
high discount rates had even higher odds of being uncircumcised (AOR 1.87, 95% CI: 0.93-3.78, p=0.08) 
in the model which controlled for inconsistent discounting.  These results are shown in Table 9, column 
3.   
Second, men who displayed inconsistent discounting (i.e., low discount rates in the far term, 
high discount rates in the near term) had significantly higher odds of not using a condom at last sex 
(AOR 1.72, 95% CI 1.04-2.38, p=0.03), compared with men who displayed consistently low discount rates 
(i.e., low discount rates in the far term and near term).   The baseline odds of not using condoms at last 
sex was 4.45 (95% CI: 3.29-5.6) among men who had consistently low discount rates, were married, 
were of average age and wealth, and had some primary education or less.  Men in this group who 
displayed inconsistent discounting had 1.72 times higher odds of not using condoms at last sex, which 
translates into odds of 7.64 (95% CI: 3.63-11.66).  These results are illustrated in Figure 6.  Full results 
are shown in Table 13, column 3. 
Third, among married men, those with high discount rates had 1.24 times higher odds of using 
alcohol in a normal week (AOR 1.24, 95% CI 0.98-1.58).  This association was of marginal statistical 
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significance, but had only modest practical significance.  The baseline odds of using alcohol were 0.28 
(95% CI: 0.21-0.36) among married men with low discount rates, who were of average age and wealth, 
and had some primary education or less.  Having high discount rates increased these odds by 1.24 times, 
resulting in odds of 0.35 (95% CI: 0.25-0.43).  Marital status did not significantly moderate the effect of 
high discount rates on HIV risk behavior, however.  These results are illustrated in Figure 8. 
Fourth, among unmarried men, high discount rates were a marginally significant predictor of 
lower odds of not using a condom at last sex, an unexpected result (AOR 0.63, 95% CI: 0.39-1.01, p=.06).  
The baseline odds of not using a condom at last sex were 1.26 (95% CI: 0.66-1.85) among unmarried 
men with low discount rates, who were of average age and wealth, and had some primary education or 
less.  Having high discount rates lowered these odds to 0.79 (95% CI: 0.47-1.12).  Marital status 
significantly moderated the association between high discount rates and not using a condom at last sex, 
but not in the predicted direction (AOR 0.52, 95% CI 0.3-0.88, p=.016.)   The effect of high discount rates 
was half the size among unmarried men as it was among married men.  These results are illustrated in 
Figure 7.  Full results are shown in Table 13 columns 4 and 6. 
Summary of All Findings 
To assist in identifying non-significant, but noteworthy trends in the data, the Kenya results are 
summarized in Figure 5 to Figure 8.  These trends are reviewed in the discussion section.  The main 
effects of time preference on each risk behavior are summarized in Figure 5.  Point estimates are the 
odds ratios associated with having high discount rates for each risk behavior.  Low discount rates were 
the reference.  Odds ratios greater than one indicate that having high discount rates was associated with 
higher odds of each risk behavior.  Unadjusted models are on the left, adjusted models on the right.  
Adjusted models controlled for age, marital status, wealth, and education.  All models used standard 
errors clustered by village.  The horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  The red vertical line 
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in each chart represents an odds ratio of 1, indicating even odds of engaging in risk behavior.  The full 
results for each model are shown in Table 9 to Table 13, columns 1 and 2.   
Figure 6 summarizes the adjusted odds ratios associated with inconsistent discounting (i.e., low 
discount rates in the far term, high discount rates in the near term) for each risk behavior.  The 
reference is having consistently low discount rates (i.e., low discount rates in both the near and far 
terms.)   Odds ratios greater than one indicate that inconsistent discounting was associated with higher 
odds of engaging in each risk behavior.  Full results for each model are shown in Table 9 to Table 13, 
column 3.   Figure 7 contains the coefficients for the interaction of “high” discount rates and being 
unmarried.  Coefficients less than one indicate that the effect of having high discount rates on the odds 
of risk behavior among unmarried men was less than it was among married men.   Full results for each 
model are shown in Table 9 to Table 13, column 4.   Figure 8 shows the adjusted odds ratios associated 
with having high discount rates for each risk behavior, disaggregated by marital status.  Men were 
divided into two samples based on marital status.  Separate analysis was conducted on each sample.   
Results for married men are on the left and unmarried men on the right.  Low discount rates are the 
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Figure 5.  Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratios for “High Discount Rate” for Each HIV Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 25 to 49 
Years, in Kenya.   “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk 
behavior.  Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  Unadjusted odds ratios for “high discount rate” are shown 
on the left.  Adjusted odds ratios are on the right.  Adjusted models controlled for age, marital status, wealth, and 
education.   Full results are shown in Table 9 to Table 13, columns 1 and 2.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01  
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Figure 6.  Adjusted Odds Ratios for “Inconsistent Discounting” (i.e., Present Bias) for Each Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 25 To 
49 Years, In Kenya.  Reference is consistently “low discount rate”.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for 
each risk behavior.  Full results are in Table 9 to Table 13, column 3. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Moderation:  Marital Status  
 
Disaggregated Results:  Marital Status   
Figure 7.  Coefficients for the Interaction of “High Discount Rate”and Being Unmarried: Men, Ages 25 to 49 
Years, in Kenya.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk behavior. Full results are in 
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Figure 8.  Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate” for Each Risk Behavior, Disaggregated by Marital status, in Kenya, 
among men, ages 25 to 49 years.  “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression 
models for each risk behavior. Full results are in Table 9 to Table 13, columns 5 and 6. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Malawi Results  
Significant Findings 
The five risk behaviors of interest in Malawi were:  having sexually concurrent partners; having 
more than one sexual partner in the past 12 months; using alcohol during an average week; refusal of 
post-survey HIV test; and infrequently using condoms in the past 12 months.  15% of respondents had 
high discount rates.  5% of respondents displayed inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias.)   
There were two notable significant results in Malawi.   First, respondents who had high discount 
rates had 1.46 times higher odds of refusing post-survey HIV testing (AOR 1.46, 95% CI 1.01-2.11, 
p=.046), compared with respondents with low discount rates.  Although statistically significant, the 
practical effect of having high discount rates was relatively modest due to the low baseline odds of 
refusing testing.   These baseline odds were 0.17 (95% CI .10-.24) among men with low discount rates 
who were married, of average age and wealth, no education, and from the South region.  Having high 
discount rates increased these odds by 1.46 times, resulting in odds of 0.24 (95% CI 0.13-0.36). These 
results are shown in Figure 9.  The full results are shown in Table 17, columns 1 and 2.  Second, 
inconsistent discounting was a marginally significant predictor of having concurrent sexual partnerships, 
although not in the predicted direction.  Compared with respondents with consistently low discount 
rates, those who demonstrated inconsistent discounting had 38% lower odds of having concurrent 
sexual partners (AOR 0.62, 95% CI: 0.36-1.06). 
Summary of All Findings 
The Malawi results are summarized in Figure 9 to Figure 16.  Noteworthy trends in the data are 
reviewed in the discussion section.  Figure 9 illustrates the main effects of time preference on HIV risk 
behavior.   Point estimates are the odds ratios and adjusted odds ratios associated with having high 
discount rates for each risk behavior.   Low discount rates were the reference.  Separate logistic 
regression models were estimated for each risk behavior.  Unadjusted models are on the left, and 
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adjusted models are on the right.   Adjusted models controlled for sex, age, marital status, wealth, 
education and region.  Standard errors were clustered by family unit.  The horizontal bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  The red vertical line in each chart represents an odds ratio of 1, indicating even 
odds of engaging in risk behavior.  The full results for each model are shown in Table 14 to Table 18, 
columns 1 and 2.  
Figure 10 shows the adjusted odds ratios associated with displaying inconsistent discounting 
(low discount rates in the far term, high discount rates in the near term) for each risk behavior.   The 
reference is respondents who displayed consistently low discount rates (i.e., low discount rates in both 
the near term and the far term).   Full results are shown in shown in Table 14 to Table 18, column 3. 
As illustrated in Figure 11, sex did not significantly moderate the effect of high discounting on the odds 
of risk behavior.   Point estimates represent the adjusted odds ratios of the interaction of being female 
and having high discount rates.  Full results are shown in Table 14 to Table 18, column 4. To aid in 
identifying how the relationship between time preference and HIV risk behavior varies by sex, I 
estimated separate models for women and men for each risk behavior.  These results are summarized in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13, for women and men, respectively.  Unadjusted model results are on the left, 
and adjusted model results are on the right.  Point estimates represent the odds ratios and adjusted 
odds ratios associated with having high discount rates.  Low discount rates are the reference.  Full 
results for women are shown in Table 19.   Full results for men are in shown in Table 20 to Table 24, 
columns 1 and 2. 
To facilitate comparing results in Kenya and Malawi, I examined whether marital status 
moderated the relationship between time preference and risk behavior among men only in Malawi.  
These results are summarized in Figure 14.  Full regression results are shown in Table 20 to Table 24, 
column 4.  The point estimates represent the adjusted odds ratios associated with the interaction of 
high discount rates and being unmarried.   To assist in interpreting these results, I estimated separate 
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models for married and unmarried men for each risk behavior.  These findings are summarized in Figure 
15.  Point estimates are the adjusted odds ratios associated with high discount rates for married and 
unmarried men.  The full regression results are shown in Table 20 to Table 24, column 5 and 6.   There 
were insufficient numbers of cases to test the effect of inconsistent discounting on risk behavior among 
men only, or to estimate any additional models for women. 
I also estimated the main effect of time preference on risk behavior among men in Malawi, 
between 25 to 49 years, the same age range as men in Kenya.   These men comprised 24% (n=719) of 
the Malawi sample.   The odds ratios associated with having high discount rates for each risk behavior 
are summarized in Figure 16.  Unadjusted results are on the left, adjusted results are on the right.  There 
were not a sufficient number of cases to conduct any tests of moderation for this group.  Full regression 


























More than one partner in past 12 months
Alcohol use in average week
Refused post-survey HIV test






.5 1 1.5 2
Adjusted Odds Ratios for Impatience
**
Figure 9.  Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate” for Each Risk Behavior: Men and Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi.   
“Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk behavior.  Horizontal bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  Unadjusted odds ratios for “high discount rate” are shown on the left.  Adjusted models are on the right and control for sex, 
age, marital status, wealth, education, and region. Full results are in Table 14 to Table 18, columns 1 and 2. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Figure 10.  Adjusted Odds Ratios for “Inconsistent Discounting” (i.e., Present Bias) for Each Risk Behavior: Men and 
Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi.  Reference is consistently “future-oriented”.  Results are from separate logistic 
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Figure 11.  Adjusted Odds Ratios for Interaction of “High Discount Rate” and Being Female for Each Risk Behavior: 
Men and Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each 
risk behavior.  Full results are in Table 14 to Table 18, column 4.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Figure 12. Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate” for Each Risk Behavior: Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in 
Malawi.   “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk behavior. Full 
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Figure 13.  Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate”for Each Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi. 
  “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk behavior. Full results are in Table 20 
to Table 24, columns 1 and 2. .+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Figure 14.  Adjusted Odds Ratios for Interaction of “High Discount Rate” and Being Unmarried for Each Risk Behavior: 
Men, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk behavior.  Full 
results are in Table 20 to Table 24, columns 5 and 6.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Figure 15.  Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate” for Each Risk Behavior, Disaggregated by Marital Status: Men, 
Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi. “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression 
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Figure 16.  Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratio for “High Discount Rate” for Each Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, 
in Malawi.  “Low discount rate” was the reference.  Results are from separate logistic regression models for each risk 






In this section, I summarize and compare the Kenya and Malawi results.  I then review the 
collective evidence for and against an association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  I find 
that five of the study’s significant results, as well as trends in the data, provide preliminary evidence that 
time preference influences some HIV risk behaviors, although further research is needed to confirm and 
expand upon these findings.  Finally, I discuss study implications, limitations and priorities for future 
research. 
Summary of Results 
This study examined the association between individuals’ time preferences and HIV risk 
behavior in two independent samples:  men in Kenya, ages 25 to 49 years, and men and women in 
Malawi, ages 15 to 64 years.  Time preference refers to the preference for immediate rewards over 
delayed rewards, and is typically expressed as a discount rate, which is the percent by which individuals 
undervalue delayed rewards.   The central hypothesis of this study is that individuals with high discount 
rates, who undervalue their future health to a greater extent, will have higher odds of engaging in HIV 
risk behavior, compared with individuals with low discount rates. 
There was stronger evidence of an association between time preference and risk behavior in 
Kenya than in Malawi.  Few results were significant, however, and there was substantial heterogeneity 
in the magnitude and direction of this association by sex, marital status and potentially by age.  There 
was less evidence that inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) was associated with risk behavior.    
In Kenya, men with high discount rates had higher odds of being uncircumcised at baseline 
(marginally significant) and drinking during a normal week (marginally significant for married men), but 
had lower odds of not using a condom at last sex (significant for unmarried men.)   Inconsistent 
discounting (i.e., present bias) was associated with higher odds of not using condoms at last sex 
(significant).  In Malawi, high discount rates were associated with significantly higher odds of refusing 
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post-survey HIV testing among the full sample of men and women.   When disaggregated by sex, 
however, men with high discount rates had lower odds of refusing post-survey HIV testing (marginally 
significant.)   Significant associations between high discount rates and HIV risk behaviors are 
summarized in Table 26.   Significant and non-significant results are summarized in Table 27, in order to 
illustrate trends in the data.  
Comparison of Kenya and Malawi Results 
There was not a high degree of concurrence between the Kenya and Malawi results.  Because 
the study was an initial exploration of the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior, I 
estimated separate models for Kenya and Malawi, rather than combining the samples.   As a result, I was 
not able to statistically test differences in the country results.  This discussion should therefore be 
interpreted with caution since observed differences and similarities may be due to sampling variability, 
rather than actual effects.   
The primary challenge in comparing the country results was that the Kenya sample was 
comprised of men, ages 25 to 49 years, while the Malawi sample was comprised of women and men, 
ages 15 to 64 years.   As a result, differences in country results may have been due to age or sex effects, 
and not to actual differences in the association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.  Where 
possible, I compare the Kenya results with the results from men in Malawi within the same 25 to 49 year 
age range.   Because this sample of men in Malawi was relatively small (n=712) and unevenly distributed 
between “high” and “low” discount rate categories, it was necessary to analyze data from the full 
sample of Malawi men, ages 15 to 64 years, when comparing the moderating effect of marital status 
and the effect of inconsistent discounting (analytically treated as a test of moderation) on the 
association between time preference and HIV risk behavior.   The following discussion examines both 





The Kenya and Malawi results were similar with respect to the condom use outcomes.   High 
discount rates were associated with higher odds of not using a condom at last sex in Kenya (Figure 5, 
Table 13, column 2), and were associated with higher odds of infrequent condom use in Malawi, within 
the full sample of men (Figure 13, Table 24, column 2), and among men ages 25 to 49 years (Figure 16, 
Table 25).  This trend was also observed among women in Malawi.  Although the Kenya and Malawi 
measures were not identical, they complemented one another.  Condom use at last sex is likely to be 
recalled with greater accuracy, while infrequent condom use over the past 12 months may be a more 
stable measure of respondents’ condom use.  Together, these results suggest individuals with high 
discount rates, who undervalue their future health to a greater extent, may be less willing to incur the 
present “costs” of condom use (ex: inconvenience, reduced partner intimacy), compared with 
individuals with low discount rates.   Observing this association within two groups of men, ages 25 to 49 
years, in two different countries increases confidence in these results for this population.    
More Than One Sexual Partner 
Results for having more than one sexual partner differed across the two countries.  Although not 
significant, high discount rates were associated with higher odds of having more than one sexual partner 
in Kenya (Figure 5, Table 10, column 2).  In Malawi, among men, ages 25 to 49 years, higher discounting 
was associated with slightly higher odds of having more than one sexual partner, as well as higher odds 
of having concurrent sexual partners, a related behavior (Figure 16, Table 25).  Among the full sample of 
men in Malawi, however, greater discounting was associated with lower odds of having more than one 
partner (Figure 13, Table 21, column 2).   These results suggest that some of the differences between 
the Kenya and Malawi results may be due to age effects.  For example, men over 49 years may engage in 
different patterns of sexual behavior or may be less likely to be future oriented due to their advanced 
age.   Differences in results may also be due to factors correlated with age, such as income or marriage.  
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Future research might explore these potential moderators of the effect of time preference on risk 
behavior. This analysis could refine our understanding of how time preference influences risk behavior 
at different stages of a person’s life, as well as across different age groups in the population, possibly 
contributing to more targeted interventions in the future.    
Another possible explanation for the divergent results in Kenya and Malawi, with respect to 
having more than one sexual partner, is unmeasured characteristics of respondents’ (prospective) 
partners or unmodeled interpersonal dynamics between respondents and their partners.  These factors 
could have had unpredictable effects on the association between time preference and having more than 
one sexual partner, producing results that did not conform to expectation.  For example, men with 
higher discount rates might have had undesirable character traits, such as being unreliable, which made 
it more difficult for them to find multiple sexual partners, buffering the predicted association between 
high discount rates and having more than one sexual partner.  Alternatively, men who excessively 
discounted their own future health may have nonetheless highly valued their partners’ future health, 
prompting them to only have one sexual partner, again complicating the expected association between 
high discounting and risk behavior.  In the future, developing models that account for both participants’ 
discount rates and also for interactions between the two, might allow for more accurate predictions of 
risk behavior that involve two people, facilitating a broader understanding of these behaviors. 
Alcohol Use  
Few other similarities between the two countries were observed.   Among married men in 
Kenya, high discounting was a marginally significant predictor of drinking alcohol in a normal week 
(Figure 8, Table 11, columns 4 and 5), but was associated with lower odds of drinking during an average 
week in Malawi, among all married men (Figure 15, Table 22, columns 4 and 5).   There was insufficient 
sample size to estimate this association for only married men, ages 25 to 49 years.  Social norms related 
to drinking alcohol appear to be relatively similar in Kenya and Malawi, so most likely do not account for 
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these divergent results.  Drinking is common in both countries due the high availability and low cost of 
informal alcohol, or alcohol brewed at home (Hall et al., 1993; R. J. Limaye et al., 2014; Othieno et al., 
2000; Papas et al., 2010).  
These divergent findings are indicative of the larger finding of married and unmarried men in 
each country having opposing results.  For example, in Kenya, unmarried men with high discount rates 
had lower odds of four of the five risk behaviors examined, while in Malawi, unmarried men had higher 
odds of these same four behaviors or their equivalent.  These differences may also be due to age effects, 
since the sample of men in Malawi span a wider age range than in Kenya, but a larger sample of men, 
ages 25 to 49 years, in Malawi is needed to test this hypothesis.  This trend is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
HIV Testing 
The results for the HIV testing behaviors also differed between the two countries.   In Kenya, 
high discounting was not associated with being tested for HIV in the past, perhaps due to many different 
factors having influenced their decision to be tested since 2013, the year the Kenya survey was 
administered, muting the influence of respondents’ time preferences (Figure 5, Table 12, column 2).  In 
Malawi, by contrast, high discounting was associated with significantly higher odds of refusing home-
based rapid tests in the full Malawi sample (Figure 9, Table 17, column 2) and all subgroups (women 
only, men only, and men 25 to 49 years).  These tests were offered in 2006 when testing was relatively 
new and also were home based, factors which may have mitigated outside influences on the decision to 
be tested, allowing for respondents’ time preferences to play a larger role.  These results should be 
interpreted with caution, since I was not able to control for past testing, and different testing protocols 
were offered to married and unmarried respondents in 2006. 
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Inconsistent Discounting (“Present bias”) 
The association between inconsistent discounting and HIV risk behavior also differed between 
Kenya (Figure 6, Table 9 to Table 13, column 3) and Malawi (Figure 10, Table 14 to Table18, column 3).  
Rather than uniformly increasing the odds of risk behavior, as predicted by behavioral economics, 
inconsistent discounting had the opposite effect on similar risk behaviors in the two countries.  For 
example, individuals who demonstrated inconsistent discounting had significantly higher odds of not 
using a condom at last sex in Kenya, but had lower odds of infrequent condom use in Malawi, compared 
with individuals with consistently low discount rates.  One possible explanation for these differences is 
age and sex effects.  There were not enough men in Malawi who displayed inconsistent discounting to 
be able to compare the results from this group with men in Kenya.  Instead, I had to use the full Malawi 
sample, which was comprised of women and men, from a wider range of ages than in Kenya.  These 
differences could have altered the relationship between inconsistent discounting and risk behavior in 
unpredictable ways, causing the country results to differ.  In addition, both samples contained 
subpopulations whose behavior did not conform to theory.  Unmarried men in Kenya and married men 
in Malawi with high discount rates inexplicably had lower odds of risk behavior compared with 
respondents with low discount rates.   The presence of these groups in the samples likely skewed the 
expected association between inconsistent discounting and risk behavior.  Future studies might try to 
replicate these analyses in other samples to determine if the differences in the Kenya and Malawi 
results are due to the lack of a systematic association between inconsistent discounting and risk 
behavior, or if these differences are due to one of the other factors cited here.   
Unmarried Men in Kenya 
It is unclear why unmarried men in Kenya with high discount rates had lower odds of risk 
behavior for four of the five outcomes examined (Figure 8, to Table 13, columns 4 and 6).   One possible 
explanation is that this population faces unique social pressures to marry, which potentially distorts the 
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expected relationship between time preference and risk behavior.   The Kenya sample was comprised of 
men, ages 25 to 49 years, and within this relatively older age group, only 12% of men were unmarried.  
Social norms in Kenya promote marriage, and families encourage marriage as a means of expanding 
kinship networks and continuing the male lineage around which inheritance rights are based (Luke & 
Munshi, 2006; Njoroge).  Older, unmarried men in Kenya with high discount rates, who are more 
concerned with immediate rewards, may be more responsive to acute familial and social pressure to get 
married.  As a result, they may be less likely to engage in and self-report HIV risk behaviors, such as 
drinking or having multiple sexual partners, as a means of maximizing their chances of finding a spouse.  
The unexpected association between high discount rates and lower odds of risk behavior was not found 
in the full sample of men in Malawi  (Figure 15, Table 20 to Table 24, column 4 and 6), but this result 
may be due to men in Malawi being substantially younger than unmarried men in Kenya.  89% of men in 
the Malawi sample were between 15 and 24 years old, while unmarried men in Kenya were between 25 
to 49 years old.   Younger men in Malawi may not have faced the same pressure to get married, either 
due to differing social norms or because of their younger age, resulting in high discount rates being 
associated with higher odds of risk behavior, as expected.   It was not possible to limit the Malawi 
sample to only unmarried men, within the same 25 to 49 year old age range as in Kenya, due to 
insufficient sample size. 
Although this explanation for the unexpected results in Kenya is speculative, it underscores the 
fact that in the real world, choices can involve multiple, conflicting immediate and delayed rewards  
(Frederick et al., 2002).  Older, unmarried men in Kenya with high discount rates may be drawn by both 
the immediate pleasure of engaging in HIV risk behavior, as well as the immediate need to placate their 
families, which might require abstaining from HIV risk behavior.  Individuals’ time preferences can 
provide insight into how individuals weigh immediate versus delayed rewards associated with HIV risk 
behavior, but these preferences provide less information about how individuals weigh competing 
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immediate rewards and competing delayed rewards that may influence risk behavior.  Including more 
contextual factors into models of risk behavior, such as relevant social norms, may help to address this 
gap.   
Married Men in Malawi 
Another result that requires explanation is why married men in Malawi with high discount rates 
had lower to even odds of having concurrent sexual partners, having more than one sexual partner, and 
drinking alcohol in an average week (Figure 15, Table 20 to Table 24, column 4 and 5).  These results 
were not observed among married men in Kenya (Figure 8, Table 9 to Table 13, columns 4 and 5).  64% 
of married men in Malawi are age 25 to 49 years, the same age range as married men in Kenya, which 
suggests that age effects may play less of a role in explaining these different results.  Married men in 
Kenya and Malawi had somewhat similar baseline odds of having more than one sexual partner (15% 
Kenya, 22% Malawi) and of drinking alcohol in an average week (38% Kenya, 23% Malawi).  It is possible 
that these differences are due to unmeasured factors in Malawi that are correlated with high discount 
rates and lower odds of each of the three risk behaviors listed above, or that there is no systematic 
association between high discounting and these risk behaviors among married men in Malawi.   
Women in Malawi 
Trends in the data suggest that the positive association between discounting and risk behavior 
was less positive for women than for men with respect to refusing post-survey HIV testing (Figure 11, 
Table 17, column 4) and infrequent condom use (Figure 11, Table 18, column 4).  These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that women’s own discount rates would have less influence on their risk 
behavior because they have less control over their behavior than do men.  For example, a woman with a 
low discount rate may want to use condoms with her partner, but be unable to negotiate their use.  The 
results also suggest, however, that the positive association between discounting and risk behavior was 
more positive for women than it was for men, with respect to having concurrent sexual partners, having 
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more than one sexual partner, and using alcohol in an average week, an unexpected result.  One 
possible explanation is that women had significantly lower baseline odds of engaging in these three risk 
behaviors than did men.  The multiplicative increase in odds due to high discounting may therefore be 
greater for women than for men.  Summarized as percentages, rather than odds, for easier 
interpretation, 3% of women reported having concurrent sexual partnerships, compared with 32% of 
men (p<.001).   1.6% of women had more than one sexual partner, compared with 22% of men (p<.001).  
Less than 5% of women reported drinking in an average week, compared with 41% of men (p<001).  
There was much less difference in baseline odds between women and men with respect to refusal of 
post-survey HIV testing (7% of women and 8% of men refused, p=.27) and infrequent condom use (83% 
of women and 74% of men reported infrequent condom use, p<.001), which might explain why the 
association between time preference and these risk behaviors was less positive for women than for 
men, as expected. 
Evidence for and Against an Association Between Time Preference and HIV Risk Behavior 
Across both countries, there were four significant results that suggest high discount rates are 
associated with higher odds of HIV risk behavior.   In Kenya, men with high discount rates had lower 
odds of being circumcised at baseline (marginally significant).  Married men with high discount rates had 
higher odds of drinking alcohol in a normal week in Kenya (marginally significant.)  Men who 
demonstrated inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) had significantly higher odds of not using 
condoms at last sex compared with men who had consistently low discount rates.  In Malawi, individuals 
with high discount rates had significantly higher odds of refusing post-survey HIV testing.   In addition to 
these results, several non-significant trends suggest that time preference may influence HIV risk 
behavior.  In Kenya, time preference predicted higher odds of four of the five risk behaviors examined.  
Although unmarried men with high discount rates had lower odds of four of the five behaviors, these 
men comprised just 12% of the sample, and may comprise a similarly small proportion of the larger 
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population.  Moreover, the results for unmarried men might be indicative of their facing competing 
immediate rewards, rather than indicating the lack of an association between time preference and risk 
behavior.  In Malawi, women with high discount rates had consistently higher odds of engaging in all five 
risk behaviors examined, although this result may be of limited practical significance since women had 
low baseline odds of engaging in risk behavior.  Individuals across all subgroups in Malawi – women, 
married men, unmarried men, and men ages 25 to 49 years –who had higher discount rates had higher 
odds of refusing post-survey HIV testing and of infrequent condom use. 
Other study results suggest a more limited association between time preference and HIV risk 
behavior.   Few study results reached the level of statistical significance.  The observed trends might 
have occurred by chance or be an artifact of the particular samples used.  It was difficult to directly 
compare the country results since there were too few men in Malawi in the same age range as men in 
Kenya, an issue which was exacerbated by the time preference measure used in Malawi which 
categorized only 15% of respondents as having high discount rates.   It is still unclear why unmarried 
men in Kenya and married men in Malawi with high discount rates had lower odds of risk behavior.  
Married men in Malawi comprised over a third of the sample, so if the association between time 
preference and risk behavior does not hold in this group, it casts doubt on the validity of the association 
in a large segment of the population.  In addition, there appear to be many unmodeled factors which 
could potentially alter the observed associations between time preference and risk behavior in 
unpredictable ways if included.  Examples are cultural factors or the influence of respondents’ partners 
for outcomes that involve two people.  Finally, there is the highly uneven performance of inconsistent 
discounting in predicting higher odds of risk behavior, as predicted.   For example, while inconsistent 
discounting was associated with higher odds of refusing post-survey HIV testing, it was also a marginally 
significant predictor of lower odds of having concurrent sexual partners, an unexpected result.   There is 
much more empirical support for this model of discounting in the literature than for the traditional 
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economic perspective (Frederick et al., 2002; George Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999), which makes it puzzling why the association between inconsistent discounting and risk behavior 
varied so widely within and across countries.   
On balance, there appears to be enough evidence to warrant future research into the 
association between time preference and risk behavior.  Future studies are needed, however, to confirm 
the associations found in this study, to answer lingering questions raised by this analysis, to develop 
better calibrated measures of time preferences, to compare results across more similar samples of 
respondents to control for confounding factors such as age or marital status, and to replicate this 
analysis in other samples and settings to determine the generalizability of the results. 
Study Implications  
Study findings contribute to the literature in a few ways.  First, this project is one of the earlier 
studies to document an association between time preference and HIV risk behavior in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  These findings expand the existing evidence base on time preferences and health by introducing 
research on a new set of health behaviors from a new setting.   Second, the study provides very 
preliminary evidence that the associations between time preference and health behavior documented 
in the U.S. may also be applicable in sub-Saharan Africa.  This finding may contribute to the rationale for 
conducting additional studies on the association between time preference and different health 
behaviors of concern in the region.  Third, the study demonstrates the feasibility of using choices over 
hypothetical monetary rewards to measure individuals’ time preferences in low resource settings, and 
then using these measures to predict some HIV risk behaviors.  These activities might help inform future 
studies of time preference and health.   Finally, study findings which suggest that excessive discounting 
is more closely associated with HIV risk behavior than inconsistent discounting may contribute to our 
understanding of which cognitive process may be more important for understanding these particular set 
of behaviors.  Further study is needed to confirm and expand on these results.   
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Study results have several practical implications for interventions.  For risk behaviors that are 
associated with high discounting, researchers could potentially identify individuals who may be more 
likely to engage in risky behavior by assessing the individuals’ time preferences.  Researchers could then 
provide these individuals with additional support to adopt healthier behaviors.   Researchers could also 
further explore interventions that encourage individuals to adopt a more future-oriented outlook as a 
means to reduce risky behavior, although the extent to which individuals’ time preference can be 
altered is debatable  (G. S. Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Amy L Odum, 2011).   Promising examples include 
microfinance programs, cash transfers (Handa, Martorano, Thirumurthy, Halpern, & Pettifor), and 
schooling (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011; Perez-Arce, 2011).   Individuals with high discount rates, and 
with inconsistent discount rates, may both benefit from interventions that offer short term incentives to 
adopt healthy behaviors.  Because these individuals are more responsive to costs and benefits in the 
present, providing them with an immediate payoff may be more motivating to them than the promise of 
better health in the future.  Identifying individuals who demonstrate inconsistent discounting (i.e., 
present bias) could allow researchers to educate people who may be unaware that their self-control 
problems are preventing them from fulfilling their intention to adopt healthier behaviors (Ariely, 2008; 
Downs et al., 2009; G. Loewenstein et al., 2007).  Studies from the U.S. have documented the efficacy of 
interventions that help people overcome poor self-control (Ariely, 2008; Downs et al., 2009; G. 
Loewenstein et al., 2007).  Precommittment devices, for example, help individuals lock their future 
selves into desired courses of action (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999).  Someone wishing to end a concurrent relationship may bring a friend with them when they 
speak with their partner, to ensure they follow through with their plan.  They might also give a friend 
something valuable, and tell the friend to keep the item if they fail to end their relationship within a 
certain timeframe.  Similar strategies involving the loss of money or other goods have been used to 
assist people to reach their long term personal goals.  (Ariely, 2008)  One policy example is imposing 
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limits on where and when alcohol can be sold, making it more costly in terms of time and possibly 
transportation costs for individuals to obtain alcohol.  (Downs et al., 2009; G. Loewenstein et al., 2007)  
Limitations and Future Research 
This study had a number of limitations.  A primary limitation was the lack of statistical power 
due to the time preference measure used in Malawi.  Only 15% of respondents were categorized as 
having high discount rates, while the remaining 85% had low discount rates.  Combined with the 
relatively low prevalence of risk behavior in the sample, particularly for women, this imbalance limited 
the ability to conduct subgroup analyses and tests of moderation.  The decision to define the variable in 
this manner was based on the uneven distribution of responses to the Malawi time preference 
questions, in which a majority of respondents fell into three of ten response categories.  Past studies 
had similar problems with responses to time preference questions being highly skewed  (G. B. Chapman 
& Coups, 1999).  In the future, pilot testing time preference measures in the study population may assist 
in developing better calibrated measures that distribute respondents more evenly across response 
categories.    
An improved measure may allow for the construction of a categorical time preference variable, 
which could provide a more nuanced understanding of how discounting affects behavior, as well as 
increase statistical power.   A categorical measure would also allow for a fuller exploration of the effect 
of inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) on HIV risk behavior.  For example, it might be possible to 
assess whether high discounting in the near term leads to larger increases in the odds of risk behavior 
among respondents with the lowest discount rates in the far term, versus those with medium-low 
discount rates in the far term.    
To address the lack of power in this study, I reran each model in Kenya and Malawi using a 
quasi-continuous measure of respondents’ discount rates in which respondents were divided into 
quartiles based on their median discount rate.  These results were somewhat similar to the results based 
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on the dichotomous measure of time preference and provided a useful comparison.  This approach is 
not found in the literature because time preference measures like the ones used in Kenya and Malawi 
are primarily intended to categorize respondents as having higher or lower discount rates relative to one 
another, and not to generate point estimates of discount rates on an absolute scale.    
A second limitation is that the time preference measures used have not yet been extensively 
tested in low resource settings.  In areas with weak institutions, individuals may choose immediate 
rewards over delayed prizes not because they have high discount rates, but rather because they cannot 
be certain that the larger, delayed prize will be delivered as promised.   The Kenya and Malawi studies 
attempt to mitigate this concern by using hypothetical prizes and by telling respondents that the larger, 
delayed prize will be held by someone trustworthy.  A related concern is that in environments with less 
material security, individuals’ answers may be influenced more by their immediate economic concerns 
than their more stable, underlying time preference.  Future research could investigate the validity of the 
time preference measures by experimenting with real monetary prizes, by conducting qualitative 
research on how respondents interpret these questions, or by cross validating economic-based time 
preference measures with measures from psychology that assess respondents’ future-orientation with 
qualitative questions, such as “I believe that a person’s day should be planned ahead each 
morning.”(Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999)   
A related limitation is that this study assumes that discount rates for hypothetical monetary 
rewards predict how individuals discount their future health.   Discount rates are often measured using 
actual or hypothetical monetary rewards because these questions are easy for respondents to 
understand, and can be quantified allowing for cross-study comparison.   Some research suggests, 
however, that discount rates are domain specific, meaning that individuals discount different goods, 
such as food or money, at different rates (Gretchen B Chapman, 1996; G. B. Chapman & Elstein, 1995; 
Amy L. Odum, 2011).  One study measured respondents’ time preferences for money and for health, 
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and found that the monetary measure better predicted uptake of the influenza vaccine.  This study 
suggested that monetary measures possibly performed better because they are easier for respondents 
to understand, and thus more reliable (G. B. Chapman & Coups, 1999).  It may also be that discount 
rates for monetary rewards are a reasonable approximation for discount rates for health to be useful in 
studies.  Further research on this topic is needed.   
Fourth, I estimated separate models for Kenya and Malawi, rather than combining the samples.  
I chose this approach so that I could focus more on each country’s time preference measures, model 
specification, and within-country trends.  However, as an initial study, I was also interested in exploring 
how generalizable the association between time preferences and HIV risk behavior was and had the 
opportunity to analyze time preference data from two sub-Saharan countries.   In the future, analyzing 
the country data together using standard logistic regression or multilevel modeling (respondents nested 
within countries) might allow for differences in estimated coefficients between the two countries to be 
formally tested.  Additional statistical techniques may be needed to conduct these comparisons if 
outcomes are binary.   
Fifth and finally, as a cross-sectional study, it was not possible to establish temporal ordering of 
individuals’ time preference and risk behavior.   Rather than time preference predicting risk behavior, 
causality could run in the opposite direction.  Risk behavior could be associated with a higher likelihood 
of actual or perceived HIV-infection, resulting in the adoption of a more present-focused outlook due to 
perceived reductions in life expectancy.   Obtaining a positive or negative HIV test result might also 
confound the association between time preference and risk behavior. A positive result, for example, 
could cause both greater focus on the present, as well as increases in one’s own risk behavior if 
individuals believe they have nothing to lose.  A negative result may have the same effects if it prompts 
individuals to believe they no longer need to be concerned about the long term consequences of 
engaging in risky behavior.  Although time preference is theorized to be a stable individual 
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characteristic, past studies have found that significant shocks, such as natural disasters, can prompt 
individuals to focus more on their short-term well-being (Callen, 2015; Cassar et al., 2017).  Potential 
reductions in life expectancy associated with being HIV-infected could have a similar effect.    
Disentangling the order of these different effects may require longitudinal studies which measure 
respondents’ time preference prior to the initiation of risky behaviors or to HIV testing.   Including time 
preference measures in future waves of the Malawi study, and recruiting younger respondents in which 
there is a lower prevalence of risk behavior, may be worth pursuing.     
4.5 Conclusion   
This study examined the association between individuals’ time preferences and HIV risk 
behavior in two independent samples:  men in Kenya, ages 25 to 49 years, and men and women, in 
Malawi, ages 15 to 64 years.  Respondents were categorized as having “high” or “low” discount rates 
based on choices over hypothetical monetary rewards.   Similar criteria were used to divide respondents 
in Kenya and Malawi to allow for cross country comparison of results.     
In Kenya, high discount rates were associated with greater odds of being uncircumcised at 
baseline, and of drinking alcohol in a normal week among married men.  These results were marginally 
significant.    Men who demonstrated inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) had significantly higher 
odds of not using condoms at last sex compared with men who had consistently low discount rates.  In 
Malawi, individuals with high discount rates had significantly higher odds of refusing post-survey HIV 
testing.      
Few other results were significant.  Sex and marital status did not significantly moderate the 
association between time preference and HIV risk behavior, although trends in the data suggest that this 
association did vary by subgroup.  High discount rates were consistently associated with higher odds of 
risk behavior among women in Malawi.  High discount rates were inexplicably associated with lower   
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odds of risk behavior among unmarried men in Kenya, and among married men in Malawi.  Future 













 No. % No. % pa 
A.  Time Preference      
“High Discount Rate”, No. (%) 1041 (55) 131 (18) 0 
 Total 1890     
“Inconsistent Discounting” (“Present bias”), No. (%) 174 (9) 56 (8) 0.25 
 Total 1890     
B.  Baseline Characteristics      
Age, mean (SD) 34 (7) 36 (7.1) 0 
Wealth based on asset indexb, mean (SD) 3.1 (1.5) 3.0c (1.4)  
Married, no. (%) 1655 (88) 693 (96) 0 
Education, no. (%)      
 No education 6 (0) 133 (19) 0 
 Some primary education 478 (25) 303 (42)  
 Completed primary education 610 (32) 150 (21)  
 Some secondary education 247 (13) 86 (12)  
 Completed secondary or greater 549 (29) 47 (7)  
 Total 1890  719   
C.  HIV status and Perceived HIV Risk      
HIV-infected (self-report), No. (%) 117 (7) - - - 
 Total 1743     
HIV-infected (HIV test results from 2004 and 2006), No. (%) - - 33 (5) - 
 Total   719   
Self-reported chance of having HIV, among those who 
reported being not HIV-infected, No. (%)   
   
 No risk at all 273 (17) 552 (77) 0 
 Low 894 (55) 109 (15)  
 Moderate 375 (23) 29 (4)  
 High 84 (5) 27 (4)  
 Total 1626  717   
D.  Self-reported Risk Behavior      
Uncircumcised at baseline, No. (%) 1501 (84) - - - 
 Total 1782     
More than one sexual partner in the past 12 months, No. (%) 320 (17) 150 (22) 0.01 
 Total 1843  693   
Drink alcohol in a normal (Kenya) or average (Malawi) week, 
No. (%) 497 (27) 181 (25) 
0.52 
 Total 1875  716   
Not previously tested for HIV, No. (%) 162 (9) - - - 
 Total 1774     
Condom not used at last sexual intercourse, No. (%) 1431 (76) - - - 
 Total 1882     
Infrequently use condoms, No. (%) - - 530 (74) - 
 Total      
a.  Χ2 tests were conducted for categorical variables, and t-tests for continuous variables. 
b. Wealth index was defined as the number of household items respondents’ indicated that they owned from a list of 11 items 
in Kenya, and 16 items in Malawi. 
c. These wealth indices may not be perfectly comparable, however, because the underlying household items that formed the 









n=1366  All   n=3054   
 No. % No. % No. % p
a 
A.  Time Preference        
“High Discount Rate”, No. (%) 212 (13) 243 (18) 455 (15) 0 
 Total 1,688  1,366  3,054   
“Inconsistent Discounting” (“Present bias”),  
No. (%) 65 (4) 91 (7) 156 (5) 0 
 Total 1,649  1,340  2,989   
B.  Baseline Characteristics        
Age, mean (SD) 33.2 (12) 35.6 (13) 34.2 (12) 0 
Wealth based on asset indexb, mean (SD) 4.4 (2) 4.7 (2) 4.5 (2) 0 
Married, no. (%)        
 Never married 111 (7) 256 (19) 367 (12) 0 
 Married 1,389 (82) 1,081 (79) 2,470 (81)  
 Separated/divorced 120  (7) 20  (2) 140  (5)  
 Widowed 68 (4) 9 (1) 77 (3)  
 Total 1,688  1,366  3,054   
Education, no. (%)        
 No education 487 (29) 218 (16) 705 (23) 0 
 Some primary education 831 (49) 594 (44) 1,425 (47)  
 Completed primary education 214 (13) 275 (20) 489 (16)  
 Some secondary education 127 (8) 191 (14) 318 (10)  
 Completed secondary or greater 29 (2) 88 (6) 117 (4)  
 Total 1,688  1,366  3,054   
Region, no. (%)        
 Central 536 (32) 437 (32) 973 (32) 0.98 
 South 579 (34) 464 (34) 1,043 (34)  
 North 573 (34) 465 (34) 1,038 (34)  
 Total 1,688  1,366  3,054   
C.  HIV status and Perceived HIV Risk        
HIV-infected, based on HIV test offered post-2004 
survey, No. (%) 62 (6) 28 (3) 90 (4) 0.01 
 Total 1,136  908  2,044   
HIV-infected, based on HIV test offered post- 2006 
survey, No. (%) 89 (7) 38 (4) 127 (5) 0 
 Total 1,378  1,070  2,448   
Self-reported chance of having HIV, among those 
who reported being not HIV-infected, No. (%)       
 
 No risk at all 1,124 (67) 1,069 (79) 2,193 (72)  
 Low 372 (22) 214 (16) 586 (19)  
 Moderate 105 (6) 43 (3) 148 (5)  
 High 72 (4) 33 (2) 105 (4) 0 
 Total 1,673  1,359  3,032   
D.  Self-reported Risk Behavior        
More than one sexual partner in the past 12 
months, No. (%) 23 (2) 274 (22) 297 (11) 0 
 Total 1,450  1,223  2,673   
Concurrent sexual partners, No. (%) 47 (3) 411 (31) 458 (16) 0 
 Total 1,622  1,307  2,929   
Drink alcohol in an average week, No. (%) 34 (2) 278 (21) 312 (10) 0 
 Total 1,685  1,359  3,044   







n=1366  All   n=3054   
 Total 1,492  1,170  2,662   
Infrequent condom use in the past 12 months, No. 
(%) 1,344 (83) 963 (74) 2,307 (79) 0 
 Total 1,627  1,304  2,931   
a.  Χ2 tests were conducted for categorical variables, and t-tests for continuous variables. 







Table 8.  Determinants of Time Preference (“High Discount Rate”) 
  Malawi Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All Women Men Men 25 to 49 Years Men 25 to 49 Years 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Female 0.638*** [0.51,0.79]             
Unmarried 0.87 [0.65,1.17] 1.041 [0.70,1.54] 0.672+ [0.43,1.05] 1.006 [0.37,2.74] 1.23 [0.90,1.69] 
Age (5 year units) 0.999 [0.95,1.05] 1.018 [0.95,1.09] 0.969 [0.91,1.04] 0.948 [0.82,1.09] 1.05 [0.98,1.13] 
Primary Education 0.846 [0.65,1.11] 0.778 [0.54,1.13] 0.958 [0.64,1.43] 0.811 [0.48,1.36] 0.85 [0.66,1.09] 
Secondary Education 0.828 [0.53,1.28] 0.827 [0.41,1.67] 0.88 [0.50,1.56] 0.72 [0.32,1.60] 0.87 [0.67,1.13] 
Wealth 1.003 [0.95,1.06] 0.995 [0.93,1.07] 1.017 [0.94,1.10] 0.997 [0.89,1.11] 1.07* [1.01,1.14] 
Central Region 1.560*** [1.22,2.00] 1.938*** [1.36,2.77] 1.278 [0.92,1.78] 1.419 [0.89,2.27]     
North Region 0.550*** [0.40,0.76] 0.558* [0.34,0.92] 0.546** [0.36,0.83] 0.561+ [0.30,1.05]     
Constant 0.257*** [0.19,0.35] 0.151*** [0.11,0.21] 0.270*** [0.18,0.40] 0.279*** [0.17,0.45] 1.34* [1.04,1.71] 
N 3054   1688   1366   719   1890   







Table 9.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Being Uncircumcised at Baseline: Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, in Kenya 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
High Discount Rate 
(near term) 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.30+ [0.97,1.73] 1.29+ [0.97,1.72] 1.87+ a [0.93,3.78] 1.34+ [1.00,1.80] 1.34+ [1.00,1.79] 1.07 [0.51,2.24] 
Unmarried    0.92 [0.66,1.27] 0.91 [0.66,1.26] 1.05 [0.63,1.75]    1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)    1.20** [1.09,1.32] 1.20** [1.09,1.32] 1.20** [1.09,1.32] 1.16** [1.05,1.28] 1.64+ [0.96,2.79] 
Primary Education    0.74 [0.52,1.07] 0.74 [0.52,1.07] 0.74 [0.51,1.06] 0.67* [0.45,0.99] 2.91 [0.80,10.54] 
Secondary Education    0.64* [0.43,0.93] 0.64* [0.44,0.93] 0.63* [0.43,0.93] 0.67+ [0.43,1.02] 0.65 [0.28,1.50] 
Wealth    0.91+ [0.83,1.01] 0.91+ [0.83,1.01] 0.91+ [0.83,1.01] 0.92 [0.83,1.03] 0.84* [0.70,1.00] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.43 [0.86,2.38]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.5 [0.21,1.22]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        0.78 [0.38,1.58]       
Constant 4.65** [3.86,5.60] 6.52** [4.53,9.37] 6.11** [4.25,8.77] 6.42** [4.45,9.26] 6.50** [4.38,9.64] 7.07** [2.99,16.72] 
N 1782   1782   1782   1782   1560   222   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
a. This odds ratio compares the odds of being uncircumcised among respondents with “reverse” inconsistent discounting (high discount rates in the far term, and low discount 
rates in the near term), with the odds for respondents with consistently low discount rates.  “Reverse” inconsistent discounting is not well explained by theory, and may 









Table 10.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Having More Than One Sexual Partner in Past 12 Months: Men, Ages 
25 to 49 Years, in Kenya 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x  
High Discount Rate 
(near term) 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.12 [0.88,1.42] 1.1 [0.87,1.40] 1 [0.56,1.79] 1.19 [0.89,1.59] 1.19 [0.90,1.59] 0.78 [0.47,1.27] 
Unmarried    3.14** [2.19,4.50] 3.15** [2.20,4.51] 3.97** [2.56,6.16] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)    0.83** [0.74,0.92] 0.83** [0.74,0.92] 0.83** [0.74,0.92] 0.83** [0.74,0.93] 0.86 [0.61,1.23] 
Primary Education    1.01 [0.75,1.36] 1.01 [0.75,1.37] 1 [0.74,1.35] 1.08 [0.78,1.50] 0.59 [0.27,1.30] 
Secondary Education    0.91 [0.67,1.25] 0.91 [0.67,1.25] 0.91 [0.67,1.24] 0.91 [0.64,1.29] 0.88 [0.39,2.01] 
Wealth    1.09* [1.01,1.18] 1.09* [1.01,1.18] 1.09* [1.01,1.18] 1.07 [0.98,1.17] 1.22* [1.01,1.47] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.83 [0.54,1.26]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.3 [0.64,2.65]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        0.66 [0.37,1.19]       
Constant 0.20** [0.17,0.23] 0.17** [0.13,0.21] 0.17** [0.14,0.22] 0.16** [0.13,0.20] 0.16** [0.12,0.21] 0.81 [0.37,1.78] 
N 1843   1843   1843   1843   1648   195   









Table 11.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Drinking Alcohol in a Normal Week: Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, in Kenya 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
High Discount Rate 
(near term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.16 [0.93,1.45] 1.16 [0.93,1.45] 1.58+ a [0.98,2.57] 1.24+ [0.98,1.57] 1.24+ [0.98,1.58] 0.77 [0.31,1.87] 
Unmarried    1.63** [1.17,2.25] 1.63** [1.17,2.26] 2.09* [1.12,3.88] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)    1.03 [0.95,1.11] 1.03 [0.95,1.11] 1.03 [0.95,1.11] 0.99 [0.91,1.08] 1.33* [1.06,1.66] 
Primary Education    1.06 [0.83,1.36] 1.06 [0.83,1.37] 1.05 [0.82,1.35] 1.02 [0.76,1.36] 1.45 [0.65,3.23] 
Secondary Education    1.13 [0.87,1.46] 1.13 [0.87,1.47] 1.12 [0.86,1.45] 1.23 [0.91,1.66] 0.82 [0.44,1.55] 
Wealth    0.92* [0.85,1.00] 0.92* [0.85,1.00] 0.92* [0.84,1.00] 0.90* [0.82,0.99] 1.02 [0.83,1.25] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.17 [0.82,1.67]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.63 [0.35,1.15]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        0.65 [0.26,1.64]       
Constant 0.33** [0.27,0.41] 0.29** [0.22,0.37] 0.28** [0.21,0.36] 0.28** [0.22,0.36] 0.27** [0.21,0.35] 0.82 [0.36,1.87] 
N 1874   1874   1874   1874   1641   233   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
a. This odds ratio compares the odds of alcohol use among respondents with “reverse” inconsistent discounting (high discount rates in the far term, and low discount rates in 
the near term), with the odds for respondents with consistently low discount rates.  “Reverse” inconsistent discounting is not well explained by theory, and may represent 









Table 12.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Not Previously Tested for HIV: Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, in Kenya 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x High 
Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.04 [0.75,1.46] 1.01 [0.72,1.42] 1.56 [0.81,3.03] 1.04 [0.74,1.47] 1.04 [0.74,1.47] 0.74 [0.28,1.94] 
Unmarried    1.82* [1.12,2.96] 1.82* [1.13,2.95] 2.01+ [0.95,4.25] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)    1.21** [1.06,1.37] 1.21** [1.06,1.38] 1.21** [1.06,1.38] 1.17* [1.02,1.34] 1.46* [1.08,1.97] 
Primary Education    0.85 [0.53,1.37] 0.84 [0.53,1.35] 0.85 [0.53,1.36] 0.93 [0.57,1.52] 0.49 [0.16,1.53] 
Secondary Education    0.65+ [0.42,1.03] 0.64+ [0.41,1.00] 0.65+ [0.42,1.02] 0.73 [0.46,1.17] 0.43+ [0.18,1.07] 
Wealth    0.9 [0.78,1.04] 0.91 [0.79,1.05] 0.9 [0.78,1.04] 0.89 [0.77,1.03] 0.99 [0.75,1.31] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.57 [0.28,1.13]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.96 [0.36,2.58]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        0.85 [0.34,2.13]       
Constant 0.10** [0.08,0.12] 0.11** [0.08,0.16] 0.13** [0.09,0.18] 0.11** [0.08,0.16] 0.10** [0.07,0.15] 0.39* [0.17,0.91] 
N 1774   1774   1774   1774   1551   223   









Table 13.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Condom Not Used at Last Sex: Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, in Kenya 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term)  
x High Discount Rate 
(near term) 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.05 [0.79,1.41] 1.09 [0.81,1.46] 1.2 [0.76,1.89] 1.22 [0.88,1.70] 1.22 [0.89,1.69] 0.54* [0.33,0.90] 
Unmarried    0.18** [0.13,0.25] 0.18** [0.13,0.25] 0.27** [0.17,0.42] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)    1.01 [0.92,1.11] 1.01 [0.92,1.11] 1.01 [0.92,1.11] 0.94 [0.85,1.03] 1.62** [1.26,2.09] 
Primary Education    0.79 [0.59,1.06] 0.79 [0.59,1.06] 0.77+ [0.57,1.05] 0.76+ [0.56,1.03] 1.12 [0.50,2.54] 
Secondary Education    0.73* [0.55,0.96] 0.73* [0.55,0.96] 0.71* [0.54,0.95] 0.82 [0.60,1.13] 0.5 [0.21,1.19] 
Wealth    1.01 [0.94,1.08] 1 [0.94,1.08] 1.01 [0.94,1.08] 1.01 [0.93,1.10] 1.03 [0.80,1.32] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.72* [1.04,2.83]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.59 [0.28,1.23]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        0.52* [0.30,0.88]       
Constant 3.08** [2.57,3.69] 4.92** [3.75,6.45] 4.45** [3.43,5.78] 4.70** [3.58,6.16] 4.48** [3.44,5.83] 2.15+ [0.96,4.86] 
N 1882   1882   1882   1882   1652   230   








Table 14.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Engaging in Concurrent Sexual Partnerships: Men and Women, Ages 15 
to 64 Years, in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate (far term)  
x High Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Female 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.252+ [0.99,1.58] 1.035 [0.81,1.32] 0.717 [0.30,1.70] 1 [0.77,1.30] 1.079 [0.82,1.42] 
Unmarried    0.684* [0.47,1.00] 0.682+ [0.47,1.00] 0.682* [0.47,1.00] 0.721 [0.46,1.12] 
Female    0.065** [0.04,0.10] 0.064** [0.04,0.09] 0.062** [0.04,0.09] 0.065** [0.04,0.10] 
Age (5 year units)    1.059** [1.01,1.11] 1.060** [1.01,1.11] 1.059** [1.01,1.11] 1.060** [1.02,1.11] 
Primary Education    1.204 [0.88,1.65] 1.201 [0.87,1.65] 1.206 [0.88,1.65] 1.206 [0.88,1.66] 
Secondary Education    0.888 [0.56,1.42] 0.884 [0.55,1.42] 0.888 [0.55,1.42] 0.886 [0.55,1.42] 
Wealth    1.062* [1.01,1.12] 1.063* [1.01,1.12] 1.062* [1.01,1.12] 1.062* [1.01,1.12] 
Central Region    0.547** [0.37,0.80] 0.548** [0.38,0.80] 0.546** [0.37,0.80] 0.546** [0.37,0.80] 
North Region    0.716* [0.53,0.97] 0.694* [0.51,0.94] 0.716* [0.53,0.97] 0.715* [0.53,0.97] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.618+ [0.36,1.06]      
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      2.332 [0.78,7.01]      
High Discount Rate x Female        1.352 [0.61,2.98]    
High Discount Rate x Unmarried          0.674 [0.23,1.98] 
Constant 0.179** [0.16,0.20] 0.566** [0.41,0.78] 0.594** [0.42,0.84] 0.569** [0.41,0.79] 0.561** [0.40,0.78] 
N 2913   2913   2913   2913   2913   










Table 15.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Having More Than One Sexual Partner in the Past 12 Months: Men and 
Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate (far term)  
x High Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Female 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.207 [0.94,1.55] 1.013 [0.76,1.35] 0.359 [0.08,1.58] 0.971 [0.70,1.34] 0.92 [0.66,1.28] 
Unmarried    1.423 [0.87,2.33] 1.419 [0.87,2.33] 1.42 [0.87,2.32] 1.274 [0.75,2.15] 
Female    0.055** [0.03,0.10] 0.056** [0.03,0.10] 0.051** [0.03,0.09] 0.055** [0.03,0.10] 
Age (5 year units)    0.99 [0.94,1.05] 0.991 [0.94,1.05] 0.99 [0.94,1.05] 0.989 [0.94,1.04] 
Primary Education    1.091 [0.78,1.53] 1.091 [0.78,1.53] 1.092 [0.78,1.53] 1.087 [0.78,1.52] 
Secondary Education    0.737 [0.43,1.26] 0.734 [0.43,1.26] 0.737 [0.43,1.27] 0.734 [0.43,1.25] 
Wealth    1.021 [0.95,1.09] 1.023 [0.95,1.10] 1.021 [0.95,1.09] 1.022 [0.95,1.09] 
Central Region    0.487** [0.30,0.78] 0.490** [0.31,0.79] 0.486** [0.30,0.78] 0.489** [0.31,0.78] 
North Region    0.728 [0.48,1.11] 0.728 [0.48,1.11] 0.728 [0.48,1.11] 0.735 [0.48,1.12] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.031 [0.64,1.66]      
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      2.974 [0.61,14.40]      
High Discount Rate x Female        1.671 [0.57,4.92]    
High Discount Rate x 
Unmarried          1.958 [0.76,5.07] 
Constant 0.121** [0.10,0.14] 0.371** [0.25,0.55] 0.369** [0.24,0.56] 0.374** [0.25,0.56] 0.377** [0.25,0.56] 
N 2662   2662   2662   2662   2662   








Table 16.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Drinking During an Average Week:  Men and Women, Ages 15 to 64 
Years, in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate (far term)  
x High Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Female 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.083 [0.77,1.52] 1.021 [0.68,1.53] 0.703 [0.22,2.22] 0.93 [0.59,1.48] 0.974 [0.64,1.49] 
Unmarried    0.501** [0.30,0.84] 0.503** [0.30,0.84] 0.496** [0.30,0.83] 0.471* [0.27,0.84] 
Female    0.071** [0.04,0.11] 0.070** [0.04,0.11] 0.063** [0.04,0.11] 0.070** [0.04,0.11] 
Age (5 year units)    1.116** [1.04,1.19] 1.117** [1.04,1.19] 1.116** [1.04,1.19] 1.115** [1.04,1.19] 
Primary Education    1.057 [0.66,1.68] 1.056 [0.66,1.68] 1.068 [0.67,1.69] 1.053 [0.66,1.68] 
Secondary Education    1.221 [0.76,1.97] 1.217 [0.76,1.96] 1.23 [0.76,1.99] 1.219 [0.75,1.97] 
Wealth    0.846** [0.80,0.90] 0.847** [0.80,0.90] 0.846** [0.80,0.90] 0.846** [0.79,0.90] 
Central Region    1.976* [1.01,3.85] 1.980* [1.01,3.89] 1.964* [1.01,3.82] 1.979* [1.02,3.86] 
North Region    6.184** [3.16,12.11] 6.022** [3.06,11.86] 6.183** [3.17,12.06] 6.216** [3.17,12.19] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.613 [0.31,1.19]      
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      2.381 [0.65,8.77]      
High Discount Rate x Female        2.137 [0.68,6.75]    
High Discount Rate x 
Unmarried          1.554 [0.52,4.65] 
Constant 0.113** [0.09,0.14] 0.097** [0.05,0.21] 0.101** [0.05,0.22] 0.098** [0.05,0.21] 0.098** [0.05,0.21] 
N 3028   3028   3028   3028   3028   








Table 17.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Refusing Post-Survey HIV Testing:  Men and Women, Ages 15 to 64 
Years, in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate (far term)  
x High Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Female 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.737** [1.21,2.50] 1.459* [1.01,2.11] 1.741 [0.81,3.75] 1.523+ [0.94,2.47] 0.839 [0.66,1.06] 
Unmarried    0.772 [0.50,1.19] 0.773 [0.50,1.20] 0.774 [0.50,1.20] 0.971 [0.78,1.21] 
Female    0.875 [0.66,1.15] 0.877 [0.66,1.16] 0.893 [0.65,1.24] 1.106 [0.95,1.29] 
Age (5 year units)    0.965 [0.90,1.04] 0.965 [0.90,1.04] 0.966 [0.90,1.04] 1.063** [1.02,1.10] 
Primary Education    0.945 [0.66,1.35] 0.944 [0.66,1.35] 0.945 [0.66,1.35] 1.190+ [0.97,1.46] 
Secondary Education    1.208 [0.67,2.17] 1.21 [0.67,2.17] 1.208 [0.67,2.17] 2.150** [1.54,3.01] 
Wealth    1.110** [1.03,1.20] 1.110** [1.03,1.20] 1.110** [1.03,1.20] 1.053** [1.01,1.10] 
Central Region    0.585** [0.40,0.85] 0.583** [0.40,0.84] 0.586** [0.41,0.85] 0.626** [0.52,0.76] 
North Region    0.149** [0.09,0.25] 0.150** [0.09,0.25] 0.149** [0.09,0.25] 1.698** [1.35,2.13] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      1.165 [0.64,2.11]      
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.707 [0.26,1.89]      
High Discount Rate x Female        0.911 [0.47,1.77]    
High Discount Rate x Unmarried          1.144 [0.64,2.04] 
Constant 0.077** [0.06,0.09] 0.167** [0.11,0.25] 0.165** [0.11,0.25] 0.165** [0.11,0.25] 1.331* [1.05,1.68] 
N 2662   2662   2662   2662   3047   








Table 18.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Infrequent Condom Use in the Past 12 Months: Men and Women, Ages 
15 to 64 Years, in Malawi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate (far term)  
x High Discount Rate (near 
term) 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Female 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.885 [0.67,1.16] 1.064 [0.81,1.40] 1.782* a [1.07,2.97] 1.12 [0.78,1.62] 1.103 [0.83,1.46] 
Unmarried    1.315+ [0.99,1.75] 1.315+ [0.99,1.75] 1.317+ [0.99,1.75] 1.352+ [0.99,1.84] 
Female    0.563** [0.47,0.67] 0.555** [0.47,0.66] 0.572** [0.47,0.70] 0.563** [0.47,0.67] 
Age (5 year units)    0.782** [0.74,0.83] 0.782** [0.74,0.83] 0.782** [0.74,0.83] 0.782** [0.74,0.83] 
Primary Education    1.015 [0.74,1.39] 1.02 [0.75,1.39] 1.014 [0.74,1.38] 1.017 [0.74,1.39] 
Secondary Education    1.483+ [0.99,2.22] 1.496* [1.00,2.23] 1.482+ [0.99,2.21] 1.483+ [0.99,2.22] 
Wealth    1.066* [1.01,1.12] 1.066* [1.01,1.12] 1.066* [1.01,1.12] 1.066* [1.01,1.12] 
Central Region    0.744+ [0.54,1.03] 0.733+ [0.53,1.01] 0.746+ [0.54,1.04] 0.744+ [0.54,1.03] 
North Region    2.054** [1.49,2.83] 2.029** [1.47,2.80] 2.055** [1.49,2.83] 2.054** [1.49,2.83] 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.84 [0.53,1.33]      
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)      0.643 [0.30,1.37]      
High Discount Rate x Female        0.883 [0.47,1.65]    
High Discount Rate x Unmarried          0.812 [0.41,1.60] 
Constant 0.276** [0.23,0.32] 0.245** [0.16,0.37] 0.250** [0.16,0.38] 0.243** [0.16,0.38] 0.243** [0.16,0.37] 
N 2915   2915   2915   2915   2915   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
a. This odds ratio compares the odds of infrequent condom use among respondents with “reverse” inconsistent discounting (high discount rates in the far term, and low 
discount rates in the near term), with the odds for respondents with consistently low discount rates.  “Reverse” inconsistent discounting is not well explained by theory, and may 









Table 19.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and HIV Risk Behavior: Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi  
  Engage in Concurrent Sexual Partnerships More Than One Sexual Partner 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI         
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.21 [0.60,2.44] 1.22 [0.59,2.50] 1.487 [0.59,3.74] 1.575 [0.58,4.30] 
Unmarried    1.366 [0.67,2.78]   4.558** [2.22,9.37] 
Age (5 year units)    1.014 [0.88,1.17]   0.778* [0.61,0.99] 
Primary Education    1.226 [0.57,2.65]   1.702 [0.67,4.35] 
Secondary Education    1.481 [0.35,6.18]   4.626+ [0.89,23.92] 
Wealth    1.033 [0.90,1.19]   0.752* [0.60,0.93] 
Central Region    1.088 [0.45,2.63]   0.538 [0.17,1.66] 
North Region    0.935 [0.32,2.75]   0.190* [0.04,0.88] 
Constant 0.029** [0.02,0.04] 0.023** [0.01,0.05] 0.015** [0.01,0.03] 0.007** [0.00,0.03] 
N 1622   1622   1450   1450   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
  Drink Alcohol In An Average Week Refused Post-Survey HIV Testing 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.512 [0.57,4.01] 1.79 [0.68,4.73] 1.614+ [0.96,2.70] 1.35 [0.82,2.22] 
Unmarried   1.072 [0.39,2.91]    0.896 [0.56,1.44] 
Age (5 year units)   1.238** [1.09,1.41]    0.926 [0.82,1.04] 
Primary Education   1.029 [0.33,3.20]    0.752 [0.46,1.24] 
Secondary Education   1 [1.00,1.00]    1.141 [0.46,2.83] 
Wealth   0.834* [0.71,0.98]    1.106* [1.00,1.22] 
Central Region   1.21 [0.38,3.89]    0.696 [0.40,1.20] 
North Region   5.129* [1.35,19.50]    0.147** [0.07,0.31] 
Constant 0.019** [0.01,0.03] 0.008** [0.00,0.02] 0.073** [0.05,0.10] 0.152** [0.09,0.25] 
N 1685   1530   1492   1492   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01                  
 








Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and HIV Risk Behavior: Women, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi (continued from 
previous page, Table 19.) 
  Infrequent Condom Use  
  (9) (10) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.772 [0.49,1.21] 1.049 [0.64,1.71] 
Unmarried    0.881 [0.58,1.34] 
Age (5 year units)    0.717** [0.67,0.77] 
Primary Education    1.074 [0.74,1.55] 
Secondary Education    1.308 [0.71,2.40] 
Wealth    1.093** [1.03,1.16] 
Central Region    0.539** [0.37,0.79] 
North Region    2.065** [1.47,2.90] 
Constant 0.217** [0.18,0.26] 0.145** [0.10,0.20] 
N 1627   1627   








Table 20.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Engaging in Concurrent Sexual Partnerships: Men, Ages 15 to 64 Years, 
in Malawi 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted 
High Discount Rate 
(far term)  
x High Discount Rate 
(near term) 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.986 [0.75,1.30] 0.991 [0.76,1.29] 0.664 [0.26,1.72] 0.999 [0.74,1.36] 1.009 [0.74,1.38] 0.871 [0.30,2.53] 
Unmarried   0.592* [0.38,0.93] 0.591* [0.37,0.93] 0.599+ [0.35,1.01] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)   1.057* [1.01,1.11] 1.057* [1.01,1.11] 1.057* [1.01,1.11] 1.043 [0.99,1.10] 1.168 [0.96,1.42] 
Primary Education   1.183 [0.84,1.66] 1.178 [0.83,1.67] 1.184 [0.84,1.67] 1.286 [0.93,1.77] 0.714 [0.21,2.39] 
Secondary Education   0.848 [0.51,1.41] 0.843 [0.50,1.41] 0.848 [0.51,1.42] 0.877 [0.53,1.46] 0.585 [0.15,2.29] 
Wealth   1.074* [1.02,1.13] 1.075** [1.02,1.13] 1.074* [1.02,1.13] 1.105** [1.04,1.17] 0.938 [0.82,1.08] 
Central Region   0.489** [0.33,0.73] 0.489** [0.33,0.73] 0.489** [0.33,0.73] 0.407** [0.27,0.61] 1.255 [0.48,3.26] 
North Region   0.678* [0.48,0.96] 0.656* [0.47,0.92] 0.678* [0.48,0.96] 0.613* [0.42,0.90] 1.112 [0.45,2.74] 
High Discount Rate (near term)     0.615+ [0.35,1.09]          
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)     2.418 [0.78,7.52]          
High Discount Rate x Unmarried       0.924 [0.29,2.94]       
Constant 0.460** [0.39,0.55] 0.623** [0.43,0.89] 0.657* [0.45,0.97] 0.621* [0.43,0.89] 0.643* [0.46,0.91] 0.474 [0.16,1.39] 
N 1307   1307   1307   1307   1074   233   









Table 21.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Having More Than One Sexual Partner in the Past 12 Months: Men, 
Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted NA 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.929 [0.67,1.29] 0.971 [0.70,1.35]   0.891 [0.63,1.26] 0.9 [0.64,1.27] 1.555 [0.58,4.20] 
Unmarried   1.126 [0.67,1.89]   1.014 [0.60,1.72] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)   0.988 [0.94,1.04]   0.987 [0.93,1.04] 0.984 [0.93,1.04] 0.915 [0.69,1.22] 
Primary Education   0.99 [0.68,1.43]   0.986 [0.68,1.43] 1.013 [0.69,1.49] 0.691 [0.18,2.70] 
Secondary Education   0.602+ [0.35,1.04]   0.599+ [0.35,1.03] 0.571* [0.33,0.98] 0.608 [0.12,3.18] 
Wealth   1.056 [0.98,1.14]   1.057 [0.98,1.14] 1.087* [1.01,1.17] 0.917 [0.77,1.10] 
Central Region   0.486** [0.31,0.77]   0.488** [0.31,0.78] 0.440** [0.26,0.75] 0.754 [0.25,2.31] 
North Region   0.816 [0.52,1.28]   0.825 [0.53,1.29] 0.804 [0.51,1.28] 0.833 [0.24,2.87] 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        1.89 [0.65,5.52]       
Constant 0.293** [0.24,0.36] 0.412** [0.26,0.64]   0.418** [0.27,0.65] 0.425** [0.27,0.67] 0.407 [0.09,1.91] 
N 1223   1223       1223   1052   171   









Table 22.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Drinking During an Average Week:  Men, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in 
Malawi 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted NA 
High Discount Rate (far 
term) x Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.816 [0.55,1.21] 0.919 [0.58,1.45]   0.84 [0.52,1.36] 0.832 [0.51,1.35] 2.125 [0.52,8.65] 
Unmarried   0.412** [0.24,0.72]   0.365** [0.20,0.68] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)   1.088* [1.02,1.16]   1.087* [1.02,1.16] 1.058+ [0.99,1.13] 1.488** [1.21,1.83] 
Primary Education   1.138 [0.72,1.81]   1.128 [0.71,1.80] 1.16 [0.70,1.91] 0.726 [0.16,3.39] 
Secondary Education   1.403 [0.81,2.42]   1.4 [0.81,2.42] 1.364 [0.73,2.54] 1.312 [0.28,6.06] 
Wealth   0.852** [0.79,0.91]   0.850** [0.79,0.91] 0.855** [0.79,0.93] 0.805** [0.70,0.93] 
Central Region   2.014* [1.02,3.96]   2.021* [1.03,3.97] 2.141* [1.08,4.26] 0.877 [0.20,3.75] 
North Region   6.074** [3.10,11.90]   6.155** [3.13,12.11] 6.221** [3.14,12.31] 6.370** [1.73,23.45] 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        2.347 [0.75,7.38]       
Constant 0.266** [0.21,0.34] 0.095** [0.05,0.20]   0.096** [0.05,0.20] 0.096** [0.04,0.21] 0.098** [0.02,0.55] 
N 1359   1359       1359   1075   284   









Table 23.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Refusing Post-Survey HIV Testing:  Men, Ages 15 to 64 Years, in Malawi 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted NA 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.808* [1.10,2.96] 1.561+ [0.94,2.60]   1.343 [0.80,2.26] 1.379 [0.82,2.32] 3.493* [1.07,11.42] 
Unmarried   0.693 [0.34,1.39]   0.547 [0.23,1.29] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)   0.989 [0.90,1.09]   0.987 [0.90,1.08] 1.004 [0.91,1.11] 0.375 [0.10,1.43] 
Primary Education   1.245 [0.72,2.15]   1.231 [0.71,2.13] 1.383 [0.76,2.52] 0.297 [0.07,1.31] 
Secondary Education   1.409 [0.74,2.67]   1.438 [0.75,2.76] 1.728 [0.81,3.70] 0.353 [0.09,1.46] 
Wealth   1.115+ [1.00,1.25]   1.113+ [0.99,1.25] 1.165* [1.03,1.32] 0.9 [0.68,1.20] 
Central Region   0.484** [0.29,0.82]   0.485** [0.29,0.82] 0.449** [0.25,0.80] 0.656 [0.17,2.47] 
North Region   0.156** [0.06,0.40]   0.155** [0.06,0.40] 0.158** [0.06,0.43] 0.105+ [0.01,1.03] 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate x Unmarried        2.317 [0.68,7.91]       
Constant 0.081** [0.06,0.11] 0.144** [0.08,0.27]   0.150** [0.08,0.29] 0.134** [0.07,0.25] 0.017* [0.00,0.76] 
N 1170   1170       1170   914   256   









Table 24.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and Infrequent Condom Use in the Past 12 Months: Men, Ages 15 to 64 
Years, in Malawi 
  All Married Men Unmarried Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Unadjusted Adjusted NA 
High Discount Rate 
(far term) x 
Unmarried 
Adjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI   OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.904 [0.64,1.27] 1.132 [0.79,1.63]   1.128 [0.77,1.65] 1.109 [0.76,1.62] 1.414 [0.61,3.28] 
Unmarried   2.168** [1.46,3.21]   2.162** [1.44,3.25] 1 [1.00,1.00] 1 [1.00,1.00] 
Age (5 year units)   0.856** [0.79,0.92]   0.856** [0.79,0.92] 0.864** [0.80,0.93] 0.736** [0.59,0.92] 
Primary Education   0.882 [0.52,1.50]   0.882 [0.52,1.50] 0.981 [0.53,1.81] 0.705 [0.24,2.07] 
Secondary Education   1.483 [0.80,2.73]   1.483 [0.80,2.73] 1.466 [0.77,2.81] 1.593 [0.42,6.03] 
Wealth   1.041 [0.97,1.12]   1.041 [0.97,1.12] 1.056 [0.98,1.14] 0.994 [0.84,1.17] 
Central Region   0.966 [0.63,1.47]   0.966 [0.63,1.47] 0.812 [0.50,1.33] 1.514 [0.67,3.40] 
North Region   2.014** [1.27,3.18]   2.014** [1.27,3.18] 1.556+ [0.93,2.59] 4.612** [2.15,9.89] 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate(far term) x 
High Discount Rate (near term)               
High Discount Rate x Unmarried       1.018 [0.47,2.22]       
Constant 0.360** [0.30,0.44] 0.230** [0.12,0.45]   0.230** [0.12,0.45] 0.250** [0.13,0.49] 0.245+ [0.06,1.03] 
N 1304   1304     1304   1076   228   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
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Table 25.  Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and HIV Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 
25 to 49 Years, in Malawi  
  Engage in Concurrent Sexual Partnerships More Than One Sexual Partner 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI         
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.068 [0.73,1.56] 1.128 [0.77,1.65] 1.009 [0.66,1.53] 1.041 [0.69,1.57] 
Unmarried   1.165 [0.50,2.69]    2.135 [0.67,6.82] 
Age (5 year units)   1.068 [0.95,1.20]    0.973 [0.85,1.12] 
Primary Education   1.292 [0.76,2.18]    1.005 [0.57,1.76] 
Secondary Education   0.844 [0.44,1.62]    0.586 [0.30,1.13] 
Wealth   1.110** [1.03,1.20]    1.103+ [0.99,1.23] 
Central Region   0.478** [0.30,0.76]    0.481* [0.26,0.89] 
North Region   0.615* [0.39,0.96]    0.707 [0.38,1.30] 
Constant 0.490** [0.40,0.60] 0.613* [0.39,0.95] 0.276** [0.22,0.35] 0.419** [0.26,0.68] 
N 712   712   693   693   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
  Drink Alcohol In An Average Week Refused Post-Survey HIV Testing 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 0.768 [0.47,1.25] 0.941 [0.55,1.61] 1.62 [0.87,3.01] 1.437 [0.75,2.75] 
Unmarried   1.144 [0.47,2.77]    0.517 [0.07,3.89] 
Age (5 year units)   1.185* [1.03,1.36]    0.874 [0.70,1.09] 
Primary Education   1.304 [0.74,2.31]    1.658 [0.84,3.29] 
Secondary Education   1.106 [0.52,2.33]    1.996 [0.81,4.92] 
Wealth   0.849** [0.77,0.94]    1.184+ [0.97,1.44] 
Central Region   1.627 [0.77,3.45]    0.285** [0.14,0.60] 
North Region   5.656** [2.59,12.37]    0.131** [0.04,0.42] 
Constant 0.354** [0.27,0.47] 0.109** [0.05,0.26] 0.080** [0.05,0.12] 0.149** [0.07,0.31] 
N 716   716   611   611   
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
(Continued on next page)  
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Association Between Time Preference (High Discount Rate) and HIV Risk Behavior: Men, Ages 25 to 49 
Years, in Malawi (continued from previous page, Table 25.) 
  Infrequent Condom Use  
  (9) (10) 
  Unadjusted Adjusted 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate (far term) 1.018 [0.67,1.54] 1.183 [0.77,1.82] 
Unmarried   1.860+ [0.89,3.89] 
Age (5 year units)   0.906 [0.78,1.05] 
Primary Education   1.027 [0.53,1.99] 
Secondary Education   1.779 [0.87,3.63] 
Wealth   1.031 [0.95,1.12] 
Central Region   0.685 [0.37,1.26] 
North Region   1.299 [0.68,2.50] 
Constant 0.348** [0.27,0.45] 0.308** [0.14,0.70] 
N 715   715   




Table 26.  Summary of Significant Associations Between High Discount Rates and HIV Risk Behaviors in 
Kenya and Malawi (Main Effects) Controlling for Covariaes. All associations were hypothesized to be 
ositive.  Up arrows (black) indicate positive associations consistent with study hypotheses.  Down arrows 


































Kenya and Malawi                   
More than One 
Sexual Partner in 
Past 12 Months 
         
Alcohol Use in 
Normal or Average 
Week 
 ↑+        
Kenya Only                   
Uncircumcised at 
Baseline 
↑+ ↑+              
Not Previously 
Tested for HIV 
               
Condom Not Used 
at Last Sex   
  ↓*             
Malawi Only                   
Concurrent Sexual 
Partners 
            
Refused Post-
Survey HIV Test 
      ↑**  ↑+    
Infrequent 
Condom Use in 
Past 12 Mon. 




Table 27.  Summary of Significant and Non-Significant Associations Between High Discount Rates and 
HIV Risk Behaviors in Kenya and Malawi (Main Effects) Controlling for Covariates.  All associations were 
hypothesized to be positive.  Upward arrows in black indicate positive associations consistent with study 
hypotheses.  Downward arrows in red indicate negative associations inconsistent with study hypotheses.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 

































Kenya and Malawi                   
More than One 
Sexual Partner in 
Past 12 Months 
↑ ↑ ↓ Even ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ 
Alcohol Use in 
Normal or Average 
Week 
↑ ↑+ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ 
Kenya Only                   
Uncircumcised at 
Baseline 
↑+ ↑+ ↑             
Not Previously 
Tested for HIV 
↑ ↑ ↓             
Condom Not Used 
at Last Sex   
↑ ↑ ↓*             
Malawi Only                   
Concurrent Sexual 
Partners 
      ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ 
Refused Post-
Survey HIV Test 
      ↑** ↑ ↑+ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Infrequent 
Condom Use in 
Past 12 Mon. 
      ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
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CHAPTER 5:  TIME PREFERENCE, EXTRAMARITAL SEX AND PERCEIVED EXTRAMARTIAL SEX 
AMONG MARRIED COUPLES IN MALAWI 
5.1 Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between time preference, extramarital sex, and perceived 
extramarital sex (i.e., the perception that one’s spouse is engaging in extramarital sex) in a sample of 
married and cohabitating couples in rural Malawi.   Time preference is an individual characteristic that 
governs the extent to which individuals prefer immediate rewards over delayed rewards when choosing 
between the two  (Frederick et al., 2002).  Time preference has been shown to be an important 
determinant of behaviors that require these types of tradeoffs, such as investing, environmental 
conservation, smoking, alcohol use, and obtaining cancer screenings.   The decision to have sex outside 
of marriage requires a similar weighing of immediate benefits (ex: pleasure, rise in social status), against 
larger potential future negative consequences (ex: increased risk of HIV, marital dissolution).   It might 
therefore be expected that individuals who prefer immediate rewards to a greater extent will have 
higher odds of having sex outside marriage.  It might also be expected that individuals whose spouses 
prefer immediate rewards will have higher odds of perceiving that their spouse is having sex outside of 
marriage.  Separately, time-inconsistent preferences (prefer delayed rewards in the future, but 
immediate rewards now), have also been associated with short-sighted behavior and may 
independently predict higher odds of having sex outside marriage. 
To my knowledge, past research has not yet explored the possible association between time 
preference and extramarital sex.   Research on extramarital sex has traditionally focused on how select 
individual characteristics traits affect the likelihood of engaging in extramarital sex (Altgelt, Reyes, 
French, Meltzer, & McNulty, 2018; Atkins, Baucom, & Jacobson, 2001; Amy A. Conroy, 2014; Drigotas, 
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Safstrom, & Gentilia, 1999).  However, the decision to have sex outside of marriage is made within the 
context of a relationship and is likely influenced by spouses and their social interactions.  This study 
seeks to address these gaps in the literature by using data from married and cohabitating couples to 
estimate the effect of husbands and wives’ time preferences on their own and their spouse’s odds of 
engaging in extramarital sex.   The study also explores the extent to which husbands and wives’ time 
preferences influence their own and their spouse’s odds of perceiving that the other is engaging in 
extramarital sex.   
Public Health Significance of Extramarital Sex and Perceived Extramarital Sex 
Empirical and model-based studies show that extramarital sex contributes to HIV incidence in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Bellan et al., 2013; Dunkle et al., 2008; J. Glynn, Carael, Buve, Musonda, & Kahindo, 
2003; D. J. Smith, 2007).  Although the relative contribution of concurrent partnerships has been 
debated, there is general agreement that having more sexual partners increases the risk of HIV (Lurie & 
Rosenthal, 2010; Mah & Halperin, 2010; Padian & Manian, 2011; Tanser et al., 2011). Sex between older 
married men and younger unmarried women has received particular attention, since these types of 
partnerships may contribute to high HIV prevalence in both groups and explain why young women 
continue to be disproportionately affected by HIV compared with young men (Abdool Karim, Baxter, & 
Birx, 2017; J. Glynn et al., 2003; J. R. Glynn et al., 2001; Gregson et al., 2002; Kelly et al., 2003; Maughan-
Brown et al., 2018; Silberschmidt & Rasch, 2001).   
Perceived extramarital sex has less direct relevance for HIV prevention, but it is of growing 
interest among researchers studying couples-based interventions.   Perceived extramarital sex has been 
shown to be an important source of marital mistrust and discord, which potentially hinders the 
effectiveness of couples-based prevention interventions.  For example, a qualitative feasibility study of a 
couples-based HIV prevention intervention found that suspicions of extramarital sex were a significant 
barrier to couples effectively discussing prevention strategies, such as condom use and HIV testing, and 
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that conversations almost inevitably shifted to extramarital sex and mistrust (Parker, Pettifor, Maman, 
Sibeko, & MacPhail, 2014).  These types of challenges have led to calls for couples-based interventions 
to include relationship-building skills, such as teaching spouses how to more effectively communicate 
and resolve conflicts  (Jiwatram-Negron & El-Bassel, 2014; Karney et al., 2010; Pequegnat & Bray, 2012; 
Pettifor et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2016; Vamos et al., 2013).  Exploring the possible association between 
time preference and perceived extramarital sex might provide additional information about the 
determinants of these perceptions, and potentially assist in developing strategies for couples to more 
productively discuss these concerns.  Perceived extramarital sex is also an outcome of interest within 
the broader health literature because it may provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
prevalence of extramarital sex within a population.  Due to underreporting of extramarital sex 
(Anglewicz & Chintsanya, 2011; Amy A. Conroy, 2014; Kohler, Behrman, & Watkins, 2007), individuals’ 
perceptions about whether their spouses are engaging in extramarital sex may provide more accurate 
estimates.  While this study focuses on the negative implications of perceived extramarital sex, in some 
situations this perception may have positive implications.  Individuals might reduce their risk of HIV if 
divorcing a spouse who they correctly perceive is having extramarital sex.   Perceived spousal 
extramarital sex has been cited as a reason for individuals and couples seeking HIV counseling and 
testing (Kumwenda et al., 2014), as well as using condoms (Onoya, Zuma, Zungu, Shisana, & 
Mehlomakhulu, 2015).    
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Conceptual Model  
 
Figure 17.  Conceptual Model for Spousal Influence on the Odds of Having Extramarital Sex 
The conceptual model for this study is shown in Figure 17.   The two predictors are wives and 
husbands’ time preferences.  The two outcomes are wives and husbands odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex.   Each spouse’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex are influenced by their own time 
preference (“actor effect”) as well as their spouse’s time preference (“partner effect”).  Actor effects are 
illustrated by the solid horizontal lines.  Partner effects are the dashed diagonal lines.  The two actor 
effects and two partner effects are estimated simultaneously using dyadic analysis.  Spouses are nested 
within couples or “dyads.”  The same model is used to examine the influence of husbands and wives’ 
time preferences on their odds of perceiving that their spouse is engaging in extramarital sex.  This 
model is based on Kenny’s Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), which captures the mutual 
influence between dyad members  (David A Kenny et al., 2006).   
Interdependence Theory 
The APIM is informed by interdependence theory, which provides the overall rationale for 
exploring how spouses mutually influence one another’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex, rather 
than focusing on individuals.  A central assumption of the theory is that individuals within dyadic 
relationships are mutually dependent on one another  (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).  






Odds of Extramarital Sex 
Husbands’ 




well as their spouse’s characteristics, and characteristics of the dyad itself, such as length of marriage or 
whether both members share the same characteristic or differ  (David A Kenny et al., 2006; Rusbult & 
Van Lange, 2008).  The theory suggests that in order to understand why individuals engage in 
extramarital sex, or perceive that their spouse is engaging in extramarital sex, it is necessary to consider 
the joint influence of all three of these factors.  Interdependence theory does not make specific 
predictions about the outcome of spousal interactions, but instead emphasizes the need to examine the 
“situation structure” or context in which a particular decision is made.  The theory suggests that in 
situations that are “temporally extended,” in which dyad members make choices that have future 
consequences, “delay of gratification,” a construct similar to time preference, will play a central role in 
members’ decision-making (Kelley, 2003; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Van Lange, 2012).  For a fuller 
understanding of how time preference potentially influences extramarital sex and perceived 
extramarital sex, it is useful to consult a separate set of theories from economics.   
Time Preference  
The discounted utility model describes how time preference influences decision-making, and 
provides the rationale for exploring time preference as a determinant of extramarital sex.  Time 
preference is an individual characteristic that governs the relative weight that individuals assign to more 
immediate costs and rewards when comparing them with delayed costs and rewards (Frederick et al., 
2002; Samuelson, 1937; Soman et al., 2005).  Most people prefer immediate rewards, and will 
“discount” or undervalue rewards they must wait to enjoy by a certain percentage or “discount rate” 
(Frederick et al., 2002).  Higher discount rates imply a stronger preference for immediate rewards.   
Discounting of delayed rewards is a well-documented phenomenon in economics and psychology that 
has been observed in different contexts, cultures, and species (Ainslie, 1974; Vanderveldt et al., 2016).  
Time preference was originally used to study economic decisions, such as saving and investing.  
Grossman’s theory of health capital was one of the first works to suggest that time preference may also 
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influence health-related decisions, since many health behaviors require making small sacrifices in the 
present, in exchange for larger benefits in the future.  The theory suggests that, compared with 
individuals with low discount rates, individuals with high discount rates will have higher odds of 
engaging in extramarital sex because they undervalue the potential future health consequences of their 
present-day behavior.     
While the link between individuals’ time preferences and their own behavior is well-established 
(actor effect), theory is less clear about how individuals’ time preferences potentially influence their 
spouses’ behavior (partner effect).   With regard to extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex, 
specifically, one possibility is that individuals who highly discount the future will have marriages that are 
less stable and less satisfactory for both spouses.  Marital instability and dissatisfaction, in turn, has 
been empirically linked with extramarital sex and other HIV risk behaviors (Mark, Janssen, & Milhausen, 
2011; Rogers et al., 2016; Vamos et al., 2013), and may breed suspicions of extramarital sex in both 
spouses.  Two potential mechanisms link time preferences with marital stability and satisfaction.  First, 
individuals with high discount rates may make an initial poor choice in selecting a spouse.  A well-known 
economic analysis of marriage characterizes the search for a spouse as an investment decision  (Gary S 
Becker, 1973; Gary S Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977).  Individuals who highly discount the future may 
invest less time and resources into finding a compatible spouse, instead basing their selection on more 
immediate considerations such as attractiveness or convenience, resulting in marriages that are more 
likely to end in divorce (De Paola & Gioia, 2013).  Second, individuals who are primarily concerned about 
their immediate self-interest may lack the commitment and interpersonal skills needed to maintain a 
stable marriage.  They may be less willing to make short-term sacrifices and compromises for their 
marriage, less patient when communicating with their spouse, and less willing to weather short-term 
set-backs in the relationship.   These types of arguments are found in the economic  (Compton, 2009; De 
Paola & Gioia, 2013) and social psychology literature (Arriaga & Agnew, 2001; Drigotas et al., 1999; 
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Kelley, 2003; Rusbult, 1980, 1983; Van Lange, 2012).  Two longitudinal studies of married couples in the 
United States and in Italy found that individuals who discount the future to a greater extent were 
significantly more likely to divorce over time (Compton, 2009; De Paola & Gioia, 2013), lending empirical 
support to this argument.    
A final way in which time preferences potentially affect the odds of extramarital sex and 
perceived extramarital sex is at the dyad-level.   More specifically, couples in which one or both spouses 
have high discount rates may be less able to cooperate to reduce their risk of HIV.  For married 
individuals, HIV risk stems from both their own behavior as well as their partner’s behavior.  It is 
therefore in both spouse’s self-interest to tacitly agree to abstain from sex outside marriage so that 
neither spouse contracts HIV and potentially infects the other.  (This strategy would only apply if both 
spouses are uninfected.)   A seminal study on cooperation used game theory to show that in order for 
cooperation based on this type of reciprocal arrangement to develop,  both parties must know they will 
meet again and must each have sufficient regard for future outcomes  (Axelrod, 2006; Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981).   If parties are concerned about reducing their future risk of contracting HIV, they have 
less reason to “defect” or cheat by having extramarital sex today, since their partner could retaliate in 
the future by also engaging in extramarital sex, increasing the risk of HIV for both parties.  In this way, 
the “shadow of the future” (i.e., the possibility that their partner will cheat in the future, if they 
themselves cheat today) provides an incentive for both spouses to cooperate in the present and not 
have sex outside marriage.  Individuals’ “discount factor” or discount rates quantify the extent to which 
they are concerned with future outcomes, suggesting a direct role of time preference in spouses’ ability 
to mutually agree to abstain from extramarital sex.   
Interdependence theory also emphasizes how the characteristics of dyads can influence the 
behavior of its members.  Within the current study, interdependence theory suggests that it is 
important to evaluate whether the odds of extramarital sex vary based on whether both spouses have 
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high discount rates, both have low discount rates, or if their discount rates differ, controlling for the 
individual-level effect of each individual’s own discount rate and their spouse’s discount rate.   Testing 
for these types of effects could shed light on whether the odds of extramarital sex and perceived 
spousal extramarital sex depend in part on how well spouses match or fit together (Cook & Kenny, 
2005).   These “goodness of fit” models are used in developmental research, in which characteristics of 
parents and children are interacted to see if certain combinations of parent-child traits affect child 
outcomes  (Cook & Kenny, 2005). 
Review of Empirical Literature 
This study was informed by research from several subject areas.   There is a growing literature 
documenting the association between time preference and health behavior.  For example, time 
preference has been associated with health risk behaviors such as alcohol use (Bickel et al., 1999; Field 
et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2005; Petry, 2001; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998) and smoking (Audrain-
McGovern et al., 2009; Bickel et al., 1999; Brown & Adams, 2013; Goto et al., 2009; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 
2007).  Time preference has also been associated with preventive behaviors, such as breast cancer 
screening (Bradford, 2010; Levy et al., 2006), physical activity (Chiteji, 2010), hypertension management 
(Axon et al., 2009), influenza vaccination (G. B. Chapman & Coups, 1999), and body mass index (BMI) 
(Dodd, 2014; Ikeda et al., 2010; Komlos et al., 2004).  Although some correlations were small and other 
studies found no association between time preference and some health behaviors  (Fuchs, 1980), the 
literature on this topic continues to expand.   Studies have not yet, however, examined the potential 
influence of time preference on extramarital sex or perceived spousal extramarital sex.  In addition, 
most studies examine the influence of individuals’ time preferences on their health behavior.  Little is 
known about how time preferences might affect one’s spouse’s health behaviors.   
There is strong empirical evidence that spouses mutually influence one another’s health 
behaviors and health outcomes.  Studies consistently show that married individuals live longer and 
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enjoy better health than those who are non-married  (K. P. Smith & Christakis, 2008), suggesting that 
spouses have a positive effect on one another’s health.    A number of different mechanisms for this 
relationship have been proposed, such as social support, direct efforts to improve a partner’s health 
behavior, and the provision of care in older age.   However, the role that individuals’ time preferences 
may play in how spouses influence one another’s health outcomes has not yet been explored. 
The HIV prevention literature has identified a number of individual and community level 
determinants of multiple and concurrent partners, but the potential role of time preference, or related 
constructs from psychology such as delay of gratification, remain unexplored.   Individual-level factors 
associated with multiple partners include sociodemographic characteristics (age, wealth, region), 
attitudes (e.g., husbands have a right to sex with other women) and other risk behaviors (alcohol use, 
early sexual debut)  (Mitsunaga, Powell, Heard, & Larsen, 2005; Vu, Tun, Karlyn, Adebajo, & Ahonsi, 
2011; White, Cleland, & Carael, 2000).  Community-level factors include gender norms that condone 
men having multiple sexual partners as a sign of success or being a “real man;” the cultural practice of 
postpartum abstinence during which time men may seek extramarital sexual partners; and the belief 
that having a variety of sexual partners helps men maintain their marriages (Onoya et al., 2015; D. J. 
Smith, 2007; Stephenson, 2010).   With few exceptions (Onoya et al., 2015), past research on multiple 
and concurrent partners has also centered on men, since they are more likely than women to have sex 
outside of marriage.  This trend prevailed even in studies where data on both husbands and wives was 
available (Mitsunaga et al., 2005).  Research has overlooked the possible influence of one’s spouse and 
other couples-level factors on the decision to have multiple or concurrent sexual partners. 
Finally, analytically, most existing studies of extramarital sex from different disciplines select 
individuals as the unit of analysis.  This approach requires that data from husbands and wives be 
analyzed separately.  Since spouses are likely more similar to one another than to others in the sample, 
pooling their data would violate the assumption of independence (Franks, Wendorf, Gonzalez, & 
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Ketterer, 2004; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2008; Vu et al., 2011; Wilson, 2002).  The main disadvantage of 
separate analysis for husbands and wives is that it does not allow for comparison of effects, such as, do 
husbands have a greater influence on wife’s outcomes than wives have on husband’s outcomes?  
Separate analysis also does not allow for an assessment of whether dyad-level factors, such as length of 
marriage, differentially affect husbands and wives’ outcomes.  These types of comparisons would allow 
for a more comprehensive understanding of how spouses mutually influence one another’s behavior, 
and provide greater insight into the outcome being studied. 
Study Hypotheses 
In order to address some of the gaps in the existing literature, this study examined the influence 
of husbands and wives’ time preferences on their own odds of engaging in extramarital sex (actor 
effects), as well as their spouse’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex (partner effects).  These same 
effects were estimated for the odds of perceived spousal extramarital sex.  The study hypotheses for 
these outcomes are shown below.   
For ease of interpretation, time preference is dichotomized in the study analysis, such that 
individuals either have high or low discount rates.  Individuals with high discount rates undervalue 
future outcomes to a greater extent, and were therefore hypothesized to have higher odds of engaging 
in extramarital sex, holding their spouse’s discount rate constant.  It was also hypothesized that 
individuals whose spouse had high discount rates would have higher odds of perceiving that their 
spouse is engaging in extramarital sex, holding their own discount rate constant.   In addition to these 
effects, the study also examined whether homogeneity in discount rates at the dyad-level affected 
individuals’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex and odds of perceiving that their spouse is engaging in 
extramarital sex, controlling for the individual-level effect of their own and their spouse’s time 
preferences.  It was hypothesized that being in a marriage in which one or both spouses had high 
discount rates would increase the odds of engaging in extramarital sex and perceiving spousal 
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extramarital sex for both husbands and wives.  Finally, interdependence theory suggests that asymmetry 
within a relationship can result in one spouse exerting greater influence over the other  (Kelley, 2003).  
Because women are more likely to be dependent on men due to less access to educational and and 
economic resources, it was hypothesized that husbands’ time preferences would exert a greater 
influence on wives’ engaging in extramarital sex and perceiving their husbands of engaging in 
extramarital sex, compared with the influence of wives’ time preference on husbands’ behavior. 
Hypotheses for engaging in extramarital sex: 
 
1.1. Individuals with high discount rates will have higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex 
compared with individuals with low discount rates (actor effect).   
1.2. Individuals whose spouses have high discount rates will have higher odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex compared with individuals whose spouses have low discount rates (partner 
effect).   
1.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex will be 
greater than the effect of wives’ discount rates on husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital 
sex.   
1.4. Husbands and wives will each have higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex if both 
spouses have high discount rates, compared with if only one spouse or neither spouse has high 
discount rates (dyad level effect).   
Hypotheses for perceiving that one’s spouse is engaging in extramarital sex:   
2.1. Individuals with high discount rates will have higher odds of perceiving their spouse is 
engaging in extramarital sex (actor effect).    
2.2. Individuals whose spouses have high discount rates will have higher odds of perceiving their 
spouse is engaging in extramarital sex (partner effect).   
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2.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on wives’ odds of perceiving husbands are engaging 
in extramarital sex will be greater than the effect of wives’ discount rates on husbands’ odds of 
perceiving their wives are engaging in extramarital sex.   
2.4. Husbands and wives will have higher odds of perceiving the other as engaging in 
extramarital sex if both spouses have high discount rates, compared with if only one spouse or 
neither spouse has high discount rates (dyad-level effect).   
Study Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  The study extends research on time 
preferences and health by examining the potential influence of time preference on two new behaviors, 
extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex.   The study explores how these behaviors are jointly 
influenced by individuals’ time preferences (within-individual), their spouses’ time preferences 
(between-individual), and the interaction of spouses’ time preferences at the couples-level (between-
dyad, i.e., both spouses have high discount rates, low discount rates, or have different discount rates), 
perhaps providing a more comprehensive understanding of how time preferences affect health within 
married couples.  The study tests these associations within a population of married couples in Malawi, 
which could shed light on whether the relationship between time preference and health behavior, which 
has primarily been studied in high-resource settings to date, is generalizable to low-resource settings, 
where uncertainty about the future may result in uniformly high discounting of future outcomes.    
This study potentially contributes to the HIV prevention literature by providing additional 
information about the decision-making process behind extramarital sex at the individual and couples 
level.   The study includes both husbands and wives, so can add to the limited knowledge base about 
women’s motivations for seeking sex outside marriage.   If an association between time preference and 
extramarital sex is found, it could potentially assist partner reduction interventions in identifying 
individuals and couples who may need additional behavior change support.  It might also help identify 
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couples who could most benefit from access to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP).  The study also 
explores the association between time preference and the perception that one’s spouse is engaging in 
extramarital sex.  This research could potentially add to our understanding of the determinants of 
perceived extramarital sex, which has been shown to cause marital discord and potentially hinder 
effectiveness of couples-based interventions.  The study could help identify individuals and couples who 
may be more likely to perceive spousal extramarital sex, allowing interventions to provide them with 
strategies for discussing their concerns in a manner that minimizes conflict.  Other studies have used 
dyadic analysis to examine behavior in sub-Saharan Africa.  This study provides additional evidence of 
the feasibility of this type of analysis, as well as its usefulness in estimating how spouses’ mutually 
influence one another’s behavior - which cannot be done with standard regression.  If partner and dyad-
level effects are detected it would suggest the importance of looking at the characteristics of both 
individuals and couples in order to predict risk behavior, as well as demonstrate the value of couples-
based approaches.   
5.2 Methods 
Study Setting and Design 
This study analyzes data from the 2006 study wave of the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families 
and Health (MLSFH).  This wave was selected because it contained detailed measures of respondents’ 
time preferences and HIV risk behavior.  The MLSFH is a longitudinal cohort study of rural Malawians.  
The sample contains data from married and cohabitating couples, as well as non-married individuals.  
The MLSFH survey was conducted in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, and approximately every two years 
thereafter  (Kohler et al., 2015a).  3,000 to 4,000 individuals were surveyed in each study wave.   
The original 1998 MLSFH sample was comprised of 1,532 randomly selected ever-married 
women, ages 15 to 49 years, and 1,065 of their male spouses.   These women were randomly selected 
from 145 villages located in three rural districts: Rumphi in the Northern region, Mchinji in the Central 
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region, and Balaka in the Southern region.  Each district was characterized by different ethnic and 
religious groups.  HIV prevalence was 6.7% in Rumphi, in 10.3% Mchinji, and 13.8% in Balaka  (Kohler et 
al., 2015a).   National prevalence was 9.1%  (UNAIDS, 2014c). 
Subsequent survey waves included all previous MLSFH respondents and new spouses.  
Individuals on the initial MSLFH roster who were absent during the first three survey waves did not 
receive further follow-up visits (Kohler et al., 2015a).   In 2004, 984 adolescents, ages 15 to 24 years, 
were added to the sample to compensate for the aging of the initial cohort.   Attrition between study 
waves was substantial, primarily due to migration (Anglewicz et al., 2009).  However, researchers found 
that the demographic profiles of the 1998 and 2010 MLSFH samples were similar to the rural sample of 
the Malawi Demographic and Health Survey (MDHS), which is a nationally representative survey (Kohler 
et al., 2015a; Thornton, 2008).   Details of the MLSFH sampling strategy are available in the study 
documentation (Kohler et al., 2015a; Kohler et al., 2015b). 
The MLSFH is administered by the University of Pennsylvania in collaboration with the University 
of Malawi.  The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Pennsylvania and, in Malawi, by the College of Medicine Research Ethics Committee (COMREC) or the 
National Health Sciences Research Committee (NHSRC).   
Analytic Sample  
The analytic sample was comprised of 869 currently married couples.  Spouses were interviewed 
separately.    925 currently married couples were identified in the 2006 MLSFH sample, in which spouses 
reported being married to one another, were not missing covariate or time preference data, and were 
between 15 and 64 years old.  The 15 to 64 year old age range has been used in previous studies 
reporting health statistics in Malawi, including the Malawi DHS and the Malawi Population-based HIV 
Impact Assessment (PHIA) conducted by Columbia University  (ICAP, December 2016).   50 men reported 
having more than one wife who was in the sample (44 men had two wives, 6 men had three wives).   
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One husband-wife pair from each of these groups was selected at random for inclusion in the study, the 
remaining pairs were dropped, resulting in a final sample of 869 couples.   
Measures 
Table 28 lists the outcome, covariate and time preference measures used.  All outcomes were 
defined as dichotomous variables.  To assist in interpreting results, risk behaviors were coded so that “1” 
indicates engaging in risk behavior, and “0” indicates not engaging in risk behavior.  Additional 
information about how the time preference variable was measured and constructed is shown below.  
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During your time together, did you have a boyfriend/girlfriend, or did you 
have sex with someone other than [your most recent spouse]?   
 
Did you have other sexual partners during the time you were in a sexual 
relationship with [your most recent spouse]? 
 
1=”yes” to one or both questions 




Women’s measure:  During your time married together, did [your spouse] 
have a girlfriend, or did he have sex with someone else apart from you 




Men’s measure:  During your time married together, did [your spouse] 






How old are you? 
Marital Status What is your current marital status? 
0=married 
1=never married, separated, divorced, widowed 
 
Sex Determined by study administrators during recruitment.   
Education What is the last grade that you successfully passed? 
Number of years at level __. 
 
Dummy coded: 
0=no schooling or some primary education 
1= primary education completed 
2= some secondary or completed secondary education and above  
Wealth Additive index of 16 household items, rescaled to 0 to 1 continuous 
variable 
 

















Now I want to ask you some questions about a hypothetical situation. 
Suppose you have earned 500 Kwacha for work that you have done for 
a trustworthy neighbor during the last week. The neighbor gives you 
an option for how he pays you for this work…I will ask you about 
receiving money 2 months from now compared with receiving money at a 
time more than 2 months from now.   
 
Would you prefer: 
 310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 2 months plus 1 week? 
780 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 7 months? 
540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 3 months? 
670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 6 months? 
550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 4 months? 
690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 5 months? 
410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 2 months plus 3 weeks? 
800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 7 months? 
330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 2 months plus 2 weeks? 
 
 
Time Preference  
Measures 
Time preferences were measured using a procedure frequently found in the literature.  
Respondents were asked to choose between a series of smaller, sooner prizes and larger, delayed prizes.   
All prizes were hypothetical, monetary sums.  For example: 
Would you prefer 540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 3 months?   
Subsequent questions varied the sizes of both the more immediate and the delayed rewards, as 
well as the length of time separating the two rewards.   The purpose of these questions was to identify 
respondents’ “indifference point,” which is the amount of money they would need to be offered after a 
delay, in order for them to be indifferent between the more immediate and the delayed reward.  These 
indifference points were then used to estimate the range in which individuals’ discount rates were likely 
to fall.  Individuals had higher discount rates if they required a larger delayed reward in order be 
indifferent between that reward and the more immediate reward.   
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The full set of questions used to assess respondents’ time preferences is shown in Table 31.  The prizes 
in these questions converted to U.S. dollars are shown in Appendix A.  In each question, the smaller, 
sooner reward is available in two months, while the delayed reward is available in more than two 
months.  These questions were designed to measure respondents’ time preference in the far term, as 
opposed to near term, which some past studies have interpreted as representing respondents’ “true” 
time preferences  (Ashraf et al., 2006).  The Malawi survey asked respondents nine questions like the 
one above, which allowed respondents to be sorted into ten categories based on the range in which 
their discount rates were estimated to fall.   
Variable Construction 
The Malawi time preference variable was dichotomized using a cut-point close to the median.   I 
dichotomized this categorical variable so that the study results would be easier to interpret and to 
ensure that there were a sufficient number of cases in the “high” and “low” discounting groups.  
Respondents were categorized as having “high” discount rates if their estimated discount rate was 
greater than 472% per year.  “Low” discount rates were the reference.    
This percentage was only use to dichotomize the time preference variable and was not used in 
the study analysis.  As reference, having a discount rate of 472% per year implies that an individual is 
indifferent between $1 today and $472 in one year.  Another way of describing how individuals were 
divided into “high” and “low” discounting groups is that individuals who were indifferent between $1 
today and some amount less than $472 in one year were considered to have “low” discount rates, while 
those who were indifferent between $1 and some amount greater than $472 in one year were deemed 
to have “high” discount rates.  Details on the full distribution of responses to the Malawi time 
preference questions, and how responses to these questions were converted to discount rates, are 




I used dyadic analysis to estimate the effect of husbands and wives’ time preferences on the 
odds of each spouse engaging in extramarital sex.  I also examined the effect of husbands and wives’ 
time preferences on the odds of each spouse perceiving that the other was engaged in extramarital sex.  
Dyadic analysis treats individuals as being nested within dyads, which accounts for possible non-
independence between spouses in both time preferences and their likelihood of having extramarital sex  
(Cook & Kenny, 2005).  Dyads or couples were the unit of analysis.  I used Kenny’s Actor-Partner 
Interdependence Model (APIM) to model actor and partner effects for husbands and wives within the 
same dyad  (David A Kenny et al., 2006; David A. Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).   This model is illustrated in 
Figure 21.   Separate models were estimated for the two study outcomes, extramarital sex and 
perceived extramarital sex. 
The APIM has two predictor variables (wives’ and husbands’ time preferences), and two 
outcome  variables (wives and husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex).  Actor effects are 
illustrated in Figure 21 as the solid arrows and represent within-individual effects, or the effect of an 
individual’s own time preference on their odds of extramarital sex, holding spouse’s time preference 
constant.  Partner effects are illustrated as the diagonal lines and represent the effect of a spouse’s time 
preference on an individual’s odds of extramarital sex, holding the individual’s time preference constant.   
Figure 21 can also be expressed as two simultaneous linear equations.  In equation 1, wives’ 
odds of having extramarital sex are a function of wives’ time preference and husbands’ time preference.  
In equation 2, husbands’ odds of having extramarital sex are a function of husbands’ time preference 
and wives’ time preference.  
extramaritalsexw=aw * discountratew + pwh * discountratew + Ew (1) 
extramaritalsexh=ah * discountrateh + phw * discountrateh + Eh (2) 
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These effects are estimated simultaneously using structural equation modeling (SEM).   The 
model is saturated because all means, variances and covariances are freely estimated, and will therefore 
not have fit statistics.  Degrees of freedom and chi-square are both equal to zero (df=0, χ2=0)  (David A. 
Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).  The residual variance for husbands and wives’ odds of extramarital sex 
represent measurement error and variance not accounted for by the model.  These residual variances 
are correlated to control for other sources of non-independence, such as exposure to social norms 
condoning sex outside of marriage or assortive mating (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  Husbands and wives’ time 
preferences are also correlated (c1) in order to estimate actor effects, holding partner effects constant, 
and vice versa.  (Fitzpatrick et al.; David A. Kenny & Cook; David A. Kenny & Ledermann, 2010)    
SEM allows for more than one equation to be estimated from the covariance matrix of the 
independent and dependent variables  (Cook & Kenny, 2005).  SEM is recommended for analyzing data 
from “distinguishable” dyads, or dyads in which the members can be differentiated, in this case by sex  
(David A Kenny et al., 2006; David A. Kenny & Ledermann, 2010).  Had the sample been comprised of 
same-sex couples, dyads would be treated as “indistinguishable” and multi-level modeling would be 
recommended (Fitzpatrick et al.; Gonzalez & Griffin, 1999).  Both approaches produce the same results.  
Statistical analysis was performed using Stata version 14.2 (StataCorp) and MPLUS version 8.0. 
In addition to the standard APIM, I also estimate a model which contains the interaction of 
husbands and wives’ time preferences.  This interaction tests whether there is a dyad-level effect of 
being in a relationship in which both spouses have high discount rates (high-high), as opposed to both 
having low discount rates (low-low) or mixed discount rates (husband high-wife low, or vice versa).  
These pairings describe the characteristics of dyads, rather than individuals, so are treated as 
representing between-dyad effects (David A Kenny et al., 2006). By contrast, actor and partner effects 
are estimated while holding the other constant, so describe within-dyad effects.   Interactions can also 
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be interpreted as standard moderation effects (i.e., does the effect of wife’s time preference on the 
odds of extramarital sex vary by whether husbands have high or low discount rates?). 
5.3 Results 
Characteristics of Married Couples 
Characteristics of married couples disaggregated by sex are shown in Table 32.  Average age for 
women was 33 years compared with 40 years for men (p=0.0).  95% of women reported that their 
husband was older than they were.  22% of women and 16% of men report that there is more than one 
wife in the relationship.  Women were less educated than men, with 30% having received no education 
compared with only 12% of men.  Women and men were poor, with average wealth index scores of 1.3 
and 1.8 respectively, out of a 14-point asset index.   
61% of women had high discount rates versus 67% of men* (p=.01), as illustrated in Figure 18.  A 
further breakdown of couples’ joint time preferences is shown in Figure 19.  41% of all couples were 
comprised of spouses who both had high discount rates.  13% of all couples were comprised of spouses 
who both had low discount rates.  26% of couples had a husband with high discount rates and a wife 
with low discount rates, 20% of couples had the opposite pattern.  In total, 54% of couples had 
homogenous discount rates, while the remaining 46% had heterogeneous discount rates.    
[These percentages are different than in paper 1 because different criteria were used to define 
“high” and “low” discounting.  In paper 1, criteria were selected which allowed the Malawi results to be 
compared with Kenya.  In paper 2, in which all data was from Malawi, criteria were selected which  
sorted women and men into high and low discounting groups that were as evenly sized as possible to 
maximize statistical power.  There is currently no agreed upon standard for measuring time preferences 
or for categorizing respondents into high and low discounting groups.  In both papers, however, criteria 
were chosen objectively based on the study purpose.]   
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There was only slight correlation between spouses’ time preferences suggesting weak assortive 
mating.  Spouses with the same time preferences were not more likely to marry one another than would 
be expected based on chance.  This finding is consistent with a study of married couples in rural Kenya 
which also found weak assortive matching in discount rates  among spouses  (ICC=0.09) (Schaner, 2015).  
Kenny suggests using Cohen’s kappa as a measure of association for dichotomous variables  (David A 
Kenny et al., 2006).  This statistic is interpreted in the same way as the interclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC), with 1 representing identical responses and 0 implying that spouses are no more similar than 
individuals who are not married to one another  (David A Kenny et al., 2006; Mustanski, Starks, & 
Newcomb, 2014).   These values are shown in Table 29 for select variables.   
38% of men reported engaging in extramarital sex compared with only 4% of women (p=0.0).   
6% of men and 26% of women perceived that their spouse was engaging in extramarital sex (p=0.0).  
These results are illustrated in Figure 20.  Results for women are in red, men are in blue.  There was also 
only slight correlation between spouses’ self-reported extramarital sex, and fair correlation between 
spouses’ perception of extramarital sex.  Despite the lack of strong correlation between spouses’ 
outcomes, dyadic analysis is still recommended over standard regression in cases where dependence 
between dyad members is expected  (David A. Kenny & Cook, 1999).  
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Table 29.  Correlation Between Spouses’ Time Preferences, Self-Reported Extramarital Sex, and Perceived 
Extramarital Sex 
Variable Cohen’s Kappa Descriptive 
Time Preferences 0.010 “slight” 
Self-Reported Extramarital sex 0.017 “slight” 
Perceived Extramarital sex 0.027 “fair” 
Descriptive column is from (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
 
Figure 18.  Percent of Wives and Husbands with High Discount Rates (Versus Low Discount Rates), 
Indicating a Preference for Immediate Rewards Over Future Rewards. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Percent of Married Couples Who Have Heterogeneous and Homogenous Time Preferences.  
Labels on x-axis refer to four possible combinations of wives and husbands having either high or low 









































Figure 20.  Percent of Women and Men Who Reported Engaging in Extramarital Sex, and Who Perceived 
That Their Spouses Were Engaging in Extramarital Sex. 
 
Results for Extramarital Sex 
 
Figure 21.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), Illustrating the Main Effect of Each 
Respondent’s Own Time Preference (“Actor Effects”), As Well As Their Spouse’s Time Preference 
(“Partner Effects”) on the Odds of Their Having Extramarital Sex.    Red arrows are actor and partner 
effects for wives’ odds of extramarital sex.  Blue arrows are actor and partner effects for husbands’ odds 
of extramarital sex.  Model included covariates for husbands and wives’ age, education, wealth and 
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aw = AOR 0.90 
phw = AOR 1.33 
ah = AOR 1.23 








Figure 22.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), Illustrating the Effect of Each Respondent’s 
Own Time Preference (“Actor Effects”), Their Spouses’ Time Preference (“Partner Effects”), and the 
Interaction Between Their Own and Their Spouses’ Time Preferences on the Odds of Their Having 
Extramarital Sex.  Red and blue arrows show actor and partner effects, and interactions, influencing 
wives and husbands’ odds of extramarital sex, respectively.  Model included covariates for husbands and 
wives’ age, education, wealth and region which are not shown. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
APIM Model without Covariates 
I first estimated a baseline model with husbands and wives’ time preferences as the only 
predictors.  Most of the estimated effects were non-significant.  As expected, husbands had higher odds 
of engaging in extramarital sex if they had high discount rates (AOR 1.23), or if their wives had high 
discount rates (AOR 1.38, 95% CI 0.98-1.87, p=0.04), an effect that was marginally significant.  Wives had 
higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex if their husbands had high discount rates (AOR 1.42), but had 
lower odds of extramarital sex if they themselves had high discount rates (AOR 0.88).  Full results are 
shown in Table 33, columns 1 and 2.   
APIM Model with Covariates 
I next estimated a standard APIM model illustrated in Figure 21.  The model contained husbands 
and wives’ time preferences as predictors, as well as covariates for husbands and wives’ age, education, 




husbands’ time preference on husbands’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex (ah) and the effect of 
wives’ time preference on wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex (aw), holding spouses’ time 
preferences constant.   The figure also illustrates the two partner effects estimated:  the effect of 
husbands’ time preference on wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex (pwh) holding wives’ time 
preferences constant, and the effect of wives’ time preference on husbands’ odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex (phw) holding husbands’ time preferences constant.   
To assist with interpreting the results, actor and partner effects for wives’ odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex are shown in red.  Actor and partner effects for husbands’ odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex are in blue.  Full results are shown in Table 33, columns 3 and 4.  None of the estimated 
effects were significant, but most were in the predicted direction.   As in the baseline model, husbands 
had higher odds of engaging in extramarital sex if they had high discount rates (AOR 1.23, actor effect), 
or if their wives had high discount rates (AOR 1.33, partner effect).  Wives had higher odds of engaging 
in extramarital sex if their husbands had high discount rates (AOR 1.4, partner effect), but had lower 
odds of extramarital sex if they themselves had high discount rates (AOR 0.8, actor effect). 
APIM Model with Interactions and Covariates 
The final model added an interaction term for husbands and wives’ time preferences, illustrated 
in Figure 22.  Separate actor, partner, and interaction effects were estimated with respect to husbands 
and wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex. These effects are shown in red for wives, and blue for 
husbands.  Specifically, the three effects for wives were: 1) the effect of wife’s time preference on wife’s 
odds of engaging in extramarital sex (aw); 2) the effect of husband’s time preference on wife’s odds of 
engaging in extramarital sex (pwh); and 3) the effect of being in a relationship in which both spouses 
have high discount rates (dyad-level effect, HxWw).   These same effects were estimated for husbands’ 
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odds of engaging in extramarital sex.  The model also contained covariates for age, education, wealth 
and region which are not shown.   
None of the model results were significant.  Both interaction terms were greater than one (AOR 
1.46 for wives; AOR 1.11 for husbands), which suggests that being in a relationship in which both 
spouses had high discount rates increased the odds of engaging in extramarital sex for both husbands 
and wives controlling for the individual-level effect of their own time preference and their spouse’s time 




Results for Perceiving That One’s Spouse is Engaging in Extramarital Sex 
 
Figure 23.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), Illustrating the Main Effect of Each 
Respondent’s Own Time Preference (“Actor Effects”), As Well As Their Spouse’s Time Preference 
(“Partner Effects”) on the Odds That They Perceive Their Spouse Is Having Extramarital Sex.  
Model contained covariates for husbands and wives’ age, education, wealth and region which are not 




Figure 24.  Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), Illustrating the Effect of Each Respondent’s 
Own Time Preference (“Actor Effects”), Their Spouses’ Time Preference (“Partner Effects”), and the 
Interaction Between Their Own and Their Spouses’ Time Preferences on The Odds of Perceiving That 
Their Spouse Is Having Extramarital Sex.   Model contained covariates for husbands and wives’ age, 





APIM Model without Covariates 
In the baseline model without covariates, two effects were significant.  Wives had higher odds of 
perceiving that their husbands were engaged in extramarital sex if their husbands had high discount 
rates (AOR 2.08, 95% CI 1.42-3.81, p=0.002), or if they themselves had high discount rates (AOR 1.4, 95% 
CI 0.91-1.94, p=0.07).  Husbands had higher odds of perceiving that their wives were having sex outside 
marriage if they had high discount rates (AOR 1.41) or their wives had high discount rates (AOR 1.2), 
although neither effect was significant.  These results are shown in Table 34, columns 1 and 2.   
APIM Model with Covariates 
Results for the APIM model with covariates are illustrated in Figure 23.  Full results are in Table 
34, columns 3 and 4.   Actor and partner effects for both husbands and wives were greater than one, 
indicating that having high discount rates, or having a spouse with high discount rates, increased the 
odds of perceiving that one’s spouse is having sex outside marriage.   Only the partner effect from 
husbands to wives was significant, however.  Wives whose husbands had high discount rates had twice 
the odds of perceiving that their husband is engaging in extramarital sex compared with wives whose 
husbands have low discount rates (AOR 2.03, 95% CI 1.42-3.67, p<0.01).  This effect is represented in 
Figure 23 by the upward sloping line labeled pwh.     
APIM Model with Interactions and Covariates 
The model which contained an interaction term for husbands and wives’ time preferences 
yielded different results for husbands and wives.  These results are illustrated in Figure 24.  Full results 
are shown in Table 34, columns 5 and 6.   The interaction term with respect to husbands’ odds of 
perceiving that their wives are engaging in extramarital sex was greater than one, but non-significant 
(AOR 2.36).  This result suggests that for husbands, being in a relationship in which both spouses had 
high discount rates increased the odds of perceiving spousal extramarital sex compared with being in a 
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relationship in which both spouses had low discount rates, or in which one spouse had low discount 
rates and the other had high discount rates.   
By contrast, the interaction term with respect to wives’ odds of perceiving that their husbands 
are engaging in extramarital sex was less than one and marginally significant (AOR 0.45, 95% CI 0.15-
1.02, p<.08).  The four effects produced by the interaction term are summarized in Table 30 and Figure 
25.  The effect of wives having high discount rates versus low discount rates on their odds of perceiving 
spousal extramarital sex was less positive if married to husbands with high discount rates (AOR 1.06, 
95% CI 0.62-1.63, p=0.80), compared with low discount rates (AOR 2.35, 95% CI 1.17-5.41, p=0.03).  The 
latter effect was significant.  In addition, the effect of husbands’ high discount rates on wives’ odds of 
perceiving spousal extramarital sex was less positive for wives who themselves had high discount rates 
(AOR 1.06, 95% CI 0.62-1.63, p= 0.80) versus low discount rates (AOR 3.46, 95% CI 1.95-8.48, p<.001).  
The latter effect was significant.    
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Table 30.  Four Estimated Effects Produced by the Interaction of Husbands and Wives’ Time Preferences 
With Regard to Wives’ Odds of Perceiving That Their Husbands are Engaging in Extramarital Sex .  
  Moderator Coefficient 
Actor effect Effect of wife having high discount rate 
versus low discount rate, if: 
Husband has low discount rate 2.35** 
Husband has high discount rate 1.06 
Partner effect Effect of husband having high discount rate 
versus low discount rate, if: 
Wife has low discount rate 3.46** 
Wife has high discount rate 1.56 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 
 
 
Figure 25.  Summary of Four Estimated Effects Produced by The Interaction of Husbands and Wives’ Time 
Preferences with Respect to Wives’ Odds of Perceiving That Their Husbands Are Engaging in Extramarital 



























This study examined the extent to which individuals’ time preferences and their spouses’ time 
preferences influenced their odds of engaging in extramarital sex and their odds of perceiving that their 
spouses are engaging in extramarital sex.  These relationships were explored using dyadic analysis, in 
which actor and partner effects were estimated for husband and wife dyads simultaneously.  This 
approach is appropriate for the study of extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex, since these 
behaviors occur within the context of marital relationships in which spouses mutually influence one 
another’s behaviors.  In this section, I summarize and discuss the study results, review study limitations, 
and identify areas for future research. 
Results Summary  
Husbands and wives’ time preferences were not significant predictors of self-reported 
extramarital sex.  With respect to perceived extramarital sex, the partner effect from husbands to wives 
was significant.  Wives whose husbands had high discount rates had twice the odds of perceiving that 
their husbands are engaging in extramarital sex, compared with wives whose husbands had low discount 
rates.   In a separate model, the interaction of husbands and wives’ time preferences was marginally 
significant for wives.  The interaction produced two significant effects summarized in Table 30 and 
Figure 25.  When married to husbands with low discount rates, wives with high discount rates had 
significantly higher odds of perceiving spousal extramarital sex compared with wives with low discount 
rates.  When married to husbands with high discount rates, wives with low discount rates had 





Although few results were significant, trends in the data provide some support for the study 
hypotheses.    
Relevant results for each study hypotheses are summarized in Table X, and discussed in greater 
detail in the following section.  Results are disaggregated by wives and husbands.  Unless otherwise 
noted, results are non-significant.   Non-significant results are included to illustrate trends.   Black 
arrows pointing upward indicate support for study hypotheses.   More specifically, the upward arrows 
indicate a positive association between high discount rates and higher odds of extramarital sex and 
perceived extramarital sex.  Red arrows pointing downward indicate results contrary to study 
hypotheses.   It was hypothesized that having high discount rates oneself (actor effect), having a spouse 
with high discount rates (partner effect), or being part of a marriage in which both members have high 
discount rates (dyad-level effect) would be associated with higher odds of extramarital sex and 
perceived extramarital sex.  It was also hypothesized that husbands would have a stronger effect on 
wives’ outcomes, than vice versa.   
Odds of Extramarital Sex 
Actor effects.  Husbands with high discount rates had higher odds of engaging in extramarital 
sex than those with low discount rates.  These results suggest that some men have sex outside of 
marriage because they are less concerned about the potential future consequences of contracting HIV 
from their outside partners, as predicted by the discounted utility model.   Wives with high discount 
rates had lower odds of engaging in extramarital sex, however.  It is possible wives underreported 
extramarital sex, or that factors such as fear of divorce, violence or social norms against women having 




Partner effects.   Being married to a spouse with high discount rates raised husbands and wives’ 
odds of engaging in extramarital sex.  As hypothesized, it is possible that time preferences affect marital 
stability and satisfaction, such that both are lower when married to a spouse who is short-sighted and 
less willing to make small sacrifices for the long-term sake of the relationship.  In these situations, 
individuals may be less invested in their marriage and more likely to seek sex and companionship with 
outside partners.  If this explanation is plausible, it might further be expected that the effect of having a 
spouse with high discount rates on an individual’s odds of engaging in extramarital sex would be greater 
if the individual themselves had high discount rates versus low discount rates.  Evidence of these 
associations was found in the model which contained an interaction for husbands and wives’ time 
preferences.   
Dyad-level effects.   As noted earlier, dyadic analysis treats spouses as being nested in dyads.  
The interaction of husbands and wives’ time preferences tests whether there is a dyad-level effect of 
being in a marriage in which both spouses have high discount rates (high-high), low discount rates (low-
low), or mixed discount rates (low-high) or (high-low).   Actor and partner effects are estimated while 
holding the other constant, so describe individual-level or within-dyad effects.    
As predicted, being in a marriage in which one or both spouses had high discount rates, 
compared with being in a marriage in which both spouses had low discount rates (reference group), 
increased husbands and wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex above and beyond the effect of 
their own time preferences or their spouses’ time preferences.  The results are consistent with the 
“goodness of fit” hypothesis from interdependence theory that suggests outcomes depend not only on 
the individual characteristics of each dyad member, but also on how the members match or fit together.   
Results also conform with research on the evolution of cooperation, which suggests that tacit 
agreements between spouses to mutually abstain from extramarital sex can only arise in pairs in which 
both spouses have sufficient regard for the shadow of the future (i.e., low discount rates).   That is, only 
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when each party is deterred from cheating in the present, out of concern that their partner will respond 
by cheating in the future, can cooperation arise and be maintained.    
This analysis is a first attempt to understand and predict how couples can cooperate to reduce 
their risk of HIV.  Research on the evolution of cooperation, which is based on the Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (IPD), is interesting and potentially fruitful because it suggests that cooperation can arise and 
possibly be promoted in cases where parties are self-interested.   This perspective suggests unique 
interventions.  For example, one recommended way to improve cooperation between parties is to 
enlarge the shadow of the future by making it more likely that players will continue to encounter each 
other over time (Axelrod, 2006).  In Malawi, this goal might be accomplished through efforts to keep 
couples together, for example, through counseling.  Divorce and remarriage are common in rural 
Malawi, with the lifetime probability of divorce estimated to be between 40 to 65% (Reniers, 2003; 
Watkins, 2004).  In this environment, agreements to mutually abstain from extramarital sex may be 
difficult to sustain, since spouses could cheat and given how normative divorce is in this setting, could 
later divorce, avoiding the potential future consequences of their defection, a strategy more easily 
adopted by men than women due to economic dependency.   More generally, a separate line of 
research from health economics suggests that when the possibility of divorce is great, spouses will have 
less incentive to invest in the health of their spouse or to cooperate for their mutual benefit since these 
resources would be lost in the event of marital dissolution (Bolin, Jacobson, & Lindgren, 2002).  Other 
suggestions from the cooperation literature align with current efforts to improve couples-based HIV 
prevention by improving relationship quality, for example by improving communication skills and 
transparency within the relationship.  These include building transparency and communication between 
parties.   In the future, studies might explore more advanced applications of game theory to understand 
how strategic interactions between spouses can affect their HIV risk, and how cooperation between 
spouses can be promoted to improve health outcomes.     
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Odds of Perceived Spousal Extramarital Sex 
Model estimates for the odds of perceiving that one’s spouse is engaging in extramarital sex 
show that all actor and partner effects were greater than one.  These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that individuals with high discount rates, and individuals whose spouses have high discount 
rates, would have higher odds of perceiving that their spouse is having extramarital sex.   
Actor effects.  One possible reason for why individuals’ time preferences were associated with 
higher odds of perceiving extramarital sex is that individuals who are more focused on present 
outcomes may be more sensitive to changes in the attention or support that they receive from their 
spouse.   As a result, they may be more likely to report that they perceive that their spouse is having sex 
outside marriage, if asked, as they were in the Malawi survey.   It is also possible that individuals with 
high discount rates are more likely to have extramarital sex themselves, allowing them to better detect 
if their spouse is engaging in the same behavior.   Future research might further explore how time 
preferences affect perceptions of extramarital sex in order to better understand how these perceptions 
are formed.    
Partner effects.  The partner effect of husbands’ time preference on wives odds of perceiving 
extramarital sex was statistically significant.   This result supports the observation that individuals’ 
interpersonal perceptions are driven more by their partners’ characteristics rather than their own 
characteristics  (David A. Kenny & Cook, 1999).  One possible explanation for this partner effect is that 
husbands (and wives) who are less concerned about the future consequences of their present-day 
actions will display a pattern of short-sighted behavior that increases the odds that their spouse will 
perceive that they are having sex outside the marriage.  This finding is consistent with the results from a 
study in Kenya on intrahousehold decision making, which found that spouses are to some extent aware 
of one another’s tendency to undervalue future outcomes and will act strategically based on that 
information.  The study showed that individuals whose spouses had high discount rates were more likely 
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to open an individual bank account that their spouse could not access, versus a joint account that 
offered higher interest, regardless of individuals’ own discount rate (Schaner, 2011).   A separate 
possible explanation is that when an individual’s spouse has high discount rates, marital stability and 
satisfaction will be lower, raising the likelihood that individuals will suspect the other of engaging in 
extramarital sex.   
Dyad-level effects.   There was evidence of dyad-level effects with respect to the odds of 
perceiving that one’s spouse is engaging in extramarital sex.  As illustrated in Figure 25, wives had 
significantly higher odds of perceiving extramarital sex when spouses had heterogeneous time 
preferences – that is, when wives had high discount rates and husbands had low discount rates, or vice 
versa, compared to homogenous time preferences.  These results suggest that for wives, higher odds of 
perceived spousal extramarital sex may be due in part to friction between spouses in how focused they 
are on immediate versus future outcomes.  By contrast, husbands and wives had higher odds of 
extramarital sex when spouses had homogenous time preferences (that is, both having high discount 
rates), suggesting a synergistic effect when both spouses shared the same outlook on the future, 
although these effects were non-significant.  These results underscore the importance of examining the 
“goodness of fit” between spouses, and the need to examine how different combinations of spouses’ 
time preferences interact to influence specific behaviors, since these effects may not be uniform. 
Comparison of Effects:  Husbands and Wives 
Husbands had a greater influence on wives’ behavior than wives had on husbands.  The partner 
effect of husbands’ time preferences on wives’ odds of perceived extramarital sex was statistically 
significant and larger in magnitude than the effect of wives’ time preference on husbands’ odds.  The 
same pattern was found with respect to the odds of extramarital sex, although neither effect was 
significant.  This finding is consistent with an observation from interdependence theory that asymmetry 
within a relationship can result in one spouse exerting greater influence over the other  (Kelley, 2003).  
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Empirical studies support the idea that the distribution of power within relationships can affect the 
ability of spouses to shape their partners’ behavior (Merline, Schulenberg, O'Malley, Bachman, & 
Johnston, 2008; Qualls, 1987).  Within married couples in sub-Saharan Africa, women are likely to be the 
more dependent partner due to lower access to education and economic resources, as well as gender 
norms which reinforce power differentials between men and women  (Amy A Conroy, 2013).  It is 
therefore not surprising that partner effects from husbands to wives would prevail.  These results 
underscore the importance of working with both husbands and wives to reduce risk behavior in both 
spouses.       
Study Implications 
This study provides a comprehensive account of how time preferences potentially influence the 
odds of extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex within married couples.  Findings provide some 
support for the suggestion that time preference influences these outcomes in three related ways:  first, 
by governing how individuals weigh the immediate benefits of extramarital sex against its long term 
potential health consequences, second, through its effect on marital stability and satisfaction, and, third, 
through its effect on the ability of spouses to cooperate and tacitly agree to abstain from extramarital 
sex for their mutual benefit.  Much of the research on time preferences and health focuses on how time 
preferences affect the weighing of immediate versus delayed rewards.  Although the additional 
mechanisms suggested here are indirect and require further study, they may more realistically depict 
the multiple and possible conflicting ways in which time preferences shape health outcomes.  Exploring 
these different pathways may improve our understanding of the cognitive processes behind particular 
health behaviors.  It also may suggest different approaches for interventions, such as by identifying ways 
to build trust and cooperation between short-sighted spouses who may have little incentive otherwise 
to work together to reduce their risk of HIV.  The study also helps to demonstrate the value of dyadic 
analysis, which provides a way to examine the joint influence of individuals’ own characteristics, 
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spouses’ characteristics, and couples-level characteristics on individuals’ health behavior.  This approach 
could be a useful tool as interest in couples-based approaches to HIV prevention continues to expand.    
Study results may also have implications for identifying couples who would most benefit from couples 
counseling or other interventions, such as Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), which could help protect 
individuals at greater risk of contracting HIV due to their own and/or their spouses’ extramarital sex. 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
There were several limitations related to the study’s cross-sectional design.  First, it was not 
possible to establish temporal ordering between time preference and the study outcomes.   Rather than 
time preference predicting extramarital sex, causality could run in the opposite direction.   Having sex 
outside of marriage, or perceiving that one’s spouse is having sex outside marriage, might evoke a more 
present-oriented outlook due to actual and perceived increased risk of HIV and its associated reductions 
in life expectancy.  Relatedly, the study also hypothesizes that time preferences affect martial stability, 
which in turn affects the odds of extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex.   It is possible, 
however, that these outcomes cause marital instability, which breeds further extramarital sex and 
perceived extramarital sex (Mark et al., 2011).  If this dynamic was present, estimates of the effect of 
time preference on these behaviors may be inflated.  In the future, longitudinal designs could clarify the 
temporal ordering of these effects.    If longitudinal data is not available, future research might gain 
additional insight by using a strategy similar to cohort-sequential designs, in which newly-married 
couples are compared with couples who have been married for longer periods of time.   
A second set of limitations is related to characteristics of the sample.  Only a small percentage of 
wives reported engaging in extramarital sex, and few husbands reported perceiving that their wives 
were engaging in extramarital sex.  As a result, some study findings had large confidence intervals and 
need to be interpreted with caution.  Due to these same data constraints, the study did not explore the 
possible interaction of extramarital sex and perceived extramarital sex.  Perceived extramarital sex may 
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contribute to actual extramarital sex, so examining them in combination may produce a more 
comprehensive picture of how time preferences influence these outcomes.   The study also did not 
examine potentially important dyad-level moderators of the association between time preference and 
extramarital sex, such as relationship duration or gender-equity norms held by respondents.  Given the 
growing interest in couples-based approaches to HIV prevention, learning more about how the features 
of a relationship affect the behaviors of its members may be valuable.  Future research might address 
these limitations by finding ways to gather more accurate self-reports of extramarital sex, for example, 
by ensuring greater confidentiality when interviewing respondents.  Larger sample sizes, and repeating 
this analysis in different populations, might also provide opportunities to conduct more detailed 
analyses on the association of time preference and extramarital sex.     
A separate limitation is that the study did not control for polygamy, which some studies have 
associated with extramarital sex in men (J. W. Eaton et al., 2014; Mitsunaga et al., 2005).  Respondents 
were asked about the number of wives in their marriage, but wives and husbands often gave conflicting 
accounts.  If men with high discount rates are more likely to have multiple wives, failing to control for 
the effects of polygamy would bias upward the estimates of the effect of high discount rates.  Future 
studies would benefit by possibly identifying other datasets with marital histories which could be used 
to repeat this analysis.     
A final set of limitations is related to the measure of respondents’ time preferences.  There is 
currently not an agreed upon method for assessing time preferences.  Study results may therefore be 
sensitive to the particular measures contained in the Malawi survey.  To my knowledge, these measures 
have not undergone rigorous testing to determine their reliability and validity, which may be of 
particular concern in low resource settings.  In areas with weak institutions, individuals may choose 
immediate rewards over delayed prizes not because they have high discount rates, but because they 
cannot be certain that the larger, delayed prize will be delivered as promised.   In addition, in 
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environments with less material security, individuals’ answers may be influenced more by their 
immediate economic concerns than their more stable, underlying time preference.  A more general 
limitation related to measuring time preferences is that discount rates may be domain specific, meaning 
that individuals discount different goods, such as health or money, at different rates.  (Gretchen B 
Chapman, 1996; G. B. Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Amy L. Odum, 2011).   Future research could investigate 
the validity of the time preference measures by experimenting with real monetary prizes or choices 
between present and future health outcomes, by conducting qualitative research on how respondents 
interpret these questions, or by cross validating economic-based time preference measures with 
measures of “delay discounting” and related constructs from psychology.   Future studies might also 
benefit from using more refined measures of time preferences.  I chose to use a dichotomous measure 
of time preference in this study due to sample size considerations.  A categorical or quasi-continuous 
measure would allow for greater differentiation of respondents and could provide a more detailed 
account of how time preferences influence extramarital sex.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This study examined the influence of husbands and wives’ time preferences on the odds of 
engaging in extramarital sex and the odds of perceiving that their spouse is engaging in extramarital sex.  
These associations were explored in a sample of married and cohabitating couples in rural Malawi.  
Respondents were categorized as having “high” or “low” discount rates based on choices over 
hypothetical monetary rewards.   Wives whose husbands had high discount rates had significantly higher 
odds of perceiving spousal extramarital sex compared with wives whose husbands had low discount 
rates.  This result supports the hypothesis that spouses influence one another’s behaviors, which 
underscores the value of dyadic analysis when studying perceived extramarital sex.   Although few other 
results were significant, trends in the data suggest that men with high discount rates have higher odds 
of self-reported extramarital sex, which suggests that how individuals weigh immediate versus delayed 
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rewards affects decision-making with respect to extramarital sex.  Trends also suggest the presence of 
dyad-level effects, such that couples in which one or both spouses have high discount rates may have 
more difficulty cooperating to reduce their mutual risk of HIV.  Future studies, particularly those with 
longitudinal designs, are needed to confirm study results and to assess generalizability to other sub-
Saharan African settings.   More advanced applications of game theory might also contribute to our 





Table 31.  Malawi Time Preference Measures 
Next…I will ask you about receiving money 2 months from 
now compared with receiving money at a time more than 
2 months from now.  Would you prefer? 
Prizes converted to $USD 
780 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 7 months? $5.74 in 2 months or $5.88 in 7 months? 
800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 7 months? $5.88 in 2 months or $6.25 in 7 months? 
670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 6 months? $4.93 in 2 months or $5.51 in 6 months? 
690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 5 months? $5.07 in 2 months or $6.25 in 5 months? 
550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 4 months? $4.04 in 2 months or $5.51 in 4 months? 
540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 3 months? $3.97 in 2 months or $5.88 in 3 months? 
410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 2 months plus 3 
weeks? 
$3.01 in 2 months or $5.51 in 2 months plus 3 weeks? 
330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 2 months plus 2 
weeks? 
$2.43 in 2 months or $5.88 in 2 months plus 2 weeks? 
310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 2 months plus 1 
week? 






Table 32.  Summary Statistics for Married Couples by Sex 
 Women  Men  All   
  No. % No. % No. % Pa 
A.  Baseline Characteristics        
Age, mean (SD) 33.1 10.4 39.8 11.6 36.5 11.5 0.00 
Age at most recent marriage, mean (SD) 20.0 6.8 27.2 8.9 23.6 8.7 0.00 
Age of spouse compared to respondent, no (%)        
Spouse was older 821 (95) 75 (9) 896 (52) 0.00 
Spouse was same age 21 (2) 21 (2) 42 (2)  
Spouse was younger 23 (3) 771 (89) 794 (46)  
Total 865 (100) 867 (100) 1,732 (100)  
More than one wife in current marriage        
Yes 188 (22) 138  (16) 327  (19) 0.00 
Total 866  (100) 869  (100) 1735  (100)  
Wealth based on asset indexb, mean (SD) 4.5 2.2 4.7 2.2 4.6 2.2 0.03 
Number of marriages including current, mean (SD) 1.3 0.6 1.8 1.1 1.6 0.9 0.00 
Education, no. (%)       
 
No education 256 (30) 154 (18) 410 (24) 0.00 
Some primary education 441 (51) 375 (43) 816 (47)  
Completed primary education 104 (12) 191 (22) 295 (17)  
Some secondary education 54 (6) 100 (12) 154 (9)  
Completed secondary or greater 14 (2) 49 (6) 63 (4)  
Total 869 (100) 869 (100) 1,738 (100)  
Region, no. (%)        
Central 293 (34) 293 (34) 586 (34)  
South 278 (32) 278 (32) 556 (32)  
North 298 (34) 298 (34) 596 (34)  
Total 869 (100) 869 (100) 1,738 (100)   
B.  Time Preference Characteristics        
High Discount Rate, No. (%) 530 (61) 585 (67) 1,115 (64) 0.01 
Total 869 (100) 869 (100) 1,738 (100)  
Inconsistent Discounting, No. (%) 67 (8) 55 (6) 122 (7) 0.26 
Total 869 (100) 869 (100) 1,738 (100)   
C.  HIV status and Perceived HIV Risk        
HIV-infected, based on HIV test offered by Malawi 
study in 2006 after survey completion, No. (%) 33 (5) 29 (4) 62 (4) 0.77 
Total 717 (100) 677 (100) 1,394 (100)  
Self-reported chance of having HIV, among those 
who reported being not HIV-infected, No. (%)       
 
No risk at all 596 (69) 679 (78) 1,275 (74) 0.00 
Low 181 (21) 136 (16) 317 (18)  
Moderate 50 (6) 27 (3) 77 (5)  
High 34 (4) 24 (3) 58 (3)  
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 Women  Men  All   
  No. % No. % No. % Pa 
Total 861 (100) 866 (100) 1,727 (100)  
Likelihood of having HIV/AIDS on a 10 point scale, 
mean (SD) 1.2 2.1 0.8 1.8 1.0 1.9 
0.00 
 
D.  Self-reported Risk Behavior       
 
Had extramarital sexual partners, No. (%) 31 (4) 316 (38) 347 (20) 0.00 
Total 864 (100) 843 (100) 1707 (100)  
Perceive that spouse had extramarital sexual 
partners, No. (%) 207 (26) 48 (6) 255 (16) 
0.00 
Total 787 (100) 803 (100) 1590 (100)  
Had more than one sexual partner in the past 12 
months, No. (%) 7 (1) 188 (22) 195 (12) 
0.00 
Total 846 (100) 843 (100) 1,689 (100)  
Condom never or rarely used with most recent 
sexual partner, No. (%) 866 (100) 862 (100) 1,728 (100) 0.56 
Total 867 (100) 864 (100) 1,731 (100)  
Drink During Average Week, No. (%) 15 (2) 207 (24) 222 (13) 0.00 
Total 869 (100) 865 (100) 1,734 (100)  
Refused HIV test in 2006 offered by Malawi study 50 (7) 56 (8) 106 (7) 0.40 
Total 768 (100) 734 (100) 1,502 (100)  
a.  Χ2 tests were conducted for categorical variables, and t-tests for continuous variables. 








Table 33.  APIM Estimates of the Effect of Time Preference (High Discount Rate) on the Odds of Engaging in Extramarital Sex. 
Each column represents a separate APIM model.  Each model has two dependent variables representing wives and husbands’ odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex.  The effects of each spouse’s time preference on these two outcomes are estimated simultaneously using structural equation 
modeling.  For wives’ odds extramarital sex (columns 1, 3 and 5), the effect of wives’ time preference is the actor effect (yellow), while the effect 
of husbands’ time preference is the partner effect (green).  For husbands’ odds of having extramarital sex (columns 2, 4 and 6), the effect of 
husbands’ time preference is the actor effect (yellow) and the effect of wives’ time preference is the partner effect (green). 
    
 





















 AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate Husband 1.42 0.55-3.37 1.23 0.81-1.66 1.40 0.51-3.58 1.23 0.80-1.60 1.13 0.36-5.82 1.16 0.67-2.21 
High Discount Rate Wife 0.88 0.52-1.87 1.38* 0.98-1.87 0.89 0.40-1.97 1.33 0.90-1.78 0.67 0.00-2.85 1.24 0.71-2.32 
High Discount Rate Husband  x  
High Discount Rate Wife         1.46 0.02-32.49 1.11 0.46-2.35 
Age (5 year units)     1.03 0.83-1.23 1.08 1.01-1.17 1.03 0.83-1.21 1.08 1.01-1.17 
Primary Education     1.10 0.39-3.44 1.37 0.79-2.00 1.10 0.39-3.42 1.37 0.80-1.98 
Secondary Education     1.73 0.18-32.20 0.95 0.43-1.98 1.73 0.00-10.76 0.95 0.43-2.10 
Wealth     0.91 0.68-1.10 1.13 1.04-1.22 0.91 0.69-1.10 1.13 1.04-1.22 
Central Region     1.36 0.49-4.66 0.53 0.31-0.80 1.36 0.50-4.67 0.53 0.31-0.80 
North Region     0.95 0.18-2.83 0.69 0.42-1.01 0.94 0.16-2.85 0.68 0.42-1.01 
Constant     0.02 0.05-0.01 0.42 0.77-0.24 0.02 0.05-0.01 0.43 0.86-0.24 
N  869  869   869   869  869  869 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01             
Actor effects are in green             








Table 34.  APIM Estimates of the Effect of Time Preference (High Discount Rate) on the Odds of Perceiving That One’s Spouse is Having 
Extramarital Sex (“Perceived Extramarital Sex”) Each column represents a separate APIM model.  Each model has two dependent variables 
representing wives and husbands’ odds of perceived extramarital sex.  The effects of each spouse’s time preference on these two outcomes are 
estimated simultaneously using structural equation modeling.  With regard to wives’ odds of perceived extramarital sex (columns 1, 3 and 5), the 
effect of wives’ time preference is the actor effect (yellow), while the effect of husbands’ time preference is the partner effect (green).  For 
husbands’ odds of perceived extramarital sex (columns 2, 4 and 6), the effect of husbands’ time preference is the actor effect (yellow) and the 
effect of wives’ time preference is the partner effect (green). 








Sex - Husbands 
(3) 
Perceived Extramarital 
Sex - Wives 
(4) 
Perceived Extramarital 
Sex - Husbands 
(5) 
Perceived Extramarital 




Sex – Husbands  
 AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
High Discount Rate 
Husband 
2.08** 1.42-3.81 1.41 0.63-2.94 2.033** 1.42-3.67 1.40 0.80-2.93 3.46** 1.95-8.48 0.79 0.22-2.04 
High Discount Rate Wife 1.40+ 0.91-1.94 1.20 0.56-2.15 1.29 0.82-1.77 1.06 0.50-1.95 2.35* 1.17-5.41 0.63 0.22-2.53 
High Discount Rate 
Husband  x  
High Discount Rate Wife          0.45+ 0.15-1.02 2.36 0.37-8.50 
Age (5 year units)     1.14** 1.02-1.24 1.05 0.92-1.23 1.15** 1.02-1.23 1.04 0.92-1.25 
Primary Education     1.23 0.76-1.94 1.81 0.73-6.63 1.23 0.83-2.24 1.58 0.51-4.69 
Secondary Education     1.75 0.49-7.90 2.38 0.48-10.07 1.77 0.54-8.22 2.10 0.40-6.32 
Wealth     1.09* 0.98-1.17 0.97 0.85-1.11 1.09* 0.98-1.16 0.97 0.85-1.12 
Central Region     0.91 0.39-1.25 1.94* 0.98-3.91 0.93 0.39-1.33 2.00* 1.07-4.25 
North Region     0.37** 0.18-0.58 0.93 0.29-3.16 0.38 0.18-0.62 0.96 0.34-3.17 
Constant     0.2** 0.37-0.1 0.02 0.06-0.01 0.13** 0.39-0.06 0.03 0.09-0.01 
N   724   724   724   724   724   724 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<.01             
Actor effects are in 
green             
Partner effects are in 




Table 35.  Summary of Study Results Relevant to Each Study Hypothesis.  Results are from actor-
partner interdependence models with covariates.   Upward arrows and text in black indicate 
results are consistent with study hypotheses.  Downward arrows and text in red indicate results 
that are inconsistent with study hypotheses.  It was hypothesized that all associations between 
high discount rates and study outcomes at the actor, partner and dyad-level would be positive.  It 
was also hypothesized that husbands’ discount rates would have a greater effect on wives’ 
outcomes, than vice versa.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01 




1.1. Actor Effect:  Individuals with high 
discount rates will have higher odds of 
engaging in extramarital sex compared with 
individuals with low discount rates. 
↓ ↑ 
1.2. Partner Effect:  Individuals whose spouses 
have high discount rates will have higher odds 
of engaging in extramarital sex compared with 
individuals whose spouses have low discount 
rates. 
↑ ↑ 
1.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on 
wives’ odds of engaging in extramarital sex will 
be greater than the effect of wives’ discount 
rates on husbands’ odds of engaging in 





1.4. Dyad-Level Effect:  Husbands and wives 
will each have higher odds of engaging in 
extramarital sex if both spouses have high 
discount rates, compared with if only one 




Hypotheses for Perceived Extramarital Sex 
 
Wives Husbands 
2.1. Actor Effect:  Individuals with high 
discount rates will have higher odds of 
perceiving their spouse is engaging in 
extramarital sex.    
↑ ↑ 
2.2. Partner Effect:  Individuals whose spouses 
have high discount rates will have higher odds 
of perceiving their spouse is engaging in 
extramarital sex.   
↑** ↑ 
2.3. The effect of husbands’ discount rates on 
wives’ odds of perceiving extramarital sex will 
be greater than the effect of wives’ discount 
rates on husbands’ odds of perceiving 







2.4. Dyad-Level Effect:  Husbands and wives 
will have higher odds of perceiving the other is 
engaging in extramarital sex if both spouses 
have high discount rates, compared with if 
only one spouse or neither spouse has high 
discount rates. 
↓+ 
Wives had significantly 
higher odds of 
perceiving extramarital 
sex if married to 
husband with 
heterogeneous time 
preferences (i.e., wife 
has high discount rate 
and husband has low 









CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation explored the association between individuals’ time preferences and HIV risk 
behavior in Kenya and Malawi.  Time preference refers to the preference for immediate rewards over 
delayed rewards when making decisions in which the two tradeoff.   Time preference is traditionally 
expressed as a discount rate, which is the percent by which individuals undervalue future rewards.  
Higher discount rates imply a weaker regard for future outcomes.  Respondents’ discount rates were 
elicited using survey-based experimental measures involving choices between hypothetical monetary 
prizes.   
The central hypothesis of this study was that individuals with high discount rates, who 
undervalue their future health to a greater extent, will have higher odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior 
compared with individuals with low discount rates.  This hypothesis was explored in the three study 
aims, each of which was informed by a different theoretical perspective of how time preferences 
influence behavior.  The first dissertation paper examined Aims 1 and 2, which represented the 
traditional economic and behavioral economic perspectives.  The second dissertation paper explored 
Aim 3, which represented the interdependence theoretical perspective.   In the remainder of this 
chapter, I summarize the study findings, discuss strengths and limitations, and review the implications of 
this research.   
6.1 Summary of Results 
The first dissertation study examined the association between individuals’ time preferences and 
HIV risk behavior in two independent samples (Aim 1):  men in Kenya, ages 25 to 49 years, and men and 
women in Malawi, ages 15 to 64 years.  Multiple risk behaviors were examined in each population.  In 
Kenya, men with high discount rates had higher odds of being uncircumcised at baseline, a marginally 
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significant result.  Married men with high discount rates had significantly higher odds of drinking alcohol 
during a normal week.  In Malawi, individuals with high discount rates had significantly higher odds of 
refusing post-survey HIV testing.  This study also examined the extent to which marital status, sex, and 
time-inconsistent discounting moderated the association between time preference and HIV risk 
behavior (Aim 2).  Men in Kenya who displayed time-inconsistent discounting (such that they had low 
discount rates in the far term, but high discount rates in the near term) had significantly higher odds of 
not using condoms at last sex.  This result suggested that risk behavior may be due to self-control 
problems, rather than an underlying preference for immediate rewards.  No other moderators were 
significant, although several unexpected trends were observed.  In Kenya, high discounting predicted 
higher odds of risk behavior among married men, but was associated with lower odds of risk behavior 
among unmarried men.  In Malawi, women with high discount rates had consistently higher odds of 
engaging in all five risk behaviors examined, but men with high discount rates had lower or odds of 
having concurrent sexual partners, having more than one sexual partner, and using alcohol in an average 
week. 
The second study examined the extent to which husbands’ and wives’ time preferences 
predicted their own and their spouses’ odds of extramarital sex and odds of perceived spousal 
extramarital sex (Aim 3).  These associations were explored within a sample of married couples, ages 15 
to 64 years, in Malawi.  Time preference was not significantly associated with the odds of extramarital 
sex.  Trends in the data, however, suggested that husbands had higher odds of extramarital sex if they 
themselves had high discount rates, or if their wives had high discount rates.  Trends also suggested that 
being in a marriage in which both spouses had high discount rates increased the odds of extramarital sex 
for both husbands and wives.  Several associations were significant with respect to the odds of 
perceiving spousal extramarital sex.  Wives whose husbands had high discount rates had twice the odds 
of perceiving spousal extramarital sex, compared with wives whose husbands had low discount rates.   
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In addition, being in a marriage in which one spouse had high discount rates, while the other had low 
discount rates, significantly increased wives’ odds of perceiving spousal extramarital sex above and 
beyond the individual-level effect of their own discount rates or their husbands’ discount rates. 
Although there were few significant results, these findings coupled with trends in the data, provide 
preliminary support for the hypothesis that individuals who discount their future health to a greater 
extent will have higher odds of engaging in HIV risk behavior.  The two dissertation papers were 
designed to build on one another.  The first paper used standard logistic regression to examine how 
individuals’ time preferences influenced their own behavior.  The second paper expanded on the first by 
exploring how spouses’ time preferences might also influence behavior.  Results from the second paper 
suggest that more can be learned about the determinants of the HIV risk behavior by considering how 
individuals in close relationships mutually influence one another’s behavior.  Each study suggests ways 
the other could be extended in the future.  Dyadic analysis could be used to study the risk behaviors 
examined in the first paper.   For unmarried individuals, dyadic analysis might be used to investigate the 
mutual influence of parent-adolescent dyads or peer dyads.   The second study could be expanded to 
test whether spouses’ inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias) influence one another’s HIV risk 
behaviors.  Although inconsistent discounting was only significantly associated with one risk behavior, 
not using condoms at last sex in Kenya, a substantial body of research suggests that it is a more accurate 
model of how individuals make decisions in the real world, indicating that it should more accurately 
predict behavior.  It is possible that larger samples are needed to be able to detect these effects. 
6.2 Strengths and Limitations 
The studies had several strengths.  First, the study explored the association between time 
preference and HIV risk behavior from three different theoretical perspectives, adding to existing 
knowledge about the cognitive processes driving these behaviors, and potentially assisting in identifying 
new avenues for intervention.   Second, the study was one of the first to examine the association 
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between time preference and HIV risk behavior in sub-Saharan Africa.  This analysis sheds light on the 
extent to which the relationship between time preference and health behavior observed in high-
resource settings is generalizable to low-resource settings, where uncertainty about the future may 
result in uniformly high discounting of future outcomes.   This analysis also contributes to our 
understanding of the drivers of HIV risk behavior in the region, as well as provides a point of comparison 
for studies conducted in high resource settings.   Third, the study examined the extent to which the 
association between time preference and HIV risk behavior varied by sex and marital status, information 
which enhances our understanding of the different role that time preference plays in the risk behaviors 
of different subgroups, potentially allowing for more targeted interventions in the future.   Fourth, the 
study explored how spouses’ time preferences mutually influenced one another’s odds of extramarital 
sex and perceived extramarital sex.  This approach recognizes that HIV risk behaviors often take place 
within the context of marital relationships, and that focusing exclusively on within-individual 
determinants of these behaviors may unintentionally obscure the important influence of interpersonal 
factors.  A final strength is that this dissertation attempted to balance the need for breadth and depth in 
its study design.  As one of the first studies to examine the association between time preference and HIV 
risk behavior in sub-Saharan Africa, it was important to assess the scope and generalizability of this 
relationship, as well as to investigate the specific avenues by which time preference potentially 
influences risk behavior.  Study breadth is demonstrated by the examination of multiple HIV risk 
behaviors, across two countries, among women and men, individuals and married couples.   Study depth 
is illustrated by examining in detail the way in which risk behavior in married couples is influenced by 
individuals’ time preferences, spouses’ time preferences, and time preferences at the dyad-level – that 
is, whether spouses had heterogeneous or homogenous time preferences.   
This study also had several limitations.  First, because the study was cross-sectional in design, it 
was not possible to establish temporal ordering of individuals’ time preference and HIV risk behavior.  
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Rather than high discounting leading to risk behavior, it is possible that risk behavior caused individuals 
to adopt a more present-oriented outlook, if individuals perceived that they were at greater risk of 
contracting HIV and had reduced life expectancy as a result.   Although time preference is theorized to 
be a stable individual characteristic, significant shocks, such as natural disasters, have been shown to 
prompt individuals to focus more on their short-term well-being (Callen, 2015; Cassar et al., 2017).  
Future research could address these concerns by conducting longitudinal studies, particularly ones that 
include younger cohorts, whose time preferences could be assessed prior to the initiation of risky 
behavior.   
A second limitation is related to the measurement of individuals’ time preferences.  Although 
time preference has been the subject of extensive study, there is still a lack of consensus over the most 
valid and reliable method of measuring this construct.  The Kenya and Malawi studies both assess 
respondents’ discount rates by asking them to choose between a series of hypothetical smaller, sooner 
and larger, later prizes.  Although many studies use this approach, the extent to which it produces 
accurate estimates of individuals’ discount rates is still open to debate and suggests caution in 
interpreting study results.  A review of over 80 peer-reviewed studies which elicited individuals’ discount 
rates using a variety of procedures, including the one used in the Kenya and Malawi studies, found little 
consistency across studies, with estimates ranging from -6% annually to infinity  (Frederick et al., 2002).   
This variation may be due to a number of factors.  The specific questions and procedures used to elicit 
discount rates could influence respondents’ answers, producing biased estimates.  These features 
include the size of the rewards offered; the number and order of the questions; the length of time 
separating the rewards; anchoring effects, in which the first question influences answers to subsequent 
questions; or magnitude effects, which describes the tendency of individuals to discount smaller 
outcomes more than larger ones  (Frederick et al., 2002; Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, & Weber, 2013).  
Another possibility is that individuals’ responses to questions used to elicit discount rates are influenced 
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by unrelated constructs which bias estimates.  For example, individuals could prefer immediate rewards 
over delayed rewards because they have greater risk aversion or uncertainty about the future  
(Frederick et al., 2002).  There is unique concern about measuring time preferences in low-resource 
settings, where individuals may prefer immediate rewards because they do not trust that the delayed 
reward will be delivered or due to temporary economic needs.  There is also debate over whether time 
preferences are domain specific, such that estimating discount rates using hypothetical monetary prizes, 
as was done in this study, may not reflect how individuals discount their future health, suggesting that 
any observed associations between discount rates and health behavior may be somewhat spurious.    
Importantly, the limitations discussed here do not apply to this study only, but also to the 
broader time preference literature.   In response to these concerns, many studies use existing time 
preference measures as a relative, rather than absolute, assessment tool.  Individuals’ responses are 
used to categorize them as having higher or lower discount rates relative to others in the sample, 
without reporting estimated discount rates  (Ashraf et al., 2006).  This strategy was used in the second 
dissertation study of married couples in Malawi.   Actual discount rates were only estimated in the first 
dissertation paper as a means of comparing time preferences in Kenya and Malawi, and to select a 
similar discount rate to divide respondents into “high” and “low” discounting groups.  Doing so allowed 
for the results in the two countries to be somewhat comparable.   As more studies are conducted which 
estimate discount rates in sub-Saharan Africa, a more standardized approach to measuring this 
construct may emerge, increasing confidence in study results.  Concrete steps future studies might 
consider include investigating the validity of existing time preference measures by conducting 
qualitative research on how respondents interpret these questions, or by cross validating economic-
based time preference measures with validated scales of related constructs from psychology, such as 
the Stanford Time Perspective Inventory  (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).  Researchers could also investigate 
whether study results are robust to different methods of measuring time preferences, such as using 
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actual versus hypothetical prizes, or by observing real world behaviors relevant to low-resource settings, 
such as household investments in farming equipment or children’s education, or membership in 
collective savings groups.   
The preceding discussion may be relevant to why respondents in Kenya had significantly higher 
discount rates than respondents in Malawi.  It is possible that this difference accurately represents 
discount rates in the two underlying populations.  Cross-national variation in discount rates has been 
previously observed in a study of time preferences in 53 countries.  Study authors hypothesized that 
these differences were due to cultural factors, such as whether daily life is fast or slow-paced  (Wang, 
Rieger, & Hens, 2016).  It is also possible, however, that the higher discount rates observed in Kenya 
were due to different questions being used to assess time preferences in the two countries.  Because 
different questions can bias estimated discount rates upward or downward, cross study comparisons 
should be interpreted with caution unless the same time preference measures are used.  As more is 
learned about the determinants of time preferences, it may be possible in the future to discern whether 
observed differences in discount rates in Kenya and Malawi are real or an artifact of the different 
measures used. 
A third limitation is that the study had limited statistical power to detect differences in HIV risk 
behavior among individuals with “high” versus “low” discount rates.  This lack of power was due to the 
distribution of responses to the Malawi and Kenya time preference questions and to the relatively low 
prevalence of some risk behaviors in the study samples.   In the first dissertation study, the Malawi and 
Kenya time preference variables were dichotomized using similar cut-points in order to be able to 
broadly compare results across the two countries.  In Kenya, 55% of respondents were in the highest 
discount rate category measured, while in Malawi most respondents were clustered in three of ten 
categories in the middle of the distribution.  Lining up these distributions based on their estimated 
discount rates suggested selecting a cut-point in which only 15% of respondents in Malawi were 
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categorized as having “high” discount rates, while the remaining 85% had “low” discount rates.  The 
unevenly sized categories reduced statistical power due to a smaller number of cases in the “high” 
discount rate category; limited the ability to conduct tests of moderation among women, who as a 
group reported low levels of risk behavior; and produced large confidence intervals for some study 
estimates.   In the second dissertation study, an alternate cut-point for dichotomizing the Malawi time 
preference variable was selected which most evenly divided respondents into “high” and “low” 
discounting groups.  This change made it possible to conduct dyadic analysis on husband and wife pairs.  
The tradeoff, however, was a more limited ability to compare results across the two dissertation studies.   
In the future, pilot testing time preference measures in the study population might assist in developing 
measures that more evenly distribute respondents across response categories, increasing statistical 
power and possibly supporting a categorical measure of time preference.  Such a measure could yield a 
more nuanced understanding of how time preference affects risk behavior than is provided by a 
dichotomous measure.   
6.3 Implications 
The study had several implications for research and practice.  First, despite the limitations in 
measuring individuals’ time preferences discussed earlier, this dissertation provides tentative support 
for the feasibility of using survey-based questions to elicit discount rates in a low-resource setting, and 
of using that information to explain variation in HIV risk behavior.  Few past studies have measured 
respondents’ time preferences in these settings, although there are several notable exceptions from 
Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (Ashraf et al., 2006; Godoy, Kirby, & Wilkie, 2001; Handa, 
Martorano, Halpern, Pettifor, & Thirumurthy, 2016; Holden, Shiferaw, & Wik, 1998; Klemick & Yesuf, 
2008; Tanaka, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010; Thirumurthy et al., 2015).  Second, the study demonstrated 
the feasibility of conducting dyadic analysis to better understand how spouses influence on another’s 
health behavior.  Other studies have used this analysis to study health behavior in married couples in 
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sub-Saharan Africa, but this approach remains underutilized.  Dyadic analysis can potentially provide 
more information about the influence of others on risk behavior than can standard logistic regression, 
but it is also easier to implement than social network analysis, potentially providing researchers with a 
useful stepping stone to more complex studies in the future.  Third, the study provided information 
about which theoretical framework may be the most useful for guiding future research related to time 
preference.  Of the three perspectives examined, there was the most empirical support for the 
traditional economic perspective, which suggests that individuals have constant discount rates that 
influence HIV risk behavior, as well as the perspective based on interdependence theory, which 
emphasizes the influence of spouses on HIV risk behavior.  There was less support for the behavioral 
economic perspective which assumes that individuals have time-inconsistent discount rates and that HIV 
risk behavior is due to self-control problems.  Relatedly, the study also demonstrated that time 
preferences can have both direct and indirect effects on HIV risk behavior, through its effect on 
relationship quality and the ability of spouses to cooperate.   Additional research on these and other 
pathways linking time preferences and risk behavior may lead to the development of more complex 
models depicting this relationship in the future.   
This study also had several practical implications.  Measuring individuals’ time preferences could 
enable programs to identify individuals and couples who may be more likely to engage in HIV risk 
behavior and who may need additional support in adopting safer practices.  This type of assessment 
could be especially useful in cases where individuals are likely to underreport risk behavior.  The extent 
to which individuals can be encouraged to adopt a more future-oriented outlook is debatable.  Some 
researchers view time preference as being a relatively fixed personality trait (Golsteyn et al., 2014; Amy 
L. Odum, 2011; Vanderveldt et al., 2016), while others suggest that education and other measures can 
bring about greater concern for future outcomes (G. S. Becker & Mulligan, 1997).  Several promising 
interventions do not aim to change individuals’ time preferences, but rather use financial incentives to 
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encourage them to change their behavior.  Because individuals with high discount rates are more 
responsive to immediate rewards, providing them with a tangible payoff in the present may be more 
motivating than emphasizing the future benefits of being healthy.   The development of these types of 





APPENDIX A: TIME PREFERENCE MEASURES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 
Time preference measures converted to USD 
Table 36 and Table 37 list the Kenya and Malawi time preference questions with the prizes 
converted to U.S. dollars (USD) for easier interpretation.  Exchange rates were based on the years in 
which the surveys were administered, 2013 in Kenya and 2006 in Malawi. The Malawi prize amounts 
were larger than in Kenya, although these exchange rates do not reflect relative purchasing power in 
each country.  Future studies could use purchasing power parity (ppp) to compare currencies.  
Table 36.  Kenya Time Preference Measures Converted to USD 
Panel A.  Time Preference in the Near Term 
Suppose that you have just won a prize that will give you a series 
of payments over time.  You can select the prize from two 
options.  Please indicate your preferred prize.  Imagine that the 
person giving you the money is someone you trust.  Do you 
prefer: 
Prizes converted to $USD 
100 Shillings today or 125 Shillings in one month $1.14 today or $1.42 in one month 
100 Shillings today or 150 Shillings in one month $1.14 today or $1.71 in one month 
100 Shillings today or 175 Shillings in one month $1.14 today or $1.99 in one month 
100 shillings today or 200 shillings in one month $1.14 today or $2.28 in one month 
100 Shillings today or 300 Shillings in one month $1.14 today or $3.41 in one month 
100 Shillings today or 400 Shillings in one month $1.14 today or $4.55 in one month 
Panel B.  Time Preference in the Far Term (Measure of time preference used in the analysis) 
Please indicate your preferred prize.  Imagine that the person 
giving you the money is someone you trust. 
Prizes converted to $USD 
100 Shillings in one month or 125 Shillings in two months $1.14 in one month or $1.42 in two months 
100 Shillings in one month or 150 Shillings in two months $1.14 in one month or $1.71 in two months 
100 Shillings in one month or 175 Shillings in two months $1.14 in one month or $1.99 in two months 
100 shillings in one month or 200 shillings in two months $1.14 in one month or $2.28 in two months 
100 Shillings in one month or 300 Shillings in two months $1.14 in one month or $3.41 in two months 




Table 37.  Malawi Time Preference Measures Converted to USD 
Panel A.  Time Preference in the Near Term 
Series 1:  The next few questions are about receiving money now 
as compared to receiving money later.  Would you prefer: 
Prizes converted to $USD 
780 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 5 months? $5.74 now or $5.88 in 5 months? 
800 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 5 months? $5.88 now or $6.25 in 5 months? 
670 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 4 months? $4.93 now or $5.51 in 4 months? 
690 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 3 months? $5.07 now or $6.25 in 3 months? 
550 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 2 months? $4.04 now or $5.51 in 2 months? 
540 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 1 month? $3.97 now or $5.88 in 1 month? 
410 Kwacha now or 750 Kwacha in 3 weeks? $3.01 now or $5.51 in 3 weeks? 
330 Kwacha now or 800 Kwacha in 2 weeks? $2.43 now or $5.88 in 2 weeks? 
310 Kwacha now or 850 Kwacha in 1 week? $2.28 now or $6.25 in 1 week? 
Panel B.  Time Preference in the Far Term (Measure of time preference used in the analysis) 
Next, I am going to ask you the same questions again, with one 
important difference. I will no longer ask you about receiving 
money now compared with receiving money later. Instead, I will 
ask you about receiving money 2 months from now compared 
with receiving money at a time more than 2 months from now.  
Would you prefer? 
Prizes converted to $USD 
780 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 7 months? $5.74 in 2 months or $5.88 in 7 months? 
800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 7 months? $5.88 in 2 months or $6.25 in 7 months? 
670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 6 months? $4.93 in 2 months or $5.51 in 6 months? 
690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 5 months? $5.07 in 2 months or $6.25 in 5 months? 
550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 4 months? $4.04 in 2 months or $5.51 in 4 months? 
540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 3 months? $3.97 in 2 months or $5.88 in 3 months? 
410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 Kwacha in 2 months plus 3 
weeks? 
$3.01 in 2 months or $5.51 in 2 months plus 3 
weeks? 
330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 Kwacha in 2 months plus 2 
weeks? 
$2.43 in 2 months or $5.88 in 2 months plus 2 
weeks? 
310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 Kwacha in 2 months plus 1 
week? 






Distribution of responses to the time preference questions 
The Kenya and Malawi surveys measured respondents’ time preferences in two time frames, the 
near term and the far term.  Within each time frame, the Kenya survey asked respondents six time 
preference questions, allowing respondents to be sorted into seven categories.  The Malawi survey 
asked respondents nine questions, allowing respondents to be sorted into ten categories.  These 
questions are shown in Table 36 and Table 37, respectively.   Response categories in both countries 
were based on the range respondents’ discount rates were estimated to fall.  These ranges were 
unevenly sized and differed between the two countries due to different questions being used to assess 
time preferences. 
The distribution of responses is listed in Table 38 and Table 39, and illustrated in Figure 26 and 
Figure 27.  The bars represent the percentage of the sample whose implied discount rates fall within the 
ranges shown in the x-axis.  For example, nearly 20% respondents in Malawi had discount rates in the 
1000% to 2200% range.   Discount rates rise moving from left to right across the chart.  An upper bound 
discount rate of 6000% is shown in the figures for convenience.   
The upper and lower bound for each discount rate category discount rates associated with each 
group were then calculated using the formula described by Laibson (Laibson, 2010; Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981):    
ρ = -ln δ = (1/t)ln[X/Y]     (1) 
where ρ is the discount rate, δ is the discount factor, X is the amount of the smaller prize, Y is the 
amount of the larger prize, t is the length of delay between the two prizes in years.   The values used for 
the smaller and larger prizes in this equation were the values from the particular time preference 
question in which respondents switched from preferring the smaller, sooner prize to the larger, later 
prize, or vice versa.  This point identifies the range in which respondents’ indifference point is likely to 
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fall, which is the amount of money they would need to be offered after a short delay for them to be 
indifferent between the smaller, sooner and larger, later prize.   
Time preference variable construction for paper 1 
In Kenya, as shown in Figure 26, 55% of respondents were in the highest discount rate category 
represented by the large bar on the far right of the chart.  Respondents in this group were categorized 
as having “high” discount rates, and the other 45% of respondents had “low” discount rates.   The cut-
point was the equivalent of having a discount rate of 1663%, represented as the dotted line in Figure 26.  
The resulting dichotomous variable is shown in simplified form in Figure 28. 
In Malawi, high discounting was defined as having an annual discount rate of 2303% per year or 
greater, represented by the dotted line in Figure 27.  2303% was the closest cut point to the 1663% used 
in Kenya, creating a somewhat comparable time preference variable.  2303% also appears to form a 
natural break in the data, which separates respondents who had the highest discount rates from the 
three large groups in the middle of the distribution that represent 72% of all respondents.  The 
simplified version of the Malawi time preference variable is shown in Figure 29.   One drawback of using 
this cut point, however, was that only 15% of respondents were categorized as being high discounters, 
which resulted in low power and small cell sizes when interacting time preference with other variables.    
The concentration of respondents in the highest discount rate group in Kenya suggests that 
future studies might include survey questions that allow researchers to differentiate between 
respondents with discount rates above 5245%.  In Malawi, it appears that less granular categories would 
be more appropriate for discount rates below 200%, but more detail is needed in the middle range 
between 200% and 2300%.  Pilot testing time preference measures might increase the chance of getting 
a more even distribution of respondents across response categories.  
Consistent with some past studies, the far term discount rate measure was interpreted as 
representing respondents’ “true” time preferences, and was used as the primary predictor variable in 
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the study analysis  (Ashraf et al., 2006).  The near term measure was used to assess whether individuals 
displayed inconsistent discounting (i.e., present bias.)  If respondents’ discount rates were “low” in the 
far term, but “high” in the near term, they were categorized as demonstrating inconsistent discounting.  
Inconsistent discounting was defined as a dichotomous variable.  The reference was having consistently 
“low” discount rates in both the near and far term.  The cross tabulations used to determine if 
individuals displayed inconsistent discounting are shown in Table 40 and Table 41. 
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Annual Discount Rate (%)
1663% 
High Discount Rate (55%) 
Low Discount Rate <------------------------------------------>High Discount Rate 
Figure 26.  Distribution of Responses to Kenya Time Preference Questions (1 Month Vs. 2 Months).   
X-axis show the discount rates associated with each response category.  55% of respondents in Kenya 
were categorized as having “high discount rates” using a cut point corresponding to a discount rate of 




Table 38.  Numbers and Percentage of Respondents in Each Time Preference Category in Kenya (1 month 
vs. 2 months) 
 Smallest prize in one month 
respondents are willing to accept 
(in bold).  Prizes are in Kenyan 
Shillings. 
Implied Discount 
Rate Range N % 





100 today or 125 in one month 








 100 today or 150 in one month  268 to 487% 168 9% 
 100 today or 175 in one month 487 to 672% 73 4% 
 100 today or 200 in one month 672 to 832% 223 12% 
 100 today or 300 in one month 832 to 1318% 179 9% 
 100 today or 400 in one month 1318 to 1663% 138 7% 
Highest Discount 
Rate 
100 today or 400 in one month 
(always prefers smaller, sooner 
prize) >1663% 1041 55% 
“High Discount Rate” 
(N=1041, 55%) 
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Annual Discount Rate (%)
Low Discount Rate <--------------------------------------->High Discount Rate 
2303% 
“High Discount Rate” (15%) 
 
Figure 27.  Distribution of Responses to Malawi Time Preference Questions.   15% of Respondents Were 
Categorized as Having “High Discount Rates” Using a Cut Point Corresponding to a Discount Rate of 
2303%, Illustrated by the Dotted Line. 
 
185 
Table 39.  Number and Percentage of Respondents in Each Time Preference Category in Malawi (2 month 
vs. 2+ months) 
 Smallest prize in two months 
respondents are willing to accept 
(in bold).   
Implied Discount 
Rate Range N % 





780 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 
Kwacha in 7 months 










 800 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 
Kwacha in 7 months 6 to 15% 21 1% 
 670 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 
Kwacha in 6 months 15 to 34% 40 1% 
 690 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 
Kwacha in 5 months 34 to 85% 91 3% 
 550 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 
Kwacha in 4 months 85 to 186% 160 5% 
 540 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 
Kwacha in 3 months 186 to 472% 688 23% 
 410 Kwacha in 2 months or 750 
Kwacha in 2 months plus 3 weeks 472 to 1047% 891 29% 
 330 Kwacha in 2 months or 800 
Kwacha in 2 months plus 2 weeks 1047 to 2302% 598 20% 
 310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 
Kwacha in 2 months plus 1 week 2303 to 5245% 79 3% 




310 Kwacha in 2 months or 850 
Kwacha in 2 months plus 1 week 
(always prefers smaller, sooner 
prize) >5245% 373 12% 






Figure 28.  Percentage of Respondents Who Have “High” and “Low” Discount Rates in in Kenya (1 month 
vs. 2 months):  Dichotomous Measure 
 
 
Figure 29.  Percentage of Respondents Who Have “High” and “Low” Discount Rates in Malawi (1 month 
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Table 40.  Number and Percentage of Respondents Who had “High Discount Rates” and Demonstrated 
“Inconsistent Discounting”:  Men, Ages 25 to 49 Years, in Kenya and Malawi. 
a. Men in Kenya, Ages 25 to 49 Years 
 
 
b. Men in Malawi, Ages 25 to 49 Years 
  Discount rate in the far term* 










Discount rate in the near 
term (now vs. 1 month) 
Low Discount 
Rate 
532 13 545 
74% 2% 76% 
High Discount 
Rate 
56 118 174 
8% 16% 24% 
 Total 
588 131 719 
 82% 18% 100% 
*Measure of time preference used in the regression models; assumed to represent individuals’ “true” 
time preference 
  
  Discount rate in the far term* 










Discount rate in the near 
term (now vs. 1 month) 
Low Discount 
Rate 
675 91 766 
36% 5% 41% 
High Discount 
Rate 
174 950 1,124 
9% 50% 59% 
 Total 
849 1,041 1,890 
 45% 55% 100% 
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Table 41.  Number and Percentage of Respondents Who had “High Discount Rates” and Demonstrated 
“Inconsistent Discounting,” by Sex in Malawi 
a. Men and Women in Malawi, Ages 15 to 64 Years 
  Discount rate in the far term* 










Discount rate in the near 
term (now vs. 1 month) 
Low Discount 
Rate 
2,443 65 2,508 
80% 2% 82% 
High Discount 
Rate 
156 390 546 
5% 13% 18% 
 Total 
2,599 455 3,054 
 85% 15% 100% 
 
b. Women in Malawi, Ages 15 to 64 
  Discount rate in the far term* 










Discount rate in the near 
term (now vs. 1 month) 
Low Discount 
Rate 
1,411 39 1,450 
84% 2% 86% 
High Discount 
Rate 
65 173 238 
4% 10% 14% 
 Total 
1,476 212 1,688 
 87% 13% 100% 
 
c. Men in Malawi, Ages 15 to 64 Years  
  Discount rate in the far term* 










Discount rate in the near 
term (now vs. 1 month) 
Low Discount 
Rate 
1,032 26 1,058 
76% 2% 77% 
High Discount 
Rate 
91 217 308 
7% 16% 23% 
 Total 
1,123 243 1,366 
 82% 18% 100% 





Time preference variable construction for paper 2 
The Malawi time preference variable in paper 2 was measured using the same questions as in 
paper 1, shown in Table 39.  The only difference is that a different cut-point was used to categorize 
respondents as having “high” or “low” discount rates.   In paper 2, a cut-point was selected that most 
evenly divided respondents into two groups.  This point was equivalent to having a discount rate of 
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Figure 30.  Percentage of Respondents Who Have “High” and “Low” 
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